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ABSTRACT

RECEPTIVITY-ADAPTABILITY: A DYNAMIC MODEL OF
INFORMATION RECEPTIVITY IN PROBLEM SOLVING
By

Kenneth A. Beattie, B.A., M. Ed.
Jeffrey

Chairman:

,

Stanford University

Eiseman

W.

The concept of an individual adapting his receptivity
to information to problem-solving circumstances is introduced

and labelled receptivity- adaptability (R-A)

In providing a

.

conceptual framework to explain the dynamics underlying

receptivity-adaptability,
works of Adorno, et

a_l.

a

literature review begins with the

(1950)

on the Authoritarian Personality

and Rokeach (1960) on the Open and Closed Mind and then proceeds
to a discussion of the nature of a basic antinomy between

openness to information calling for

a

change in one's percep-

tions of the environment and a desire to preserve already

existing views and attitudes of the environment.

Several

theories supporting the functionality of the "open" and "closed
sides of the antinomy are reviewed in this discussion.
means by
The concept of a cognitive structure as the
the environment
which an individual organizes his perceptions of
of this structure
is then developed and the characteristics
et ad.
as viewed by Ausubel, Bruner, Harvey,

Piaget, Rokeach, and Berlyne are compared.

,

Schroder, et al

.

Three characteristics

of cognitive structures are distilled from this review:

comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration.

The

concept of an individual's receptivity-adaptability (R-A)

profile is developed in more detail.

First, patterns of

receptivity to information are described in terms of

(1)

of receptivity and (2) category accessibility rules.

problem situations are described in terms of

(1)

scope

Second,

factors con-

tributing to the potential arousal level of an individual and
(2)

factors contributing to the information input complexity

of the situation.

The relationships between these problem

situation characteristics and the three characteristics of
cognitive structure are examined in

which provides

a

a

conceptual discussion

framework for explaining the dynamics under-

lying individual differences in R-A profiles.

An empirical study conducted to investigate the hypotheses
that (1)

individuals change their patterns of receptivity as

problem situations change and

(2)

that

r eceptivity-

adaptability

is related to intolerance of ambiguity and to cognitive com-

plexity is then described and its results presented.
The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the

educational and research implications of the conceptual frame-

work and the empirical study.

A GRADUATE STUDENT’S SOLILOQUY

,

To imply or to infer, that is the confusion.
Whether tis nobler to be illuminating in one's
thoughts as is the sunshine of day, or to be
confounding in one's mental tribulations as is
the valley fog of early morn'
'

Me thinks it presumptuous, if not sumptuously
presumptuous, that me thinks me thinks aught of
value or intellectual coinage for the practical
mind of the impractical man. Me thinks, you thinks,
they thinks.
'Tis doubtless more a fool's folly
than ice cream, you scream, we all scream for I
scream.
But anon!
A chapter awaits.
This hand, this
mind, pax vobiscum, this curmudgeonly soul must
needs be productively engaged forthwith lest my
marriage and my life's degree be left f orthwi thout
Poor Dum Dum!
But, alas, poor Yorick!

Humblet
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III, iv
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
Perhaps man should heed the plight of the mosquito.
Few, if any, of Man's adversaries have been as successful as
the mosquito in overcoming the situational obstacles placed
in the course of his existence as pest and sometime deadly

enemy to Man.

Despite the ingenuity of Man's methods of eradi-

cating the mosquito, it always has survived
adapting to the new circumstances.

-

survived by

Man also has had an

enviable record for overcoming the obstacles he has faced in
his short history.

He, like the mosquito, has owed his success

to his adaptability.

The mosquito's adaptability is an outgrowth of the

rapidity with which the process of random mutation supplies
the species with resistance to the new pesticide or other

change that has been introduced into his environment.

Man

owes his adaptability to different species characteristics.

His adaptability has been an outgrowth of his ability to

manipulate factors in his environment, or this solution
failing, to change his behavior patterns voluntarily to fit
the situation in which he has found himself.

Standard Oil of New Jersey (whose way of adapting to

environmental changes has been to change its name to Exxon)
believes it has finally come up with an obstacle to place in
1

2

the mosquito

'

environment to which the mosquito will not be

s

able to adapt.

Many writers on ecology, technology, and

sociology believe man may have also come up with obstacles to

which he himself will not be able to adapt.
(and present)

Man's earlier

failures to appreciate and respect the complica-

ted network of ecological interrelationships of which he is

part threatens his existence on one side.

dependence on

a

a

His ever-increasing

technology that threatens to become too special-

ized and elaborate for him to control presses on him from

another side.

And the intricacies of his social relation-

ships produce larger and larger problems that threaten to de-

stroy his species from within.

There is no easy way to

characterize the nature of all the obstacles, but there

characteristic common to the all: complexity

.

is

a

Through the

process of adapting his environment to his immediate needs
Man has triggered such rapid and complex change in his en-

vironment that the key to his surviving these problems
ability to adapt even more rapidly and on

a

is an

more massive scale.

It is at this point that the potential role of educa-

tion becomes crucial.

I

believe that

a

major function of

education should be to aid society to adapt to changing ciicumstances (Many aspects and implications of this belief are

delineated in Eiseman, 1969).

Given the context of Man's

existence described above, this function could most appio
effective
priately be carried out by preparing individuals to be

problem-solvers in

a

highly complex world.

A great deal of

3

the effort of some educators has been devoted to this
goal, but
a flaw in their

effort has been their failure to deal with that

aspect of problem solving which concerns the appropriateness
of an individual's receptivity to available information.

That

this is a crucial aspect of problem solving becomes apparent as we

examine the present context of Man's existence.
This context is made up of two related components.

first of these is the socio-his toric context.

characterized by five general tendencies

I

Briefly, it is

believe are present

or evolving in men's relations with other men

elements of their environment.

The

and with other

The five are:

1.

Movement toward ever-increasing specialization
of function resulting in greater and greater
interdependence among men, and a concomitant increase in the complexity of social events.

2.

Partly as a consequence of the above tendency,
an increase in the number of serious conflict
situations faced by men- -conflict situations
which frequently have at their heart attitudinal or ideological components.

3.

As the problems faced by men become more technical, an increase in the degree to which generalists in decision-making roles must rely on the
advice given them by specialists who, because of
their widely separated areas of expertise and
differing perspectives on the given problem, may
make recommendations which conflict.

4.

5.

An increase in mass participation in decisionmaking due partially to the growth of mass
communications technology and partially to the
character of the dominant political philosophies
of the present.

An increase in the rate of social, technological
and environmental change necessitating ever more
rapid adaptation of men's behaviors to compensate
for the changes.

4
•

Problems that arise in the context of these socio-

historic tendencies are likely to put
change of information between people.

a

premium on the exThis rise in depen-

dence on social sources of information creates two diffi-

culties for the p r ob 1 em- s o 1 ve r involving his receptivity to
information.

First, the use of other people as sources of

information often complicates

a

problem-solving situation

by introducing a concern with information about the social

sources themselves in addition to his concern with the problem-

relevant information they offer.

Should the problem- solver

be equally or differentially receptive to information from

different social sources?

In making this decision,

to what

sorts of information about the sources should he be recep-

tive (i.e., allow to influence him)?
The other difficulty accompanying dependence on social

sources or information is the ease with which the amount of

revelant and irrelevant information can increase to

a

point

that surpasses the information-processing capacities of the

problem- solver

.

Can he avoid an information overload by

closing out, or ignoring irrelevant or less important information and attending only to relevant or crucial information?

Unfortunately,

a

partial answer to these questions comes

from a second component of the context of human activity.
This second component involves the susceptibility of most

individuals to several behavioral propensities

influence their receptivity to information.

propensities include:

I

believe

These behavioral

5

1.

Resis tence to changes requiring new
behavior patterns and low receptivity
to information urging or supporting
such changes.

2.

Low receptivity to information from
other persons having attitudes, beliefs,
and behavior patterns differing significantly from their own.

3.

A capacity for disregarding and/or misperceiving available and potentially
valuable information, especially that
which counters currently held beliefs,
attitudes and expectations.

4.

Difficulty focusing upon relevant information available from the total
conglomerate of relevant and irrelevant
information present in the problem-solving
situation

5.

Difficulty ignoring relevant but less
crucial information when exigencies of
the situation demand focusing upon a narrow
range of information.

When these human propensities regarding receptivity to

information are combined with the socio-histor ic conditions
outlined earlier, they greatly exacerbate the difficulties

encountered by Man as he attempts to solve the complex problems
he faces in adapting to his changing environment.

one hand, he must avoid being too closed:

For on the

he must be recep-

tive to information that contradicts his previously held

views or that comes from unexpected sources; he must be able
to evaluate the information and its source on their separate

merits and be only minimally biased by his own values; he must
be able to ferret out important information hidden among hosts

of irrelevancies or recognize it even when it is distorted by

the heat of emotion; and he must be able to foresee the long-

6

term consequences that may be wrought by the
complex interactions of present events.
Yet on the other hand, he must
avoid being too open; he must be able to close out

the caco-

phony of irrelevant information that can so easily
overwhelm
his limited information processing capacities; and
when the

situation requires it, he must ignore the relevant-but-not
crucial information and focus only upon crucial information.
To cope with both sets of needs,

I

believe men must attempt

to match their receptivity to information to the characteristics

of the problem-solving situations they encounter. Some indi-

viduals achieve more successful matches than others.

It is

this unequal distribution of the ability to adapt one's recep-

tivity to information to the characteristics of the problem-

solving situation that leads me to look for the factors that
influence the growth of this ability in an individual.

My

hope is that some of the factors are susceptible to manipu-

lation by educators.

If this can be demonstrated, schools

may someday be able to improve

a

person's ability to adapt his

receptivity to information to the characteristics of the situations he faces and thereby increase his problem-solving ability.
It should be apparent that an individual's having an

appropriate degree of receptivity to available information is
but one aspect of successful problem solving.

Problem solving

in its broadest sense has been the concern of enlightened

educators at least since the early writings of John Dewey.

Occupying such

a

position of central concern for such

a

long

7

period it has not failed to attract its share of
talented
scientists to probe the intricacies of its functioning.

Among others, Piaget (Flavel, 1963), Bruner (Bruner,
Olver
Greenfield, £t al.

,

1966)

and Ausubel

(Ausubel, 1963, 1969,

Anderson and Ausubel, 1965) have studied it from the perspective of the cognitivist while Skinner (Skinner, 1957),

Berlyne (Berlyne, 1965), and Maltzman (e.g., in Anderson and
Ausubel, 1965) have looked at it through the eyes of the

learning theorist.
As indicated above, my specific concern is with an

individual's receptivity to information, that is, with the
factors that influence the match between his receptivity
and the characteristics of the problem-solving contexts in

which he functions and this aspect requires attention to
more than the intelligent, rational functioning of an
individual.

It also requires attention to the role of factors

in the affective realm -- attitudes, values, and commitments,

anxieties, and emotions.
also have been

a

These aspects of human behavior

major concern of social scientists and

educators for a long time and have drawn their share of

investigators, primarily social psychologists.

experiments and writings of Festinger (1952)

,

The

Heider (1946)

Osgood and Tannenbaum (1957), Rosenberg (1956, 1960, 1965),
and others just begin the list of those who have been

concerned with the role of attitudes, values, etc. on
perception, memory, learning, and other aspects of

8

problem-solving behavior.

The work of these social

psychologists and the psychologists concerned more directly
with cognitive functioning furnishes a solid base to
build

upon; and it is by drawing together some of the theories
and findings of these two groups of pyschologists that

I

hope to develop a theoretical framework for investigating
the factors influencing a person’s ability to adapt his

receptivity to situational characteristics.
The study outlined in Chapter V of this proposal is in-

tended to examine a few of the most basic assumptions underlying this theoretical framework and to give some indication of
the heuristic utility of the concept of an individual's

receptivity- adaptability (R-A) profile

.

In characterizing the concept of an R-A profile it is

necessary to relate two sets of factors:

(1)

the nature of

the individual's receptivity to information in a given

problem-solving situation and

(2)

the nature of the receptivity

called for by the characteristics of the problem-solving

situation itself.

I

begin here by discussing the former of the

two aspects of the R-A profile.

One can imagine a receptivity to information dimension

running from low to high.

A person high on this dimension

would be highly receptive to any information available,

whether it was in the form of written arguments for different
sides of a salient issue, irrelevant comments overheard from
a

nearby conversation, or subtle changes in the background

9

noises present in the setting in which he finds himself.
By contrast, a person low on this dimension would be
essentially

unreceptive to available information as

a

result of either

actively avoiding or just not perceiving information that pertained to the conditions and problems surrounding him.

example of the latter case might be

reveries about last night's date.

a

An

secretary deep in

Somewhere between very

high receptivity and very low receptivity would be the cases
of the moderately receptive person who is actively seeking

information about all aspects of

a

salient issue regardless

of the viewpoint but at the same time completely unaware of

other events taking place around him, and the moderately un-

receptive person who is quite receptive to information about
new aspects of a salient issue only as long as this new

information does not contradict his presently held attitudes

concerning the issue.
In addition to its being possible to characterize an in-

dividual's receptivity to information along

a

dimension, it is also possible to characterize

low-to-high
a

situation

as calling for a particular receptivity somewhere along the

low-to-high dimension.

One situation may require a person to

be very receptive while another situation may require this

same individual to be relatively unreceptive.

prior to making

a

For example,

major foreign policy decision regarding the

distribution of foreign aid the situation calls for

a

high

degree of receptivity to information ranging all the way from the

10

likely short-term reaction of the domestic electorate, through
the impact of the aid program on the stability of a number of

crucial international alliances, to the long-term impact of

possible cultural and societal changes that might result
from alterations in the economic structure of recipient nations.
On the other hand, faced with a sudden crisis calling for

immediate action, it would be highly disfunctional for
leader to consider too wide

a

a

range of alternative solutions,

thereby diminishing the amount of attention he could devote
to any one.

Such

a

situation calls for only moderate recep-

tivity to available information.
a

decision regarding

a

Furthermore, having made

course of action,

tivity may become most appropriate.

a

very low recep-

By ignoring all infor-

mation regarding what might have been done, and even information
regarding the quality and wisdom of the decision made, all
of the individual's energy and attention can be devoted to

seeing that everything possible is done to carry out the

elected course of action successfully.
or high receptivity to,

Overconcern with,

information regarding the advantages

of a foregone course of action often reduces the likelihood
of success of the chosen course by causing vacillation and

equivocation.

Assuming the possibility of placing both individuals
and problem-solving situations along the dimension of low-to-

high receptivity, it then becomes feasible to characterize

individual's abilities to adapt their receptivity to the re-
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quircmcnts of the situation.
placing an individual in

The strategy becomes one of

number of problem-solving situa-

a

tions requiring different degrees of receptivity and deter-

mining the extent to which his own receptivity matches that

required by the characteristics of the various problemsolving situations.

The hypothetical construct used to

describe the extent of this match

receptivity-adaptability profile.

I

have designated the
The word profile is used

to indicate that receptivity- adaptability is probably a

multi- dimensional trait even though in this first chapter it
has been treated as a uni-dimensional trait.

This point and others regarding the hypothetical nature
of receptivity- adaptability and its underlying dynamics will be

discussed in Chapter IV when

a

conceptual framework is de-

In Chapter V,

veloped and presented.
study undertaken to test

a

a

modest empirical

few of the basic hypotheses in-

cluded in the conceptual framework will be described and its
results discussed.

The implications the conceptual framework

and the empirical study might have for future research and
for educational practice are set forth in Chapter VI

.

But

between us and the conceptual framework lies the material

contained in Chapters

II

and III.

This material includes

a

review of work by others, which comprises the base upon

which the conceptual framework is built, and

description of the concept of
profile.

It is

a

a

more extensive

receptivity-adaptability

to this material that we turn now.

CHAPTER

II

A REVIEW OF EARLIER WORK IN RECEPTIVITY TO INFORMATION
The purpose of Chapter II is to review briefly the work
of several social scientists that have influenced the
think-

^^8 presented in the Chapters III and IV.

In

these two chap-

ters a conceptual framework for identifying individual differ-

ences that determine to what extent individuals will have the

ability labelled in the last chapter
is

developed.

r ecept ivl ty-

adaptabi 1 i ty

As mentioned in the first chapter, this con-

ceptual framework will be built in large measure upon the com-

bined works of several social pyschologists who might be characterized as ’’consistency theorists" and several developmental

psychologists who might be characterized as "cognitive theorists."
However, the works of two groups of psychologists who fit neither
of these categories constitute the initial parts of the base

underlying the conceptual framework, and they will be discussed
first.
T.

W.

These two groups of psychologists were those led by

Adorno and Milton Rokeach.

works of Adorno

e_t

al

(1950)

Though at first glance, the

and Rokeach

et_

al

(1960) do not

seem concerned with studying receptivity-adaptability, aspects
of both studies have an important bearing upon the investi-

gation of this ability.

12
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Early Work Bearing on Receptivity-Adaptability:
A Review of Adorno and Rokeach
In their well-known work, The Authoritarian
Personality

,

Adorno and his co-workers were concerned with studying the
nature of prejudice and its relationship to the political

ideology of the prejudiced individual.

Very early in the

course of their study, they discovered that prejudice seemed
to be a general trait rather than a specific and isolated

behavior.

By this, it is meant that a person prejudiced against

one minority group, e.g., Jews, was also very likely to exhibit

prejudice toward members of any other minority groups he might
encounter, e.g., Chinese.

Indeed, Levinson argued that the

prejudiced, or highly ethnocentric, person tends always to

view the social world in terms of an out- group- - ingroup situation in which the outgroup is viewed as less moral, weaker, and

generally inferior to the ingroup of which he is
(Adorno, 1950, pp.

a

member

145-150).

A second finding reported by Adorno,

ejt

al

concerns the

apparent relationship between ethnocentricity and political
ideology.

Specifically, Adorno's group believed that the very

prejudiced person was also likely to be
conservative person

-

a

264-267)

very politically

fascist, in the terminology used in

Adorno's Authoritarian Personality
pp.

a

.

(Adorno, 1950, p.

279,

Although not specifically stated in their work,

much of the discussion pertaining to political ideology, and
indeed, the title of the work itself, make it clear that

Adorno et al. regarded the prejudiced person's attitude

14

toward authority to be a crucial trait
in the personality
syndrome of the prejudiced individual.
Again and again the
authors stress the dependence of the
prejudiced person on
authority, his belief in unquestioned obedience
to authority,
and the right of the superior ingroup to
exercise authority
over the weaker, inferior outgroups.
The importance of Adorno's work for an investigation
of

receptivity- adaptability becomes more clear when the two

phenomena discussed by Adorno, prejudice and authoritarianism,
are presented in terms of patterns of receptivity to information.

Viewed in these terms,

a

major aspect of prejudice can

be regarded as being the selective rejection of information

about certain groups of people when the information

c ontradicts

the stereotype the prejudiced individual attaches to that

group.

The other side of this phenomenon is that the pre-

judiced person will have

a

high receptivity to information

that supports his stereotypes.

Again when viewed in terms of

patterns of receptivity, an important aspect of prejudice is
that a prejudiced individual is likely to have very low recep-

tivity to information from persons he regards as being members
of outgroups, e.g., a prejudiced person who is Caucasian and

lives in

a

predominantly white country

is not

likely to be

as receptive to information from Filippinos or others he

regards as members of inferior minority groups as he is to

information from members of his own race.

Likewise, Adorno's

authoritarian personality, when described from the perspective

15

of patterns of receptivity to
information, becomes an indi-

vidual who is very receptive to
information from social
sources occupying positions of authority
and quite unreceptive to information which goes counter
to the view prescribed
by authority.
Adorno et al^ thus found that

the ''authoritarian

personality" tended to adopt patterns of receptivity
which
were chai acterized by evaluation of information

on the basis

of its valence

(i.e., receptive to pro-atti tudinal information,

unreceptive to counter-attitudinal information) and on
the
basis of its source (i.e., receptive to information

from in-

group sources
sources).

,

unreceptive to information from outgroup

This recasting of Adorno's findings into terms re-

lating to receptivity to information helps highlight the fact
that his work is some of the earliest which investigates, if

only in a limited way, factors which influence the degree to

which individuals have the ability we have labelled receptivityadaptability.
The approach taken by Adorno and his co-workers was to

search for underlying personality characteristics that were

influencing particular aspects of an individual's behavior.

Having identified these personality characteristics, e.g.
repression,

a

power orientation, rigidity, etc., the investi-

gation was extended to include

a

search for the roots of these

personality characteristics in the individual's early family
experiences, especially his relationship with early authority
figures such as father and mother (Adorno, 1950, pp. 473-488).

16

It is their investigation of the early environmental
conditions
to which individuals are exposed and the relationship
between

these and an individual's development which have the greatest
import for our understanding the training conditions which
will result in individuals having differing degrees of re-

ceptivity-adaptability.
The approach taken by Milton Rokeach and his co-workers

departs in an important way from the emphasis placed on the
role of personality by Adorno et al

prejudice and authoritarian ideology.

in their analysis of

Rokeach and his fellow

researchers believed that ideological extremism and attitudes
toward authority, as well as many aspects of cognitive behavior, aesthetic preferences, and even personality traits

themselves, had at their source still more basic individual

characteristics.

In the words of Rokeach, he had set out

"to find a single set of concepts, a single language, that is

equally appropriate to the analysis of personality, ideology,
and cognitive behavior" (Rokeach, 1960, p. 7).

Rokeach contended

that such a set of concepts would have to be concerned with
the structure, rather than the content of individuals' beliefs

and behaviors.

The set of concepts Rokeach

et_

al

developed

in The Open and Closed Mind for analyzing personality, ideo-

logy, and cognitive behavior deal specifically with the

structure of an individual's belief-disbelief system

.

Because

this set of concepts provided the jumping-off-point for

many of the ideas set forth in the conceptual framework
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presented in Chapter IV, they deserve some discussion
here.
According to Rokeach, the individual's belief

-disbelief

system includes beliefs concerned with religion,
politics
science, philosophy, aesthetics, etc., and in fact,
includes:
.every belief and disbelief of every
sort the person may have built up about
the physical and social universe he lives
in.
...we mean it to represent each man's
total framework for understanding his
universe as best he can. (Rokeach, 1960,
.

.

p.

35)

Rokeach uses the term "belief - disbelief system" to highlight
the point that we must investigate the values and attitudes

rejected by the individual as well as those he holds.
more, Rokeach is concerned that

a

Further-

person's disbelief system

not be regarded simply as the mirror image of his belief

system.

He argues that:

...every [belief-disbelief] system is
asymmetrical; it includes on the one
hand a system of beliefs that one
accepts, and on the other, a series
of systems that one rejects.
.The belief system is conceived
to represent all the beliefs, sets,
expectancies, or hypotheses, conscious
that a person at a
and unconscious
given time accepts as true of the
The disbelief
world he lives in.
system is composed of a series of subsystems rather than merely a single
one, and contains all the disbeliefs,
sets, expectancies, conscious and unconscious, that, to one degree or
another, a person at a given time
(Rokeach, 1960, pp.
rejects as false.
•

.

.

,

An illustration of Rokeach

1

s

32-33)

point might be the case of

Catholic who accepts the system of religious beliefs set

a
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down in Church dogma but rejects, to
varying degrees, a
whole series of other religious belief
systems including

Protestantism, Islam, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism,
Agnosticism,
and Atheism.
In discussing the organization of
belief-disbelief

systems, Rokeach identifies three characteristics
or dimensions
of the system's structure.
of -belief s dimension.

The first of these is a similarity-

Rokeach hypothesizes that the individual

rejects each of the systems making up his disbelief system
to the extent that its content is similar to, or different

from, his own belief system.

Accordingly, if

a

schematic

drawing could be made of an individual's belief -disbelief
system, it would show his own belief system at one end of

a

dimension and the most different belief system of which the
individual is aware at the other end.

At intervals between

these two belief systems, others of which the individual is

aware would be placed in order of their similarities to his

belief system.

The extent to which the individual rejected

given system would be indicated by its distance from his

a

own belief system along the dimension (See Figure 2.1).

Similarity- Diss imi lari ty Dimension

Protestantism
Catholicism

I

|

Hinduism

Agnosticism
Zoroastrianism
Atheism
j

Islam

FIGURE 2.1
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Rokeach also assumes that the organization of an individual's belief-disbelief system along the similar ity-dissimilarity dimension will be influenced by three properties of
the system.

As summarized by Rokeach these properties are:

!•

ISOLATION of beliefs or subsystems
of beliefs as evidenced by (a) the
coexistence of logically inconsistent
beliefs within a belief system; (b)
the accentuation of differences and
minimization of similarities between
belief and disbelief systems; and (c)
the denial of existing contradictions
within a system.

2.

DIFFERENTIATION of belief subsystems as
evidenced by (a) relative amount of
knowledge possessed pertaining to a
particular belief or belief system and
(b) the perception of similarity between
adjacent subsystems.

3.

COMPREHENSIVENESS or NARROWNESS of the
system as evidenced by the total number
or range of disbelief subsystems represented within a given belief -disbelief
system (Rokeach, 1960, pp. 35-39).

The second major dimension of belief-disbelief system

organization is the central-peripheral dimension.
subdivides this dimension into three regions.

Rokeach

The Central

Region is composed of "primitive" or "pre- ideological"

beliefs which include beliefs about the ultimate nature of
things, e.g. the nature of physical reality, the nature of the

social world such as the extent to which it is basically

hostile or friendly, the nature of one's individual existence
such as one's orientation in physical space, autonomy, etc.

These central or primitive beliefs are those which

a

person

assumes are held by everyone, those which are regarded as so
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basically obvious to everyone that they are not susceptible
to disconfirmat ion by any authority.

The second of the three

regions, the Intermediate Region, contains an individual’s

beliefs regarding the extent to which he should be guided by
authority.

Ihese intermediate beliefs concern such issues as

whether or not there is such
(human or supernatural)

,

a

thing as absolute authority

whether pronouncements by authority

must be accepted totally or if they should be tempered by an

individual’s own rational reflections, etc.

The third of the

three regions, the Peripheral Region, contains all the indi-

vidual's remaining beliefs about specific aspects of the
world- -whether he has acquired these by his own experience
or from sources he regards as valid authorities.

The issues

covered by peripheral beliefs would range all the way from how
one views government regulation of industry to whether one

believes the Yankee teams of the 1930s

were better than the

Dodger teams of the 1950s.
The third major dimension of belief -disbelief systems

identified by Rokeach is

a time

ranges from broad to narrow.

perspective dimension which

A broad time-perspective is

one in which the past, present, and future are all represented
in the belief system.

A narrow time-perspective is one in

which beliefs are concentrated in either past, present, or
future.

The belief systems of many religious sects and

utopian political movements are examples of narrow timeperspectives in that they are often concentrated on recreating
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a

"golden age" of the past or

future.
in

a

"perfect world" in the

A narrow time-perspective can .also bo concentrated

the present

,

as

in the ease of an individual

who "lives

only for the present" and has no significant beliefs concerning either the past or the future.

The three dimensions of belief -disbelief systems just

discussed

-

the similar ity-dissimilarity dimension, the central-

peripheral dimension, and the narrow-broad time-perspective

dimension

-

arc the basic structural elements which Rokcach

believed underlay an effective analysis of individuals’

personalities, ideologies, cognitive behavior, etc.

In

contrast

to Adorno, Rokeach rejected the idea that a useful way of

categorizing people was according to the content of their
beliefs, e.g., on the basis of whether or not they favored

authoritarian forms of government and social organization.
Rokeach felt that

a

more profound way of categorizing indi-

viduals was according to the structure of their belief -disbelief
systems in terms of the three major dimensions

Categorization based upon

a

lie

had identified.

structural analysis, allowed

Rokeach to group together individuals with very different beliefs on the basis of behavior patterns they had in common.
For example, some extreme political conservatives and some

extreme political radicals are very similar with respect to

certain patterns of behavior they exhibit despite great differences in the content of their ideological beliefs.

On the other

make
hand, this structural analysis also allowed Rokeach to
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important distinctions between members of
the same group,
e.g., communists, on the basis of
fundamental differences in
their behavior patterns despite their holding
common ideological beliefs
(Rokeach, 1960, pp. 109-131). The crucial
factor in predicting an individual's behavior,
argued Rokeach,
was whether or not that person had an open or
closed mind a

condition Rokeacli contended would determine whether an

individual rejected others because they had beliefs that

differed from his own and accepted all those who had similar
beliefs, or whether an individual accepted others who held

beliefs that contradicted his own beliefs.
By casting Rokeach

's

work in terms of receptivity to

information, we can see more clearly the relevance of
Rokeach'

s

ideas and findings to our concern with receptivity-

adaptability.

From this perspective, his studies can be

regarded as an investigation of the effects of the structural

characteristics of an individual's belief -disbelief system
on his dependence upon the similarity of an information source
to his own beliefs in determining whether to accept or reject

information from that source.

Given certain structural charac

teristics-, an individual's belief-disbelief structure should

influence him to be open-minded and receptive to information
counter-

regardless of its valence (i.e., pro-atti tudinal vs

attitudinal) and its source (i.e., those espousing dissimilar

beliefs as well as those espousing similar beliefs)
a

.

Given

different set of structural characteristics, an individual's
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belief-disbelief system should influence him to
be closedminded and receptive only to information
consistent with
his own beliefs or coming from sources which
espouse the same

important beliefs as he does.

These are, of course, only

two polar-types of belief-disbelief system
structures which

represent the opposite poles of

a

continuous dimension.

characteristics which determine the extent to which

a

The

belief-

disbelief system will lead an individual to be open-minded
or closed-minded are summarized by Rokeach in Figure 2.2

which is taken from The Open and Closed Mind

(Rokeach, 1960,

pp.

55-56). Note that Rokeach violates his own rule that it

is

structure rather than content which should be analyzed by

including in his discussion of the central -peripheral continuum
a

concern with content as

a

crucial variable.

In justifying the characterizations given in Figure 2.2,

Rokeach argues that the essence of the distinction between
the open and the closed mind is the inability of the closed-minded

individual to "discriminate substantive information from in-

formation about the source, and to assess the two separately"
(Rokeach, 1960, p.

60).

This leads to the closed-minded person’s

evaluating others on the basis of the similarity of their
beliefs to his own and also to his accepting or rejecting

information on the basis of whether or not the source has the
same value, or belief bias as

lie

does.

Rokeach then draws

from this and other assumptions what he regards as the logical

implications for the nature of open and closed belief systems.
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FIGURE 2.2

A Belief-Disbelief System Is

Open
A.

Closed

to the extent that, with
respect to its organization along
the belief - disbelief continuum,

1.
the magnitude of rejection
1.
the magnitude of rejection of
of disbelief subsystems is reldisbelief subsystems is relatively
atively low at each point along ligh
at each point along the disthe continuum;
belief continuum;
2.
there is communication of
parts within and between belief and disbelief systems;

2.
there is isolation of parts
within and between belief and
disbelief systems;

3.
there is relatively little discrepancy in the degree
of differentiation between
belief and disbelief systems;

there is relatively great
discrepancy in the degree of
differentiation between belief
and disbelief systems;
3.

4.
there is a relatively high 4.
there is relatively
differentiation within the dis- differentiation within little
the disbelief system;
belief system;

B.

to the extent that, with respect to the organization
alone
the central-peripheral dimension,

1the specific content of
primitive beliefs (central
region) is to the effect that
the world one lives in, or the
situation one is in at a particular moment, is a friendly

one

the specific content of primitive beliefs (central region) is
to the effect that the world one
lives in, or the situation one
is in at a particular moment, is
a threatening one;
1-

2.
the formal content of be2.
the formal content of beliefs
liefs about authority and about about authority and about people
people who hold to systems of
who hold to systems of authority
authority (intermediate region) (intermediate region) is to the
is to the effect that authority effect that authority is absolute
is not absolute and that people and that people are to be accepted
are not to be evaluated (if
and rejected according to their
they are to be evaluated at all) agreement or disagreement with
according to their agreement or such authority;
disagreement with such author-

ity;
3.

the structure of beliefs

3.

the structure of beliefs and
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FIGURE 2.2 (Continued)
and disbeliefs perceived to
emanate from authority (peripheral region) is such that
its substructures are in relative communication with each
other, and finally;

disbeliefs perceived to emanate from authority (peripheral
region) is such that its substructures are in relative isolation
with each other, and finally;

to the extent that, with respect to the
time-perspective
dimension, there is a
C.

1.
relatively broad timeperspective
.

relatively narrow, futureoriented time perspective.
1.

The arguments offered by Rokeach in making these inferences
are not entirely satisfactory (see Rokeach, 1960,
pp. 60-70).

However, in the course of presenting the arguments, Rokeach
does make a point that is crucial to the development of our

conceptual framework.

This point is that the function of

belief-disbelief systems is

a dual one.

In the words of

Rokeach
...all belief-disbelief systems serve
two powerful and conflicting sets of
motives at the same time:
the need
for a cognitive framework to know and
to understand and the need to ward off
threatening aspects of reality
To the
extent that the cognitive need to know
is predominant and the need to ward off
threat absent, open systems should reIn the service of the cognitive
sult.
need to know, external pressures and
irrational internal drives will often
be pushed aside, so that information
received from outside will be discriminated,
assessed, and acted on according to the
objective requirements of the situation.
But as the need to ward off threat becomes
stronger, the cognitive need to know should become weaker, resulting in more closed belief
Under threat, information and
systems.
source should become inseparable and should
be evaluated arbitrarily in linewith the rewards and punishments meted out by authority.
.
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(Rokeach 1960, pp. 67-68).
lining mine.)
,

(Under-

We find in this statement by Rokeach our
first mention

of what we have called receptivity-adaptability.
to Rokeach,

a

According

person remains receptive to information (has

an open mind) when the need to understand the world
is pre-

dominant, but as soon as information coming from the outside

world causes the individual to experience

a

maximum level of

threat, he adopts a pattern of receptivity (closed mind) which

leaves him receptive only to information which helps decrease
the feelings of being threatened.

With this, Rokeach has taken

us several steps further than Adorno et al

He has highlighted

the importance of examining behavior patterns for an underlying

structure that explains behavior in

a

number of seemingly

disparate realms.

a

more explicit level the

He has raised to

notion that the manner in which

a

person accepts and rejects

information is crucial to understanding many aspects of behavior.

And, most important, he has suggested that the function

to be played by whatever structure it is that determines whether

an individual has an "open mind" or

a

"closed mind" is

a

dual

one which sometimes emphasizes his need to know and understand

reality and at other times emphasizes his need to be protected
from threatening aspects of reality.
But Rokeach has not taken us far enough.

functions of

a

belief-disbelief structure are:

If the basic
(1)

to help us

satisfy the need to know and understand the world and

(2)

to
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help us ward off threatening aspects of this world,
what in
turn are the sources of these two needs? Why is
it need-

fulfilling or functional for an individual to understand
reality,
or, on the other hand, why is it need-fulfilling
or functional

not to understand reality?

An attempt to give full answers

to these questions must wait until Chapter IV, but the work

of some of the social psychologists mentioned in the first

chapter brings us nearer to an understanding of why it may be

functional for an individual to adopt either of the two

opposite orientations toward information from the environment.
A Social Psychology Perspective
The Basic Antimony

An appropriate starting point for reviewing the work of
the psychologists we have labelled "consistency theorists"
is a discussion of the Jones and Gerard concept of the basic

antinomy (Jones and Gerard, 1967, pp. 227-240).
duced the concept of

a

They intro-

basic antinomy between "openness to

change and the desire to preserve

a

pre-existing view or

or conviction" to explain much of the research data on the

impact of value and attitude on perceiving and remembering.

They hypothesize that one principle of human behavior is that
an individual will tend on the one hand to be open to, seek,

perceive, and respond to information which conflicts with
;

their present beliefs and expectations regarding aspects of
the environment and on the other hand to be closed to, avoid,

l
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distort, and ignore such information.

The tendency toward

openness presumably favors changes in the behavior and beliefs of the person while the opposite tendency toward
being

closed presumably favors the preservation of present behavior

patterns and beliefs.

A basic assumption underlying the reasoning presented
in Chapter IV is that the existence of this basic antinomy

can be attributed to its functional utility in Man's evolu-

tionary history.

Though it may usually be treated as

a

psychological phenomenon, it is the adaptive role it has
played in the biological survival of Man that may explain
its existence.

1

It may have

evolved in much the same way that

Konrad Lorenz has argued that agression and several mechanisms
to curb agression came to be a part of Man's behavior

pp. 54-83).

(Lorenz,

Despite its largely speculative nature, it is

worth noting that the existence of the basic antinomy as

a

basic principle of human behavior is probably justified by
its function as an aid to Man's survival.

To examine the manner in which this basic antinomy is

functional, it may be helpful to look separately at the advantages of each of the opposing sides of the antinomy for an

individual.

First, let us look at the case for the closed

good description of the notion that biological
adaptation consists of an organism's approximating his actual
response to the "optimal response" and the implications of
this for the organism's gathering and rejecting information
is given by Berlyne in his Structure and Direction in
Thinking 1965, pp 34-48.
,

.
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side of the antinomy, that is the evidence
that

a

pattern of

receptivity which allows an individual to
perceive consistency
and stability in the environment is advantageous
to
him.

The

most basic advantage to an individual of being
able to close
out information from the environment is that
it allows him
to give selective attention to certain aspects
of his environ-

ment.

The huge mass of potentially available information
in

the form of sensory input cannot possibly be processed
simul-

taneously by

a

person's limited cognitive abilities.

He

therefore finds it to his advantage to "pay attention to"
only those aspects of the environment which in the past have

proven important to him.
A related, but somewhat more sophisticated, advantage

attributable to the closed side of the antinomy results from
the necessity of being able to predict events which will take

place in the environment.

This allows an individual to adjust

his behavior so that it will be appropriate to forthcoming

events.

In order for a person to anticipate events success-

fully, the environment must appear relatively stable and pre-

dictable to him.

If he takes note of every change in the

environment, no matter how insignificant or irrelevant to
his present purpose, an individual will be much less likely
to note the over-all consistency and stability of the environ-

ment.

It is the closed side of the basic antinomy

-

the

human tendency to ignore, distort, or simply not perceive

information in the environment

-

that allows an individual to
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perceive the environment as relatively
stable and predictable
and helps an individual take note
of the general laws governing the occurrence of events in the
universe.

Another functional advantage of the closed
side of the
basic antinomy is discussed by Jones and
Gerard
(Jones and

Gerard, 1967, pp

.

180-184).

They argue that it helps the

individual move toward an "unequivocal behavior
orientation
(UBO)" which allows the individual "to act without
the dis-

ruptive influence of holding conflicting views regarding
what
actions he should take."

Their assumption is that an action

taken by a resolute person is more effective than the action
taken by a person who is vacillating between
choices.

a

number of

By becoming less receptive to information regarding

unchosen alternatives

,

the individual will become more and

more unequivocal about following the course of action he
has elected.

A last argument for the functionality of an individual's

receptivity being governed by the closed side of the antinomy
comes from the role habituation plays in human behavior.
is through

habituation that humans are allowed to follow

sort of "least effort principle."

It
a

After repeated exposures

to similar stimulus characteristics in the environment, or

after repeated enactments of the same behavior sequence,
an individual is able to perform a seemingly automatic be-

havior sequence in these oft-repeated situations.

circumstances,

a

Under such

conscious level of involvement in the selec-

31

tion of relevant elements of information
or appropriate
actions is no longer necessary.
If the essential aspects of
the situation remain unchanged and the
originally acquired
habits remain appropriate ones, this habituation
can result
in more efficient behavior than that based
on conscious de-

cision-making.

Performance in an assembly line or carrying

out a much practiced procedure such as

a

lunar landing are

examples of such situations.

A good deal of indirect empirical and theoretical support
for the existence of the closed side of the basic antinomy has

been produced by the social psychologists concerned with

demonstrating the influence of
sistency.

a

human preference for con-

The commonality shared by all these theories is

the basic assumption that humans have a need to view themselves

and the world as maintaining an over-all consistency.

Because

each of the major theorists differs somewhat from the others
in terms of how consistency is defined,

it is worthwhile to

discuss briefly three of the major consistency theories.
Robert Zajonc (1968) has reviewed each extensively in his

chapter in the Second Edition of The Handbook of Social

Psychology and

I

have borrowed heavily from his discussion.

Perhaps the earliest of the consistency theories is the

balance theory of Fritz Heider (1946, 1958).

Heider’s theory

stresses the importance of structurally balanced relationships
in dyads and triads.
a set

He begins with the assumption that when

of relations, e.g., between three people or between a
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person and an action or object, is
perceived by an individual
as composing a unit, that unit
will be either in a balanced
(steady) state or in a state of
imbalance
(disequilibrium).

The state of a unit is determined by
the "dynamic character"
of its parts, i.e., whether each is
perceived as positive or

negative.

For example, a dyad consisting of
persons A and B

will be balanced from A's standpoint if he
perceives himself
to like B and perceives B as liking him
in return.
Cartwright
and Harary (1956) converted Beider' s theory
into the language
of graph theory and used signed graphs to depict
balanced

and unbalanced states.

The example of a balanced unit given

above would be depicted as:

A^

^^

B

;

while an imbalanced unit,

e.g., A liking B but perceiving that B dislikes A, would

appear as:

"*J3

.

In a similar fashion triads can also be

either balanced or unbalanced as shown in Figure 2.3.

J
A'''

'*4

Balanced

Unbalanced

Balanced

Unbalanced

FIGURE 2.3

Heider's theory postulates that units in disequilibrium will
tend to move toward balanced relationships or the units them-

selves

will break-up.

However, these forces toward symmetry

or balance in unit relations is not presumed to be a power-

ful driving force,

only

a

tendency.
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In reviewing the empirical literature
applying to

balance theory as formulated by Heider
and extended and
formalized by Cartwright and Harary
(1956) and Abelson and
Rosenberg (1958), Zajonc raises an important
question regarding this research.
Though evidence exists which strongly
suggests a human preference for balanced states,
Zajonc

questions whether these results are due to the
forces"

’’good figure

of balance theory or due to the effects of attraction

or preference for agreement.

He believes the latter is the

most important factor in many of the studies and regrets that

these studies fail to separate the effects of these different
factors

Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) attempt to avoid the problems caused by the effects and interactions due to attraction

and agreement by limiting their concern specifically to the

relations between:

the attitude of a person toward

a

2

The term "good figure forces" derives from the basic
contention of Gestalt psychology that humans have a strong
perceptual tendency to "complete" fragmented stimulus objects
or regularize irregular stimulus patterns in such a way as to
result in the individual's perceiving a "good figure." The
assumption Heider seems to have made is that balanced states
constitute "good figures" and imbalanced states "bad figures"
with the consequence that an individual will tend to want to
bring about a balanced unit relationship whenever possible.

^Theodore Newcomb's theory of balance (Newcomb, 1953)
does deal directly with the role of agreement as a factor
determining the extent to which a social relationship is in
Because agreement in Newcomb's theory is
a balanced state.
conceived of as a social force toward consistency rather
than as a cognitive force toward consistency, it is less
germane to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter IV
and, therefore, is not discussed here.
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source

(s)

the person's attitude toward a concept

;

an assertion made by the source about
the concept.

(c)

;

and

The basic

hypothesis of the theory outlined by Osgood and
Tannenbaum
is the

congruity principle- -namely that attitude change
will
take place in the direction of bringing into
congruence
an

individual

s

attitudes toward

a

source,

a

concept, and the

attitude expressed by the source in assertions made
about the
concept
In empirical tests of the Osgood and Tannenbaum hypo-

thesis, the subject rates the source

(s)

and the concept (c)

on the semantic differential scales developed by Osgood and

then is presented with the assertion (positive or negative)

made by the source about the concept.
made from

a

Predictions are then

mathematical model about the amount and direction

of the subjects changes in attitude toward the concept.

model includes two weighting factors:

(1)

+

A,

The

the assertion

constant intended to balance the stronger effect an assertion
will have on the attitude toward a concept than it will have
on the attitude toward the source and

(2)

i,

the incredulity

factor which is intended to balance the effect of the subject's

disbelieving that

a

source makes the alleged assertion.

The

congruity principle predicts that the subject will use one of
four strategies to achieve congruity and still maintain his

attitudes unchanged.
1.

These four strategies are:

weakening the association between the source and
concept
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2.

invalidating the assertion by bringing
to bear
information which contradicts it;

3.

strengthening his attitude towards the
concept
by seeking supportive information
and beliefsand
*

4.

changing his attitude toward the source.

If these four strategies fail the
individual, he must achieve

congruity by changing his attitude toward the
concept.
Empirical tests of the congruity principle have
generally

ordered the data but failed to give satisfactory numerical
fits between the quantitative predictions of amounts
of

attitude change and the actual amounts of attitude change

obtained in the results.
Less formal, but also less limited in application, is

Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance (1957).

According

to the theory, cognitions that bear a relevant relation to

each other can either be consonant or dissonant, i.e. either

consistent or inconsistent with one another.

In Festinger's

words
Two elements are in dissonant relation
if considering these two alone, the
obverse of one element would follow
from the other.
To state it a bit
more formally, x and y are dissonant
if not-x follows from y. (Festinger,
1957, p. 13)

Presumably, humans have two tendencies that determine
the dynamics of dissonance:

1

'

(1)

a

propensity on the part of

an individual to bring his cognitions into congruence with

perceived reality and

(2)

a

drive to maintain consistency
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among the cognitions themselves.

Dissonance can arise because

of a number of occurrences including
informational inconsis-

tency, disconfirmed expectations, insufficient
justifications
for actions taken, and post-decision regret.

As for the

theory itself, Zajonc summarizes the major elements
by listing
nine propositions:
1.

Cognitive dissonance is

2.

In the case of cognitive dissonance the
individual attempts to reduce or eliminate it
and he acts so as to avoid events that will
increase it.

3.

In the case of consonance the individual acts
so as to avoid dissonance -producing events.

4.

The severity or the intensity of cognitive
dissonance varies with (a) the importance
of the cognitions involved (b) the relative
number of cognitions standing in dissonant
relation to one another.

5.

The strength of the tendencies enumerated
in (2) and (3) is a direct function of the
severity of dissonance.

6.

Cognitive dissonance can be reduced or
eliminated only by (a) adding new cognitions
or (b) changing existing ones.

7.

Adding new cognitions reduces dissonance if
(a) the new cognitions add weight to one side
and thus decrease the proportion of cognitive
elements which are dissonant, or (b) the new
cognitions change the importance of the cognitive elements that are in dissonant relation
with one another.

8.

Changing existing cognitions reduces dissonance if (a) their new content makes them less
contradictory with others, or (b) their importance is reduced.

a

noxious state.
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9.

If new cognitions cannot be added
or the
existing ones changed by means of a
passive process, behaviors which have
c
li tive consequences favoring
consonance
?f!,
will
be recruited.
Seeking new information is an example of such behavior.
.

For our purposes it is important to note
that the

propositions numbered 6,7,8, and

9

concern the means by which

cognitive consistency may be conserved and are
similar to the
second and third strategy alternatives available for
maintaining attitudinal consistency mentioned by Osgood
and Tannenbaum
in discussing their congruity principle

(see p.34).

These

propostions are the elements of greatest concern to us in
the consistency theories because they deal directly with the

role played by information in reducing the tension developed
by imbalance, inconsistency, or dissonance.

In effect,

these

propositions support the notion that by becoming receptive only
to information which helps achieve or maintain cognitive

consistency

,

the individual can escape from the anxiety or

tension these theories hypothesize accompanies cognitive
inconsistency.

Although

a

majority of the studies prompted by Festinger's

theory of cognitive dissonance deal
a

witli

attitudinal change as

means of dissonance reduction, one class of studies has been

concerned more directly with receptivity to information.
These studies attempt to investigate the effects of dissonance
on selective exposure to information.

The hypothesis in

these experiments is that an individual will avoid or reduce
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dissonance by attempting to expose himself
only to information
which supports positions to which he has
already committed
himself.

In his review of the studies on
selective exposure

to information,

Zajonc (1968, pp.

382-386) calls attention

to the equivocal nature of the results.

He attributes this

to experimental design difficulties which
confound other

factors with dissonance and which are plagued by
failures to
create sufficiently strong dissonance in the subjects.

A

second failing of these studies which is more important
from
the perspective of our concern with receptivity to informa-

tion is that they concern themselves only with whether the

individual exposes himself to supportive or to discrepant

information and not with how the individual actually deals

with the information to which he exposes himself.

With regard

to this point, Festinger argues that a person with knowledge

that discrepant information does exist may experience disson-

ance until given the opportunity to seek out that discrepant

information with the intention of discovering and rebutting
the fallacious arguments it contains.

Not mentioned by Zajonc or Festinger but important to
the understanding of the results obtained in the selective

exposure experiments is the possibility that the individual
either perceives the discrepant information in such
and distorted manner that it does not constitute

a

a

biased

discrep-

ancy for him or that he reacts to the information by rejecting
its validity on the basis of its coming from what he regards
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as a biased source.

Whatever the case, dissonance theory

and some of its supporting studies do
highlight the tendency
for individuals to maintain a consistent
outlook on the pheno-

mena composing their environments by remaining
closed to, or
unreceptive to, information which threatens their
maintaining
a

consistent world view.

In effect,

all of the consistency

theories imply that inconsistency can be one of the
'threatening aspects of reality" Rokeach believes a closed
belief-

disbelief system protects the individual from.
The support of the functional role of the closed side
of the basic antinomy does not rest solely on the arguments

and studies produced by the consistency theorists.

Gerard (1967, pp.

Jones and

227-255) cite an impressive list of studies

dealing with perception, learning, and information retention
that also support the functionality of the closed side of the

basic antinomy.

Because our interest lies more in the area

of the influence of cognitive consistency and inconsistency

on receptivity to information, these other studies will not
be discussed here.

All of the consistency theories have in common a tension-

reduction view of human motivation.

They assume that

a

basic

force in man and other organisms is the desire to escape

tension, reduce drive, or avoid arousal.

Somewhat in oppo-

sition to the tension-reduction theory of human motivation is
the contention by White

(1959)

,

Berlyne (1960) and others

that man and higher organisms have

a

tendency to seek out
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novelty in the environment, to be challenged
by changing
circumstances, and to welcome arousal.
This second view of
human behavior reflects the functioning of the

open side of

the basic antinomy and is consistent with the
other function
of belief-disbelief systems

-

that of providing

a

framework to know and understand" the environment
by Rokeach.

"cognitive
-

identified

Now that we have reviewed the support for the

functionality of the closed side of the basic antinomy, it is
necessary to review the support for the existence of the other
side of the antinomy

-

the open side

-

and of the advantages

to an individual of being open to information which conflicts

with his current view of the environment.
From

a

logical point of view the functionality of the

open side of the antinomy derives from man's information-

dependence on his environment.

If an individual is to ad-

just his actions appropriately to the changes taking place

around him, he must constantly be open to information that
signals the coming or arrival of changes.

As long as the

environment is stable or consistent, prediction of events,
and consequently decision-making and action, tend to be less

dependent upon the gathering of information from the environment.

As the environment becomes increasingly unpredictable,

an individual has to grasp the significance of new events

and is consequently more dependent upon accurately perceiving
and processing information from the environment.
In addition to this logical argument,

there exists both
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theoretical and empirical support for the functional
advantages of the open side of the basic antinomy.

R.W.

White (1959)

has reviewed a large number of studies done with higher ver-

tebrates and humans and has concluded that some explanation
other than drive reduction is necessary to explain such be-

haviors as

:

visual exploration grasping, crawling
and walking, attention and perception,
language and thinking, exploring novel
objects and places, manipulating the
surroundings, and producing effective
changes in the environment.
The [Mr.
White's] thesis is then proposed that
all of these behaviors have a common
biological significance:
they all form
part of the process whereby the animal
or child learns to interact effectively
with his environment ... Such activities
in the ultimate purpose of competence must
therefore be conceived to be motivated in
their own right.
It is proposed to designate this motivation by the term effectance,
and to characterize the experience produced
as a feeling of efficacy (White, 1959.
.

.

.

,

p.

32 97:

Thus, a feeling of efficacy, due in large part it will be

argued in Chapter IV to the ability of an individual to

predict the consequences of his interactions with the environment, is the ultimate motivation for the individual to let
his behavior and his receptivity to information be guided by
the open side of the basic antinomy.

Berlyne (1960) in discussing the motivations for what
he terms epistemic behavior or "behavior that augments know-

ledge"

(1960, p.

262)

rejects as insufficient the theories

based on extrinsic motivation, i.e., theories which argue
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that all behavior is motivated by seeking
external rewards

which lead to drive reduction.

His reason for rejecting

these theories is their inability to explain
idle curiosity
or behavior which Berlyne calls

..epistemic searches concerned with
matters that are perplexing but trivial
from a practical point of view. (Berlyne
.

1960, p.

278)

Berlyne also rejects these theories as insufficient because
they do not explain how an individual is motivated to go
thi ough the chain of intervening symbolic responses,

or

mental steps, involved in deductive problem-solving of the
sort typified in moving from the statement of an assumption
to the proof of

a

theorem.

Only the final step of the proof,

that is, the symbolic statement which begins with the word

"therefore..." is capable of reducing the drive to achieve
solution of the proof.

And yet, as Berlyne points out,

the person is capable of making this supposedly drive-reducing

symbolic response at anytime and without having performed
the intervening steps in the proof.
As an alternative to the extrinsic motivation theories,

Berlyne proposes that there is an intrinsic motivation to
seek information and that this drive is

ceptual conflict.

a

consequence of con-

He likens it to the Gestalt position

that man seeks to fill the gaps in incomplete configurations

and to Dewey's contention that "the object of thinking is
to introduce a congruity between

...conditions at hand and
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desiied and intended result, between an end and the
means

for reaching it"

(Dewey, 1910).

Despite his opposition to

the dr ive - reduct ion theories, Berlyne recognizes that
his

own theory of conceptual conflict is

a

of drive reduction

The essential difference

(1960, p. viii)

.

highly modified version

is that he rejects the idea that the so-called "basic drives"

are the source of the motivation to think, and he substitutes

instead the idea that the most important motivation for epistemic behavior is the conflict which occurs when

a

stimulus

situation is such that several, incompatible symbolic responses
could be made by the individual but there are no cues which

clearly favor the enactment of any one of the responses over
any of the others.

An individual trying to choose which of

four liberal democrats to support in the presidential primary

elections is an example of

a

situation in which several in-

compatible responses are elicited by the stimulus situation
and could lead to conceptual conflict, and hence, to epistemic

behavior.

Though based largely upon extrapolation from

general principles of behavior theory, Berlyne also cites

a

number of diverse studies which give strong, if not direct,
support for his contentions.^
Berlyne'

s

work has important implications for the con-

ceptualization presented in Chapter IV and will be discussed
detailed review of these studies see D.E. Berlyne,
Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity 1960, pp 261-275.
4 For

a

.

,
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again there; but for the moment it is
necessary to limit
ourselves to mentioning those aspects of his
work which relate to the functioning of the open side of
the basic antinomy.
This latter portion of his work can be summarized
by noting
that Berlyne's review of work done on orienting
responses,

investigatory responses, and arousal supplies considerable
evidence that both humans and higher animals assume states
of high receptivity to information and even seek arousal

from exposure to stimulus situations containing excitatory
levels of complexity, uncertainty, or incongruity.
In reviewing the evidence that a basic antinomy be-

tween openness to incongruent or discrepant information on
the one hand and closedness toward such information on the

other hand exists as a basic, and functional component of

human behavior, we have attempted to make

a

strong case for

Rokeach's observation that some internal structure (Rokeach
believes it to be

a

belief -disbelief system) performs two

important but opposing functions:

(1)

to furnish the individual

with a cognitive framework to help him know and understand
reality, and

(2)

to provide him with a protective screen to

help him ward off threatening aspects of reality.

We have

shown that both of these functions can be advantageous and
that they seem to form an important part of typical human

behavior patterns.

But we have not found a sufficient

explanation of the dynamics underlying the operation of this
basic antinomy.
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In discussing this, Jones and Gerard

(1967, pp.

227-

speak in terms of the dominance of one side
or another
of the basic antinomy as being dependent
upon the phase of
229)

behavior in which

a

person finds himself.

In the pre -decision-

al phase of behavior, when attempting to
determine what course

of action is most desirable, the open side of the
antinomy is

dominant.

In the post-decisional phase of behavior, when the

action is being, or has been taken, the closed side of the

antinomy is dominant.
possible

-

Where no action is perceived to be

that is, when the individual does not believe his

behavior can significantly change the course of events
closed side of the antinomy is again dominant.

-

the

For Jones and

Gerard these are functional determinants of which side of the

antinomy will be dominant.

They lead the person to be "better

prepared to approach attractive stimuli," perceptually defend
against uncongenial events when action is not possible, or
be hypervigilant to negative stimuli when preventative action
is

possible (Jones and Gerard, 1967,

p.

225).

The argument by Jones and Gerard that the dominance
\'

of either >side of the basic antinomy is determined by whether
a

person is in the pre- or post-decisional phase of behavior

and whether or not action on his part is possible does ex-

plain why one or another side of the antinomy should be
dominant.

But it does not explain why in reality the

balance between the two sides of the antinomy may function
in an inappropriate manner causing a person to be open when
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he should be closed and vice-versa

.

This explanation gives

us no insight into why there should
be the individual differ-

ences in receptivity to information that so
concerned Rokeach.
Nor does it give us a means of characterizing
these individual differences.
This is partially due to the fact that Jones' and

Gerard's conception of open-closed as

a

single dimension

indicating the degree to which an individual is receptive to

counter-attitudinal and incongruent information does not
take into account other characteristics of the individual,
of the information, or of the problem situation than whether
or not action can be taken by the individual.

In Chapters

III and IV we will introduce some of these other factors

which may be determinants of whether or not an individual's
patterns of receptivity to information are striking an

appropriate balance between the two sides of the basic
antinomy.

I

c H

A

P T E R III

COGNITIVE STRUCTURE AND THE CONCEPT OF
A RECEPTIVITY-ADAPTABILITY PROFILE
At the close of Chapter II it was noted that
Jones’s
and Gerard's explanation of the dynamics underlying
the

functioning of the basic antinomy was insufficient partly
because it did not take into consideration important characteristics of individuals which might influence the functioning
of the basic antinomy and partly because it did not take into

consideration important characteristics of the environmental
situation which might also influence the functioning of the
basic antinomy.

To rectify this shortcoming, we will

(1)

discuss the nature of cognitive structures and the important

characteristics of their organization which may influence
the functioning of the basic antinomy and (2) discuss the

notion of

a

receptivity-adaptability (R-A) profile as

a

use-

ful expansion of the basic antinomy notion of Jones and Gerard

and the open-closed mind notion of Rokeach.

Characteristics of Cognitive Structure
One useful way of conceptualizing the manner in which
a

mature human organizes and reacts to the diverse stimuli

of his environment is by postulating the existence of a cog-

nitive structure in all individuals.
47

This cognitive structure
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has been variously described by a
number of cognitive theorists
including Ausubel (1963), Bruner
(1956, 1966), Harvey, Hunt,
and Schroder (1961), Piaget (1950,
1952), Schroder, Driver,
and Streufert (1967), and Berlyne (1965). 1
All of these

theorists, with the exception of Berlyne, have
in common the
assumption that the cognitive structure is the
organizational

pattern through which are filtered, or into which are
fitted
stimuli from the individual’s environment.

regarded as
ronment.

a

The structure is

sort of cognitive representation of the envi-

Baldwin (1969, p.333), in discussing the nature of

this cognitive representation, suggests that it is

a

coding

of the information in the environment, and he goes on to stress

that the cognitive representation "must be a coding that in-

dicates the structure of the environment, i.e., the relationships among items as well as the items themselves ..." and is

not limited to information currently present, but also includes

information available in the individual’s memory.
cognitive structure is not only
vironment, but also is

a

a

Thus, the

representation of the en-

structure that the individual "pro-

jects onto the environment" thereby highlighting the relationships among the elements composing the environment.

^Berlyne's position differs significantly from the
others mentioned here because he is essentially an S-R theorist.
His concept of the cognitive structure is discussed in Chapter
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Bruner's model of cognitive development
(Bruner, 1966,
p.319) assumes that the individual’s "knowledge
of the world
is based on a constructed model of
reality, a model that can
only partially and intermittently be tested
against input,"
and that, Bruner, contends, can represent
reality
in any of

three modes:
mode); and

(1)

(3)

action (enactive mode);

(2)

symbolism (symbolic mode)

imagery (ikonic

(1966, pp.1-67).

In mature members of western societies the
symbolic mode

usually supercedes the other two.

According to Bruner (1966,

p.47) the minimum properties of such symbolic representations

must include categoriality

,

hierarchy, prediction, causation,

and modification because "any symbolic activity

...

is logically

and empirically unthinkable without these properties."

Pre-

sumably then, Bruner's model of the cognitive structure is
set of categories organized in

a

a

hierarchical fashion and

having the functions of enabling the individual to predict
events in his environment, infer causation in these events,
and cognize actions to modify them.

Bruner (1957) has also

argued that each of the categories in such

a

cognitive

structure is characterized at any point in time by having
some particular degree of "category accessibility" which

governs the ease with which an individual will perceive and

process different stimuli into the various categories he has
in his cognitive structure.

In Ausubel's view,

the cognitive structure is composed

of a hierarchy of "traces" of past experience including some
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"highly inclusive conceptual traces
under which are subsumed
traces of less inclusive
subconcepts
as well as traces of

specific informational data’.

(Ausubel, 1963, p.

24).

Accord-

ing to Ausubel, structures
typified by this "progressive

differentiation" correspond most closely
to the "postulated
way in which ...knowledge is
represented, organized, and
stored in the human nervous system"
(1963, p.

79)

More fully developed than Bruner’s and
Ausubel

's

characterization of cognitive structure, but very
similar to
them,

is

that of Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder
(1961).

They

conceive of the structure as a system of concepts
and give
the following explanation:

A concept in the most general sense is a schema
for evaluating impinging stimulus objects or
events.
Abstracted from the experience of
objects in the environing world, it represents
a category of varying definitiveness and
breadth along some specifiable dimension
(hot-cold, good-bad, and so forth) (Harvey and
Rutherford, 1958).
Once a concept has evolved,
it serves as a psychological yardstick in terms
of which stimuli are compared and guaged, a
kind of experiential filter through which
objects are screened and evaluated on their
way from sensory reception to ultimate response
evocation.

Concepts, in their matrix of interrelatedness, serve the critical cognitive function of
providing a system of ordering by means of
which the environment is broken down and organized, is differentiated and integrated, into
its many psychologically relevant facets.
In
.this capacity, they provide the medium through
which the individual establishes and maintains
ties with the surrounding world.
It is on
the basis of the web of these conceptual ties
that one is able to place oneself stably and
meaningfully in relation to time, space, and
other dimensions of his psychological universe.
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It is on this basis,

one

hence, that

self-identity and existence are
articulated and maintained. Threat
to such ties or severance of them
leads to a psychological mobilization
aimed at maintaining or restoring
them efforts, which if unsuccessful
may result in a major reorientation
and organization of ties to the world,
or moi e drastically, even to breakdown
or destruction of the self.
(1961, p. li)
|

s

,

We have in this statement something very close
to the idea

expressed by Rokeach concerning the dual functions of

a

belief-disbelief system (see page 25) except that the structure
under discussion is

a

conceptual system or cognitive structure.

Piaget's conception of the cognitive functioning of
the mature individual is also based on the assumption that

structui al elements allow the individual to organize and

understand his environment.

In Piaget's theory 2 (Piaget

1950)

,

the basic element of structure is the scheme or schema (the

term being translated each way by different translators)

.

The

schema is a pattern the individual uses for interacting with
the objects and events in the environment, or in the vocabu-

lary of Piaget, for assimilating the environment.

who was educated as

a

For Piaget,

biologist, the schema is the psychologi-

cal analog of biological structures, e.g.

Just as the digestive system is

a

the digestive system.

structure whose function is

2

In addition to the primary sources cited, much of the
discussion of Piaget's theories is based upon A. L. Baldwin's
chapters on Piaget in his Theories of Child Development
,

1967, pp.

171-300.
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to enable the organism to assimilate
food,

so Piaget conceives

of schemata as structures enabling the
individual to assimilate elements of his environment.
Piaget discusses two kinds
of schemata: (1) sensory-motor schemata
which are overt

patterns of behavior performed as a reaction to
stimuli in
the environment, e.g., reacting to the stimulus
of

rattle by reaching for and grasping it; and

(2)

a

baby

conceptual

schemata which consist of cognitive operations such
as classifying or determining relationships between stimuli perceived
in the environment or retained as memories of past interactions

with the environment.

It is

this latter kind of schema with

which we are most concerned since it is the structure most
akin to what we have labelled cognitive structures.

Piaget's

conceptual schema can be regarded as the elements of which

a

cognitive structure is composed and are thus roughly equivalent
to Bruner's categories

,

Ausubel's traces

,

and the concepts of

Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder.

Because the cognitive structure, as described by the

theorists discussed above, is the major component of an

individual's information-processing mechanism, it is reasonable to assume that the patterns of receptivity to information

exhibited by an individual will be reflections of his cognitive
structure.

Marked individual differences in patterns of re-

ceptivity displayed by two individuals probably have as their
source important differences in the characteristics of the
two individuals'

cognitive structures.

This is

a

view very
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similar to Rokeach's structural theory
as presented in
Chapter II, except that the structure
postulated here is

cognitive structure rather than

a

a

belief -disbelief structure.

This hypothesized influence of cognitive
structure
characteristics on receptivity to information is
based on the
same assumptions that are made by the
"cognitivists" about
the functioning of cognitive structures.
is

One such assumption

that information perceived in the environment is
in some

way categorized as it is taken into the cognitive
structure.
A given stimulus object is likely to have

a

number of differ-

ent attributes any one of which, or combination of which,

determines the manner in which it is fitted into the cognitive
structure.

A green rubber ball, for example, has attributes

which include size, color, weight, hardness, smell, taste,
resiliency, density, suitability for playing jacks, suitability for playing handball, suitability for use in a one-way

valve, etc.

Which of these attributes are noted by an in-

dividual is likely to depend on the categories or concepts
the individual's cognitive structure contains, as well as

upon current situational demands.

Another assumption underlying the concept of cognitive
structure that has implications for the relationship between
cognitive structures and receptivity is the notion that the

cognitive structure does more than represent the elements in
the environment.

It also serves to highlight the relation-

ships between these elements, to reflect the structure of
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the environment itself.

The nature of these relationships

extends beyond the temporal and
special relationships that
our senses relay to us.
There are also intricate
cause-andeffect relationships which cannot
be perceived without the
individual's having a means of
representing these relationships.
Thus, a person whose cognitive
structure reflects
the interdependence between heat
and the expansion of materials
is likely to be receptive to a
different set of hypotheses

regarding the behavior of

a

bi-metallic bar than a person

whose cognitive structure reflects only the
interdependence
of heat and the melting or burning of
materials.
Furthermore, the cognitive structure is likely
to
influence the patterns of receptivity an individual
adopts
for one other reason.

The information available in the

environment at any particular time is only

a

portion of the

information at the individual's disposal for understanding
that particular sitaution.

An individual's cognitive struc-

ture represents a storehouse of information which may be

brought to mind by characteristics of the environment at
a

given time.

Missing or obscured elements of information

may be added to the situation from the individual's cognitive structure and, therefore, differences in the dimensions

defining the various categories in an individual's cognitive

structure are likely to influence his ability to supply the

appropriate bits of information to

a

given solution.
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In addition to characterizing in
one manner or another

the nature of cognitive structures
in general, each of the

cognitive theorists mentioned above supplies
some hints regarding what characteristics of cognitive
structures might
contribute to individual differences in receptivity
to

information.

According to Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (1961)

the crucial variable of cognitive structure
contributing to

individual differences is the degree of concreteness-abstractness of the concepts making up an individual's cognitive

structure.

In contrast to Ausubel's emphasis on the hierar-

chical nature of cognitive organization, Harvey, Hunt, and

Schroder hypothesize that conceptual concreteness - abstractness
is

reflected in four organizational characteristics of con-

ceptual systems, namely:
i

1.

The clarity-ambiguity dimension which
refers to "the distinctness with which
the component aspects of the system
are differentiated or articulated;
.

2

.

.

compar tmentalizat ion- interrelatedness
which refers to "the extent to which
concepts within a system are interconnected" or isolated from one
another

3.

centrality-peripherali ty which refers
to "the degree of essentialness of a
concept to the larger constellation
of concepts;" and

4.

openness - closedness which refers to
"the receptivity of the system to external events or to varied interpretations of the situation" and which Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder hypothesized might
be a function of centrality-peripherality
(1961, pp.

75-76)
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worth noting the similarity of these
dimensions
of cognitive structure to the dimensions
of belief
It is

-disbelief

structure identified by Rokeach.

In both cases differen-

tiation (termed clarity-ambiguity by Harvey
et alj and integration (termed compartmentalizat ion- interrelate
dness by

Harvey et al^ and isolation by Rokeach) are
identified as
crucial dimensions.

Both theories also consider centrality

periphei ality an important dimension, but the definitions
of this dimension given by Rokeach and Harvey, Hunt,
and

Schroder differ significantly from one another.

It was noted

in the discussion of Rokeach'

II

23)

s

theory in Chapter

(see page

that he violated his own structural approach in defining

the centrality-peripherality dimension.

The definition

given by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder is much less extensive
but also violates the consistency maintained in their

definitions of the other dimensions of cognitive structure.
The others are all defined as structural characteristics,
but centrality-peripherality is defined as a characteristic
of the units making up the structure.

Thus it is possible

to speak in terms of the differentiation

(i.e., clarity-

ambiguity), integration (compartmentalization- interrelatedness)

,

or receptivity

(openness-closedness) of a cognitive

structure, but it is inappropriate to speak in terms of the

centrality or per ipherality of

a

cognitive structure.

In a later work written with Driver and Streufert

(Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, 1967), Schroder abandoned
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the notion of centrality-peripherality as

a

dimension of

cognitive structure and chose to define the
levels of
information processing attainable by a conceptual
structure
as being a function of three dimensions:
1.

differentiation, or the number of
unique dimensions used by an individual to arrange the perceived information
;

2.

discrimination, or the capacity of the
structure to distinguish between different stimuli or elements of information
along a single dimension; and

3.

integrative complexity, or the number of
different ways in which "dimensional
units of information can be interrelated
in different ways in order to generate
new and discrepant perspectives about
stimuli." (1967, pp. 14-28)

There is apparently room for confusion and disagreement
t

concerning the identification of tliose dimensions of
cognitive
structure which are the sources of individual
differences
in receptivity to information.
Figure 3.1 presents a com-

parison of the dimensions identified by Rokeach et al

(1960),

Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1967), and Schroder, Driver, and

Streufert (1967) as well as the dimensions or characteristics
of cognitive structure used in the development of the con-

ceptual framework presented in Chapter IV.

The centrality-,

peripherali ty dimensions identified by Rokeach and by Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder are not used in the conceptual framework
for the reasons discussed above regarding the inconsistency

of the definition of that dimension with

a

structural approach

>
p

C P
7s <D
O P
6
aj
P
tp

pi.

aj

d
u

rH

p

aj

*h

P

CO
CO

•H

•H

•H

to

c
o
do
p
g
o

Presented

u

r^
vO
CO
X) rH

c
o

ri

o
Pi
o
>

Pa
Concept

r~*

o
•

P

p

aj

<L)

a}

P
00
0

1

P

1

Pi

1

'

i

p

O
P
O

m

*

'

p
H

•H
4h
-H

P

P

P 0
pi
CD

XJ
•H

<P
•H
XJ

58

v_^

PI

m
p
p
CD

P

CO

o
•H Xj

P

Pi

as

oj

N
•H

•*

Pi

P

CtS

CD

OO

>

P *H
O P

•

>
Q—

,

i

er

•H

p

«
•'

p
O
STRUCTURES

PI

t
p
O

p

•H

•H

aj

•H

PS

o
p

O

P

m
i

i

i

CO

xj

p
Pi

o
p
O

m
Cp

o x>
p a
rC
u

•H
xj

CCS

CO

PI

O

CD

P

pi

o

P

PS

P

Pi

cci

Hg
P
o

p

co

•H

CD

Xi

'

p
oo
0

•H

1

'

PL,

POrt
u pd
pdo
U

O

C

CO

0
>

Pi

•H
Xj

•H

P

PI

•H
~

—

X)

r

0

rH

p

•H vO
PI CO
00 rH

o
u

Pi

0
CO

0
p p

pop

COGNITIVE

X)

OF

p

P
0
X xi
o
* p
Xd
0 u
> co
P

1

P
•H

CO
to

PS

0

oo

Pi

•H

PI
PS

1

1

CCS

p

1

^
p
•H

p
a

cc!

X

rH

u

1

ccS

N
CCS

a3

P

rH

Pi

0 0
P g
P p
0 p

P

X

P

xs •H
0 rH

g
1

O
•H
1

•h
rH
aj

Pa

g
O
O

rH
aj

p
0

P

d

+->

Pa
-H

PI

rH

CO

to

p

1

U

•>

1

aj

P

1

P

PI

aj

P

0 P
U 0

P
aj

P

P

rP !h

S-L,

U

Pa

CCS

PI

•H

p

rH'H

P

Ort)

O M
p p
U rP O
•H u 5
P CO 0
co
g
•h x) aj
P Pi P
0 aj m

Pi

X

PI
aj

CHARACTERISTICS

P

P
POP
O

•rH

ccS

•»

•v

0
U
con

major
Harvey

the

e

d

rH
to
co

d
CJ
cci

0
dO
Pi

0
PI
0
>
•H
CO
Pi

0
-CP

0
P
PL,

g
o
o

CCS

P
0

PI

o

d

•H

P

PL,

•H

aj

P

o

P
0

tP

•H

Pa

•H

0
P
0

'P

m
•H
xs

Pi

P
as

1

rH

rH

ccS

O

p

co

•H

p
PI

0
u

0
>
•H

P

P

O
Pi

P<

co

CO

•H

p
0

P

1

•H

P

xJ

cr>

rH

o

0
g

O -HP

/~v

tp to

U
0

Pa

*>

'

—

'

d

0
co

P

U 0

as

to

0 o
d
g o P
o cd
no
O
aj

X
<d

P!
aj

W
pci

X
D

C

IH
PL,

59

to the problem.
a

As a characteristic of categories making up

cognitive structure, centrality-per ipherality is discussed

in Chapter IV.

Rokeach’s time -per spective dimension is also

rejected as being essentially

a

concern

'with the

content

,

(and therefore subsumable under the comprehensiveness dimension)

rather than the organization of cognitive structures and of
little importance to the development of the conceptual frame-

work dealing with receptivity-adaptability.

The openness-

closedness dimension identified by Harvey, Hunt and Schroder
is

rejected because this characteristic of cognitive structures,

it is hypothesized in our conceptual framework,

is

likely to

be determined by the other dimensions of the structure.

Finally,

the two dimensions which Schroder, Driver and Streufert iden-

tify as discrimination and differentiation are combined into
a

single dimension in the conceptual framework of Chapter

In their definitions of these two dimensions,

IV.

differentia-

tion and discrimination, Schroder, Driver and Streufert

attempt to make

a

distinction between what in common usage

are synonymous terms.

Differentiation they use to indicate

the number of dimensions available in

a

cognitive structure

for evaluating a given set of information.

They use discrimi -

nation to indicate the fineness of the gradations available
on a given dimension in a cognitive structure for evaluating
a

given set of information.

We have combined these two

dimensions because most stimulus situations an individual
will encounter are complex enough that discrimination be-
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tween stimulus elements is usually made on the basis of com-

parision of multiple dimensions rather than on the basis of
quantitative differences along

a

single dimension.

Because

of this, and because gradations along a single dimension

often can be translated into points along more specific com-

binations of dimensions

3
,

we shall assume that our usage of

the term differentiation encompasses both the existence of

multiple dimensions and fine gradations along single dimensions; but we will also assume that the latter is the more

important aspect of cognitive structure in terms of influence
upon receptivity to information.
We are left, then, with three major characteristics of

differentiation, integration, and

cognitive structure

-

comprehensiveness

and may presume that significant differences

-

between structures on any of these dimensions will result in

differences in the cognitive functioning and patterns of
With these three charac-

receptivity exhibited by individuals.
teristics in mind, we will now offer

a

more detailed conceptu-

alization of cognitive structure which will serve as the basis
for the conceptual framework developed in the next chapter.

We will hypothesize that a cognitive structure is com-

posed of

a

number of categories or concepts that are interre-

lated in a complex fashion.

Each category, or concept, can

example, points along the dimension "redness"
dimensions intensity
may be translated into points along the
of redness" and "purity of hue.
3 For
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be imagined to consist of tbe location where a number of

dimensions overlap and thereby define the category.

Figure

3.2 gives a rough pictoral representation of such a definition
of cognitive categories.

The large circle

is the area re-

presenting the category "ball" defined by the overlapping
of portions of the four dimensions:

and resiliency.

size, hardness, roundness,

Any object judged to have appropriate amounts

of these four physical attributes

(i.e.,

fall within the

admissible ranges on these four dimensions) will be categorized as a ball.

The circle within the larger circle represents

the category "game ball."

Again, the category is defined

by the same four dimensions which define the broader category

"ball", but the category "game ball" is more restrictive

because the permissible range of variation along the four

defining dimensions is narrower.

Several objects

(viz.

a

basketball, football, golfball, medicine ball, cotton ball,
and moon) are then evaluated according to the four dimensions
and located in the "cognitive structure" represented in

Figure 3.2.

This is done by placing

a

point on each dimension

to indicate the amount of this attribute possessed by each

object and then connecting these points so that the ’location"
of each object in the "cognitive structure" is shown by the

area encompassed by the lines connecting the points.

Thus,

for example, the area contained by the green lines represents
a

medicine ball (which falls in the category "ball" but not

by the blue
in the category "game ball") and the area bounded

found

KEY:

—

Basketball'

•

Cotton Ball

Football
Golfball-F +

Medicine Ball

Moon#**#

++

A pictoral representation of the categories "Ball" (large circle)
and "Game Ball" (smaller circle) defined by four dimensions: size
Shown "located" in this
hardness, roundness, and resiliency.
four- dimens ion "cognitive structure" are the six objects listed
in the Key above.

FIGURE 3.2
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lincjs

represents a football (which falls in both the cate-

gory "game ball" and the category "ball").
Some of the categories in a cognitive structure would
be completely subsumed under others, e.g., the category

"basketball" would be subsumed completely under the category "game ball" which in turn might be subsumed under the

category "ball".

Some of the categories would overlap

without one or the other being completely subsumed, e.g.,
the categories "sociology" and "psychology" may overlap in
a

smaller category "social psychology".

Yet other cate-

gories might be related to others only by virtue of their

possessing

a

common dimension, e.g., the categories

"bureaucracy" and "steam engine" may have in common the

dimension "degree of entropy".
Building on this conceptualization of

a

cognitive

structure, we can begin to envision the differences between

cognitive structures characterized by differing degrees of
differentiation, integration, and comprehensiveness.
more comprehensive structure would contain

a

A

much larger

number of dimensions and categories available for evaluating
objects or events perceived in the environment than

comprehensive structure would.

a

less

For example, a comprehensive

structure might include the dimensions and categories relating to geogrpahy, transportation, economics, politics,

sociology, aesthetics, psychology, religion and architecture
for dealing with the problem of choosing a site for

a
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community development.

A less comprehensive structure might

include only dimensions and categories relating to shelter,
climate, proximity to drinking water, and the availability
of food supplies for dealing with the same problem.

This

difference in comprehensiveness of the two structures could

significantly influence the receptivity patterns adopted by
the two individuals as they evaluate prospective sites for
a

community development.
Ihe use of an analogy between cognitive structures
on

the one hand and library classification and cataloging
sys-

tems on the other is helpful for envisioning the differences

between a more and a less comprehensive cognitive structure.
In classifying a book or other object,

assigning

a

the library is actually

location to that object in the library collection.

This location establishes

a

spatial relationship between this

and other books in the library that is reflective of the re-

lationships between their contents.
to a cognitive structure,

a

In terms of our analogy

particular class, or subclass,

in the library classification system would be the analog of
a

particular category, or sub-category, in the individual's

cognitive structure.
a

book to

a

book.

a

Distinct from the process of assigning

class or subclass, is the process of cataloging

This involves the identification of key attributes

of the book (e.g., the topics dealt

with by the book, its

author or editor, its title) and the use of these attributes to indicate (through cards in the catalog) the various
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access routes an individual can use to locate
the book.
For example, it might be possible that a book
on erotic

Japanesepainting of the 18th Century written by Ino
Mishiko
might be found by an individual looking in the catalog

under

art, under painting, under eroticism, under Japan

under the title, or under the author’s name.
analog)

,

art,

-

In terms of our

these different aspects of the book are the analogs

to the dimensions characterizing a stimulus in the environ-

ment.

Just as the headings used in a catalog give an in-

dividual access to the classes or subclasses partially defined by these headings

tained in them)

,

(and hence access to the books con-

so dimensions give an individual access to

the cognitive categories defined, or partially
defined, by

these dimensions (and hence access to the
elements of in-

formation the categories contain).

In this way,

it can be

seen that what Bruner calls the "accessibility” of

a cate-

gory can be raised by the individual’s noting one of its

defining dimensions in the environment.

For example,

if

the dimension "round" is a salient characteristic or

dimension of the environment at

a

particular moment, cate-

gories partially defined by the dimension "roundness"
will be made more accessible.
The reverse of this relationship between category accessi-

bility and the salience of particular dimensions is also
likely to be true.

That is, given that

a

particular category

has a high accessibility, it is likely the dimensions which
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define that category will be more
salient aspects of the
environment for the individual than
dimensions not defining
the highly accessible category.
An example from our library
analogy would be the case of a student
who has been studying
works
the class "erotic Japanese art of the
18th Century"
beginning to note Japanese influences in
European art.

m

This library analogy is valid for characterizing
compi ehensiveness also.

Comprehensiveness indicates the

number of classes, or categories, into which
stimulus, can be placed.

a

book, or a

Thus, a college library using the

Dewey Decimal System has ten such classes in its
classification

system while an art library using the Dewey system would have
only one class.

The college library is much more compre-

hensive than the art library in terms of classification
structure.
is

The implication of this structural difference

that the college library has

a

much broader range of

receptivity to information than has the art library.

The art

library is receptive only to material which belongs in the
class "art" and rejects information which belongs in the

other nine classes of the Dewey Decimal System.

The analo-

gous relationship between the comprehensiveness of an

individual's cognitive structure and the range of receptivity to information he is able to adopt is discussed in the
next Chapter.

Differentiation of

a

cognitive structure, as mentioned

earlier, is indicated by the number of dimensions available
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for evaluating information encountered in the
environment.
In Figure 3.2 four dimensions are available
for defining

the categories "ball" and "game ball" and for
evaluating whether
or not objects encountered in the environment fit
these cog-

nitive categories.

In Figure 3.3, a pictoral representation

of these same two categories defined by the overlapping of

only two dimensions, size and roundness, is presented.

The

cognitive structure" of Figure 3.2 is therefore characterized by a higher degree of differentiation than is the

"cognitive structure" of Figure 3.3.

The implications of

this structural difference becomes apparent when the objects

included in the category "game ball" shown in Figure 3.2 are

compared with the objects included in that same category shown
•in

Figure 3.3.

Because of the increased differentiation of

the "cognitive structure" of Figure 3.2, it excluded from the

category "game ball" two of the objects (medicine ball and
cotton ball) included in this category in the "cognitive

structure" of Figure 3.3.

Returning to the analogy between libraries and cognitive structures,

a

more complex picture of structural

differentiation can be presented.

A small high school

library might subdivide its classification for art into the

subclasses "painting", "sculpture", "architecture", and
"crafts".

In the subclass "painting" might be placed in

alphabetical order such diverse works as

a

catalog of

works by Rembrandt, a book titled Great Paintings of the
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found

Golfball-*-

+ +

Moon * * * *

-+

A pictoral representation of the categories "Ball" (large circle)
and "Game Ball" (smaller circle) defined by only two dimensions:
size and roundness.
Shown "located" in this two-dimensioned
"cognitive structure" are the six objects listed above in the Key.

FIGURE 3.3
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Louvre

,

a

book on how to paint with water colors, and

book called Re naissance Painters and Paintings

a

An art

.

library, on the other hand, would subdivide its classification for art into far more specific classes and subclasses.
The category "painting", for example, might be further sub-

divided into categories by medium (e.g., watercolor, oil,
tempera, etc.), each of these into categories indicating

geographical areas (e.g., France, China, Mexico, etc.) and
>

each of these, in turn, into categories
denoting historical
period.
A book on French watercolor painting in
the 19th
Century, then, would have its place in a
specific class a

class quite distinct from those containing books
about

19th Century o il painting in France, from those
containing

books about 19th Century Japanese watercolor painting,
or

from those containing books about 20th Century French watercolor painting.

In contrast,

the much less -di f f erentiated

classification structure of the high school library would
place books on these subjects all in the same undifferentiated
class "painting".

The essential difference between the two

types of library classification systems is the number of

dimensions each uses for evaluating information about art.
The high school library uses only one dimension
(i.e., painting, sculpture,

crafts)

-

-

art form

while the art library

uses several dimensions just to define the category painting
and its many subclasses.

The implication of this structural

difference is that the art library will be far more discrim-

70

mating than

the high school library in evaluating
the mate-

rials it acquires for its collection.

An analogous differ-

ence between the differentiation of two
individual's cognitive structures would have the effect of
making one of the
individuals much more discriminating in his
evaluation of

stimuli from the environment.
The third major characteristic of cognitive
structure

with which we will be concerned is integration.

The degree

of integration of a cognitive structure indicates the
inter-

relatedness of the different categories making up the
structure.

Ausubel and Bruner seem to have stressed inter-

relationships of

a

hierarchical nature such as that depicted

in Figure 3.4 which is a representation of the Dewey Decimal

System's treatment of the classes "sociology", "social

psychology", "groups", and "small groups".
classes is

Each of these

related to the next more general class by

virtue of its being completely subsumed by it.^

This

hierarchical form of organization does not result in

a

very

high degree of integration because categories are related to
one another only within vertically connected groups.

^Credit for the library analogies is due to a very
helpful librarian in the Cataloging Department of Frost
Library at Amherst College.
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FIGURE 3.4
A representation of the hierarchical organization of four
classes within the Dewey Decimal System.
Integration between the c sses is limited to vertical interrelationships
.

A more complex, and significant, way in which categories within

a

cognitive structure can be interrelated

becomes apparent when it is recalled that categories are

defined by the overlapping of dimensions.

This makes possible

horizontal, as well as vertical, relationships between cog-

nitive categories.

For example, the category "game ball" is

related to the category "ball" in

a

hierachical fashion by

virtue of possessing the same defining dimensions.

But the

categories "coconut" and "tomatoes" can be related to the

category "game ball" without any hierarchical relationship
connecting them.

The three categories are related by their

having in common the dimension "roundness".

With common
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defining dimensions as the basis for
relationships between
cognitive categories it becomes feasible
for a cognitive
structure to be characterized by very
complex and subtle

relationships between categories.
case

m

The more this is the

an individual's cognitive structure,
the greater

its degree of integration.

The implication of this is that

such diverse categories as "ecology,"

"endocrinology,"

and

organizational change," which may be regarded as
unrelated
by an individual whose cognitive structure has
a low level
of integration, will, in the cognitive structure
that is

highly integrated, be related by the dimensions:
differentiation,"

"specialization of sub-parts,"

pendence of sub-parts,"

and "control of change,"

sequence of this higher level of integration

is

"structural
"interdeThe con-

that relation-

ships between cognitive categories will create new dimensions

which the individual can use for evaluating environmental
stimuli.

For example, the relationship between the cate-

gories just mentioned may result in the individual's generating the new dimension "degree of dynamic equilibrium."
This example also calls attention to another important
point.

This is the interrelationship between the three

characteristics of cognitive structures we have been discussing.
First, the greater the degree of differentiation of

a

cog-

nitive structure, the greater the potential for high levels
of integration.

This relationship follows from the fact that

common dimensions are the basis of interrelationships between

73

categories and the more dimensions defining
each category,
the more dimensions are likely to
be common to large numbers
of other categories.

Second, the greater the integration
of

cognitive structure, the greater the
potential for high
levels of differentiation since it is
integration which leads
a

to the generation of new dimensions and
hence to greater

differentiation.

The primary purpose at this point is to

characterize the three structural characteristics.
done so, we will leave

a

Having

more detailed discussion of their

implications for the next chapter.
The Receptivity-Adaptability Profile
i

.

Up to this point we have been concerned with the

individual differences (specifically, differences having to
do with the organization of cognitive structure) which may

influence the patterns of receptivity to information adopted
by individuals.

However, it was noted at the beginning of

this chapter that a better understanding of the functioning
of the basic antinomy identified by Jones and Gerard (see pp.

27-46) might be obtained by expanding their notion to in-

clude a consideration of important character is tics of the

environmental situation which might also influence the
functioning of the basic antinomy and hence the patterns of

receptivity individuals will adopt.
We begin this expansion of the notions of Jones and

Gerard and Rokeach by returning briefly to Bruner's hypotheses
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regarding category accessibility
(see pp. 48-50).
Bruner
(1957) suggests that an individual may
be more receptive at
a given time to information
falling into certain categories
or be more likely to perceive a
given stimulus as belonging
to one category rather than to
another.
This difference
between categories Bruner calls category
accessibility to
indicate the accessibility or receptivity of

category to information at

a

given moment.

a

particular

Building on this

notion, we can redefine the openness shown by an
individual
as being the number,

or range,

having high accessibility at

a

of his cognitive categories

given moment.

When faced

with information in a problem situation, the more open

person would have

a

broad range of categories available (i.e.,

categories with high accessibility) for classifying the

different items of information in the environment.

In con-

trast, a more closed person may at that moment have only

a

limited number of categories with high accessibility for

classifying information from the environment.

In effect,

his receptivity to information is narrowed down, or focused,
in such a way that he will receive only information fitting
a small

number of categories.

ceptive to

a

As

a

result, he would be re-

much smaller proportion of the total informa-

tion available than the open person, and he would either

exclude the information which is not readily classifiable
in his high-accessibility categories or be forced to distort

the information in such a way that it would fit into these
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few categories.

An important consequence of redefining
the opennessclosedness dimension in terms of the
breadth or narrowness
of the information spectrum covered
by categories with high
accessibility is that it removes the negative
and disfunctional connotations of being "closed" that
are attached to that
term by Rokeach and others.

Being closed no longer has to

mean that a person is unreceptive to information
because it
does not agree wtih his view of the world (the
definition
given the term by Rokeach and Jones and Gerard)

;

now being

closed can also be interpreted more generally to mean that
the individual has focused his attention (for whatever
good
or bad, conscious or unconscious, reasons) on a limited,

rather than broad number of categories of information.^
We are taken a step further in our expansion of the

notion of openness-closedness into

a

notion of receptivity-

It should be noted here, perhaps, that this redefinition of the openness -closedness dimension does not
preclude an individual's being considered closed-minded in
the sense that Rokeach uses the term.
If an individual has
only a narrow range of categories with high accessibility at
a particular time, it could be that the narrowness is based
on the desireability of focusing on information relevant to
a specific problem; or, it could be that the narrowness is
In the latter case, all
based on purely attitudinal criteria.
information of a counter-attitudinal nature could be excluded
because the individual has low accessibility in those
categories of his cognitive structure that pertain to matters
Such a receptivity pattern would
contradicting his beliefs.
indicate that the individual is closed-minded. This issue
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV with regard
to the domination of receptivity patterns by particular types
of category accessibility rules.
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adaptability by some comments made by
Ausubel.

He introduces

the idea that a discussion of individual
differences in cog-

nitive structures should include

a

concern with the relation-

ship between an individual’s structure
and the characteristics
of the situation in which he finds
himself.
It

is in the

context of discussing factors which influence
meaningful

reception learning that Ausubel identifies three
variables
of cognitive structure

(Ausubel, 1963, pp

.

28-29):

1.

.the availability in cognitive organization of relevant subsuming concepts at an
appropriate level of inclusiveness to provide optimal anchorage" for the information
received from the environment;

2.

the extent to which the information is discriminable from the "established conceptual
systems that subsume it;" and

3.

the stability and clarity of the subsuming
traces in the cognitive structure.

.

.

Here Ausubel is actually defining variables of cognitive

structure in terms of the appropriateness of the structure
to the information being encountered by the individual.

In

speaking of "relevant subsuming concepts," "appropriate
level of inclusiveness,"

discriminability of the information

from the "established conceptual systems," etc. Ausubel is

implying that changes in either the cognitive structure or
in the information in the environment could modify the

appropriateness of the cognitive structure to the situation
facing the individual.

If this reasoning is extended,

it is

apparent that any static cognitive structure could not be
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appropriate to all, or even a majority,
of the varied
circumstances an individual will
encounter.
To maintain

appropriateness in

variety of problem situations,
the
individual’s cognitive structure should
be capable
a

of change,

i.e.

cognitive restructuring.

Along these lines, Piaget

speaks of conceptual schemata having
"scope
(Piaget, 1950, p.

[s]

120) and of their having mobility or the

ability to adapt themselves to new situations
1950, pp.

of application"

142-143).

(Piaget,

This notion of adaptability to differing

situational characteristics leads us to the second
aspect
of our expansion of the open-closed dimension
into the notion

of a receptivity-adaptability profile.

Just as it is unlikely that

a

single, static cog-

nitive structure could be expected to suit all circumstances,
so it is equally unlikely that a single pattern of
receptivity
to information could be expected to suit a wide variety of

circumstances.

Therefore, rather than thinking in terms of

an individual's having a certain degree of openness to in-

formation (i.e., having
high accessibility)

a

certain range of categories with

it is more fruitful to think in terms

,

of the adaptability of the individual's receptivity.

capable of adopting

a

Is

lie

broad range of receptivity when the

situation requires it and then switching to

a

narrower,

focused pattern of receptivity when changes in the situation
call for it?

Cast in these terms, receptivity patterns take

on a dynamic character rather than the static character
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ascribed to receptivity by Rokeach or the
open-before-adecis ion- closed -after -a -decision character
ascribed to receptivity
the Jones and Gerard concept of the
basic antinomy's
functioning.
Characterizing an individual's receptivity to
information now can be seen to involve much more
than whether he
is open or closed at a given instant.
An appropriate description

m

of an individual's receptivity must include:
1.

a determination of what particular
patterns of receptivity are most
appropriate to the variety of situations the individual encounters
in his environment;

2.

a determination of the extent of the
match between the patterns of receptivity adopted by the individual and the
patterns of receptivity called for by
the situations he encounters; and

3.

determination of the situational
factors which are affecting the types
of receptivity patterns the individual will adopt.
a

In determining the pattern of receptivity called for by
a

particular situation or in characterizing the pattern of

receptivity adopted by an individual, it is necessary to examine
two crucial elements of the receptivity pattern.
is

the scope

o'f

The first

receptivity, broad vs. focused, indicated by

the range of different categories in the individual's cog-

nitive structure which have high category accessibility.

We

have discussed this aspect of receptivity patterns previously.
1

The second element of receptivity patterns which must

bo examined is the rule, or
rules, being applied by the
in
dividual to govern which categories
will have high uccessi

bility (i.e. ho most open to
information from the environment).
There are at least four typos of
category access!bility rules which can be identified.
These are:
1

•

Co n font - Or i on t a t on rules which
uc t e rin 1 n*e th a t a 1 1 categories
having to do with a particular
subject or aspoct of the environment will have high category
accessibility.
The inverse of
this type of rule would determine
that, all categories having to do
with a particular subject or aspect
of
he environment will have very
low category accessibility.
i

t.

2*

Pr occss-Or.icntat on rules which
determine that all categories having
to do with taking a particular approach
or set of approaches to the situation
i

will .have high category accessibility
(or in the case of t lie inverse, low
category accessibility).
3.

Sour c e - Or i en t a t i on rules which deter111

i

nr

1

fi;i

l

;i

I

I

i

;i

I

rj-or

i

cs

ha

v

i

ng

l

o

do with information emitted by a
particular source or sources (c.g.,
an expert, authority figure, or
grantor of rewards) will have high
category accessibility (or in the
case of the rule's inverse, low

category accessibility).
4

.

or Belief - alencc rules
which determine that a D. categories
having a particular valence (i.e.,
pro-attitudinal or counter- attitudinal valence) will have high category
accessibility (or in the case of the
rule's inverse, low category accessibility)
A 1 1 i t u d n al

.
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In addition to these four
rules,

two other cases

influencing category accessibility
should be mentioned.
One
is the possibility that
category accessibility may
appear to
be completely random with no
particular category accessibility
rules being applied to govern the
individual’s pattern of
receptivity.
The other possibility is that
whatever rule or
rules are governing category
accessibility will be superseded
by characteristics of the
information in the situation such
as the novelty or the intensity
of a particular stimulus.
For example, three men in an
apple orchard discussing apples
may be functioning under a
content-orientation rule to the
effect that only categories having to do
with apples will

have high category accessibility.

If there is suddenly a

loud lion's roar behind them, it is likely
that the "apples
only content-orientation rule will be
superseded by a rule

resulting in high category accessibility for those
categories
having to do with lions, modes of escape available
in an
a pple

orchard, the consequences of being eaten by

a

large

hungry carnivore, etc.
Possessed of the ability to describe patterns of receptivity to information in terms of the two elements just discussed, i.e., the scope of categories with high accessibility
and the rules governing category accessibility, it becomes

feasible to identify the pattern of receptivity required by
a

particular situation and to compare that with the pattern

of receptivity adopted by a particular individual in that
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situation.

If it were possible to
create a number of problem-

solving situations each of which
requires a different pattern
of receptivity, place an individual
in each of these situations in turn, and then compare
the patterns of receptivity
adopted by the individual with those
required by the situations, we would have a rough profile
of the individual's

ability to adjust his receptivity patterns
to fit varying
situations.
However, such a profile of the individual's

receptivity-adaptability would have little or no
generalizability beyond the specific situations in
which the individual

s

receptivity-adaptability has been observed.

To achieve

an R-A profile of an individual that does have
some measure
of generalizability

,

it is necessary to add another facet to

the profile.

This additional facet is a concern with the situational

variables that are having an influence on the individual in
terms of the receptivity patterns he adopts.

There are

a

large

number of such situational characteristics which could be
used for measuring the differences between problem-solving
situations, but for purposes of manageability and for conceptual reasons discussed in Chapter IV, we will place all these

situational characteristics into two categories and treat them
as only two variables.

The situational characteristics will

be classified into those influencing the arousal level of the

individual, and into those influencing the complexity of the

potential information input to the individual.

Factors con-
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tributing to arousal of the individual
would include time
restraints, physical conditions,
reward and punishment contingencies, the individual's involvement
or interest in the
situation, the individual's committment
to influencing the
situation, etc.
Factors contributing to the complexity
of
information input to the individual would
include the changeability of the information, the number
of sources emitting
information, the novelty of the information,
the intricacy of
the relationships among elements of
information, the size of
the information load (i.e., the number
of elements of infor-

mation which are crucial, must be generated by
the individual,
must be rejected, etc.), etc.
Rather than constructing
an

individual's receptivity- adaptability (R-A) profile from
his

information-processing behavior in randomly varied situations,
attention to arousal factors and complexity factors permits
the construction of R-A profiles for an individual under

given sets of circumstances, e.g., high arousal-high complexity, high arousal-low complexity,

and low arousal-low complexity.

low arousal-high complexity,

Such an R-A profile would

permit generalizations to be made about the patterns of

receptivity an individual is likely to adopt in the presence
of given levels of the two situational variables, arousal and

complexity
The first step in constructing such an R-A profile for
an individual would be to construct

solving situations that vary

(a)

a

typology of problem-

with respect to the patterns
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of receptivity most appropriate
to them and (b) with respect
to their situational characteristics.
Thus each situation
could be rated in terms of the
presence of factors contributing to an individual's arousal
level, in terms of the presence of factors contributing to
information complexity, in

terms of the scope of receptivity most
appropriate to it,
and in terms of the category accessibility
rule(s) most
appropriate to it.

Having rated the situations in the typology in the
manner just described, the next step in constructing
an individual's R-A profile would be to observe what patterns
of

receptivity the individual actually adopts in each situation
included in the typology.

His patterns of receptivity would

then be compared with the

appropriate receptivity patterns to

determine the extent of the match between the two sets of

receptivity patterns.

The final step would then be to ex-

amine the relationships between the levels of the two situational variables

(arousal and complexity) and the two re-

ceptivity variables (scope of receptivity and category accessibility rule dominance).

Such an analysis would indicate what

pattern of receptivity the individual would be likely to
adopt under various situational circumstances.
A concrete example may be helpful in understanding the

concepts we have been discussing in abstract terms.

We will

use the example of a single play in a football game as the

situation and the quarterback as the example of the individual
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whose pattern of receptivity we
are interested in.
First we
look at the situational factors
which determine the levels
of the two situational variables,
arousal and complexity.
Contributing to arousal is a time
limitation - there are only
twenty seconds left in the game.
Also contributing to arousal
are the reward co ntingencies of the
situation it is the

third- down -and -goal from the nine-yardline

behind 12-7 in the Super Bowl.

,

with the team

The winners get fame and

glory, the satisfaction of being the best
team, $32,000 per

player in winner's shares, and untold fortunes
from product
endorsements. Also contributing to arousal is
uncertainty 6 the opponent's pass and rush defenses have been
equally

effective.

A pass is more likely to gain the long yardage

needed, but an interception, dropped pass, or fully- covered

receivers are all possible obstacles to the success of
pass-play.
is

a

A run is safe from any interception, but a fumble

possible and wide runs have not been effective against the

opponent's defense while runs up the middle have been averaging
only five yards per carry.

All of these factors add up to

a

relatively tense situation which we would label "high arousal."
The situation is also characterized by factors contri-

buting to high information input complexity.

The information

available to the quarterback is highly changeable because the
opponents change their defensive formations several times
^The relationship between uncertainty and arousal
is discussed at length in Chapter IV.
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while the quarterback is in the
huddle and after he has begun
calling his signals at the line of
scrimmage.
Information
complexity is also increased by the
high information load,
primarily in terms of information which
must be rejected by
the quarterback.
This includes the sound of jet
planes overhead, sirens and other traffic noise
in the streets outside
the stadium, thoughts of the weekend
he spent in New York
with last month's Pl aybo "Playmate," and
y
remembrances of the
sensation he had two plays ago when he was
"sacked" by two

300-pound linemen.

There are also the perspicacious comments

from spectators yelling for

a

pass to wide-receiver "Lean

Louie" Lowenthal, a run by "Slippery Sam" Salvatorre, and
the

talk in the huddle about the results of the Redskins'
attempt
at a double-reverse suggested by the President in a
similar,

crucial third-down situation.

Further complicating the information input is the

inconsistent relationship between the intensity of different
elements of information and their potential importance to

helping the quarterback choose the correct solution to the

problem facing him.

The linebackers'

obvious feints toward

the line of scrimmage may be revealing a blitz or only be

fakes, while their true intentions may or may not be reflected
by their barely noticeable glances toward the receivers they

would normally cover.

The situation qualifies as

a

high

arousal-high complexity situation.
With regard to the pattern of receptivity appropriate
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to the situation it is
apparent that the quarterback
should

have

focused, rather than broad, scope
of receptivity.
The categories with high receptivity
should be limited to
those having to do with information
about the game itself,
more specifically, those categories
having to do with the
probable actions of the defense, the
whereabouts of open
receivers, the timing of the snap from
center, etc.
The most
appropriate pattern of receptivity would be
dominated
a

by

content-orientation and source-orientation rules
intended to
include specific information, e.g. rules to
the effect
that

only categories having to do with the immediate
play situation will have high accessibility/’ or "only
categories

having to do with information emanating from the coaching
staff (not spectators or politicians) will have high
category

accessibility."

Process-orientation rules, e.g., "only

categories having to do with

a

passing approach will have

high category accessibility," and attitude -valence rules, e.g.,
"all categories having to do with information which contra-

dicts my opinion will have low accessibility," would both be

inappropriate types of rules for this situation.

All situa-

tions could be examined and rated in a similar fashion.

Through such

a

for example,

as exhibiting appropriately broad scopes of

procedure, individuals could be characterized,

receptivity under conditions of low arousal and moderate
complexity, and to adopt receptivity patterns dominated by
source - or ientation and attitude -valence rules when arousal
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reaches moderate levels.
In abstract terms,

at least, we have moved from
the

limited notions of the open and closed
minds of Rokeach and
the Jones and Gerard basic antinomy
to the concept
of a

receptivity-adaptability profile that allows us
to characterize the functional adaptability of a
person’s receptivity
over time and across varying circumstances.

Such a means

of characterizing an individual’s receptivity
would have

important uses in predicting performance in various
roles,

performance under different conditions, etc., but our
concern
here lies in another direction.
For us the importance
of

having

a

means of characterizing an individual's receptivity-

adaptability is its usefulness as

a

tool for investigating

factors which give rise to individual differences in re-

ceptivity-adaptability.

Assuming that individuals must have

adequate receptivity-adaptability if they, and their society,
are to cope with the problems resulting from the socio-

his tor ical conditions outlined in Chapter

I,

it becomes

crucial that educators be able to maximize the likelihood
of each individual's attaining a minimal ability to adopt

and maintain appropriate patterns of receptivity in changing

circumstances.

If the search for these factors is to be

productive, it must be guided by

a

conceptual framework which

proposes an explanation of the dynamics which underlie

differences in receptivity-adaptability.

building such
Chapter IV.

a

It is the task of

conceptual framework to which we now turn in

CHAPTER

IV

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In the last chapter we developed the
notion of a re-

ceptivity-adaptability profile as

a

more useful way of

looking at an individual's receptivity to information
than
the open-v_s -closed concept of receptivity put forward
by

Rokoach and the basic antinomy notion developed by Jones and
Gerard.

We also suggested that the patterns of receptivity

exhibited by an individual under different circumstances
reflect underlying characteristics of that individual's

cognitive structure.

In describing the characteristics of

cognitive structures

-

for example their being made up of

cognitive categories whose interrelationships reflect the

interrelationships of environmental phenomena, their being

characterized by different degrees of comprehensiveness,
differentiation, and integration, and also their being characterized by some categories having higher accessibility to

environmental stimuli than others
nitive structure in

a

-

we portrayed the cog-

relatively static state.

This is in

contrast to our contention that receptivity should be looked
upon as a dynamic process rather than as
Therefore, we have reached

a

a

static state.

point where it is appropriate

to discuss the dynamic properties of cognitive structures

and their influence upon the dynamic process of receptivity,
88
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or, as we have labelled it,
receptivity-adaptability.

Dynamic Views of Cognitive Structure
Several of the theorists discussed in the last
chapter
have devoted some of their thinking and writing
to the problem of how an individual's cognitive structure develops
and

changes.

Ausubel (1963) believes that growth of the cognitive

structure can result from the systematic exposure of the individual to pioperly organized information.
must be presented in

a

The information

sequence that first provides

a

framework of subsuming categories ("traces" in Ausubel

general
'

terminology) which is firmly anchored to existing categories
in the structure by careful efforts to highlight the logical

connections between the new categories and the stable, already present ones.

Subsequently, information is presented

which differentiates the newly acquired framework of categories into more and more discrete sub - categories

.

This

process of anchoring "advance organizers" to stable parts
of the cognitive structure and then supplying more detailed

information to form sub-categories constitutes Ausubel's

conception of meaningful verbal learning.
Bruner, who, as an advocate of "discovery learning,"
has disputed Ausubel's contention that cognitive growth will

result merely from the presentation of carefully organized

information, emphasizes the necessity of some motive force
being present before cognitive growth will take place.
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Bruner (Bruner

etaL,

1966, pp.

11-29) argues that this

motive force derives from an individual's
experiencing a
conflict between his cognitive
representation of the world
and the appearance" of the world.
Bruner interprets
this

conflict as being

a

conflict between representational modes

used by the individual in constructing

a

model of reality.

Thus the individual's symbolic representation
of the world
may be contradicted by events perceived in
the environment
that are consistent with his "ilconic" or
"enactive" repre-

sentations of reality.

This conflict is resolved when the

individual reorganizes his cognitive representation in
such
a

way that the new relationships between symbolic categories

reflect more accurately the relat ionships between environ-

mental phenomena.
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961, pp
a

.

85-112) propose

stage theory of cognitive development (their term is

"conceptual development") which has the individual's cognitive structure passing through four stages en route
from

a

concrete structure to an abstract structure.

1

The

progression through the four stages is hypothesized to result from a Hegelian process of conflict between "antithe-

tical poles or opposites in development" followed by their
1 The

concrete- abstract dimension of a structure is
a measure of its dependence upon the "physical attributes
of the activating stimulus" (Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder,
1961, p. 3).
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integration and the subsequent emergence
of two new antithetical poles.
The poles, in pairs of A-B,

C-D, and E-F,

represent variations of the two opposities,
dependence and
independence.
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder support
their

belief

m

the likelihood of such a process by noting
several

points
1.

The discrimination of extreme opposites can be made more easily than
the discrimination between less different stimuli.
Once these opposite poles
have been discriminated, the person is
in a position to make finer and more
difficult discriminations.
The reference points placed around the extreme
limits of a given conceptual system
(that is, the two poles) therefore
serve as anchorages for making finer
discriminations with the "gap".

2.

Interpretations based on opposite poles
are more easily integrated than differentiations based on concepts that have
no necessary relationship to each other.
That is, black and white are opposites,
but they are also both colors.
Therefore the very opposition of the two
poles on the same dimension facilitates
integration whereas the integration of
differentiations based on unrelated
anchors would be more difficult.

3.

If the person can differentiate such
opposing poles and integrate them, such
a process represents the "optimal"
developmental leap because the emerging
conceptual system would have the characteristics of maximal abstractness relative to the poles of the original
concept on which it was based.

The facilitating effects of "opposites"
upon progression may be viewed in another
Progression is facilitated under
way.
conditions of clarity of the initial
concept, openness of the developing
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concept to discrepant (particularly opposing) events, and
the successful integration of
these two systems of mapping
into a new conceptual schema.
This view of the process of
development is one of emerging
concepts.
When training conditions favor the generation of
discrepant conceptual orderings
(opposing poles) a new synthesis
can emerge if the opposing or
discrepant differentiations can
be integrated.
The new synthesis
contains modified aspects of the
two initially discrepant poles.
When a new synthesis emerges, it
in turn serves as a baseline for
the possible generation of new
discrepant differentiations and
the development of new syntheses.

Piaget's theory of cognitive development also proposes
that cognitive growth takes place in stages, moving from a

sensorimotor period to

a

preoperational period, to

a

concrete

operational stage, and finally, to the stage of formal operations.

But the stages Piaget identifies are less important

to our concern with the relation between cognitive develop-

ment and receptivity-adaptability than are his concepts of

equilibrium and equilibration.
Piaget (1957) views the interaction between the in-

dividual and the environment in terms of

a

balanced vacillation

between the two processes of assimilation and accomodation

Assimilation is the process of the individual's cognitive
structure (schema's in Piagetian terminology) taking in

environmental stimuli and organizing it in accordance with

.
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the model of reality implicit in
the cognitive structure.

Accommodation is the process of the
individual's cognitive
structure undergoing changes or
reorganizations
to make it

more congruent with perceived reality.

structure has achieved

When the cognitive

balance between assimilation and

a

accommodation, Piaget considers it to be in
equilibrium.

a

state of

According to Ginsburg and Opper (1969,

p.

172),

"When in equilibrium the cognitive system need
not distort
events to assimilate them; nor need it change
very much to

accommodate to new events.
activity, openness, and

environment

a

Equilibrium then, involves
state of relative harmony with the

.

But the process by which cognitive structures achieve

higher and higher levels of equilibrium is the process Piaget
calls equilibration

.

Piaget theorizes that the equilibrium

of a structure is upset when the individual encounters novel

information in the environment which cannot be assimilated
by his cognitive structure.

However, if this disturbance

of the equilibrium of the structure results from a condition
of "moderate novelty,"

the cognitive structure accommodates

to the new information and thereby undergoes development

which results in re-establishment of equilibrium at
level.

a

higher

Piaget characterizes the condition ofmoderatc novelty"

as existing whenever the incongruity between perceived reality

and an individual’s cognitive structure is large enough that
the structure cannot assimilate the new information yet the
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incongruity is small enough that

a

reasonably small change in

the structure will result in the accommodation
of the structure
to this new perception of the environment.

Piaget maintains

that the individual seeks out aspects of the environment
that
are "moderately novel" because he becomes
habituated or sati-

ated with familiar stimuli (not sufficiently
incongruous) yet
also remains unattracted to radically novel
stimuli because
they do not correspond to anything in his
cognitive structure
(Piaget, 1952, p.

68).

Thus, only if there are sufficient

opportunities for the individual to encounter moderate novelty
will the process of equilibration, or cognitive growth,
be
a

consequence.
Berlyne, who has studied with Piaget and his co-

workers in Switzerland, regards himself as an S-R psychologist
rather than a cognitivist, and argues that cognitive behavior
must be explained in terms of S-R associations.

Berlyne

recognizes the likely existence of internal stimuli and responses which constitute mediating processes between environ-

mental stimuli and overt behavior much as cognitivists argue
that the components of a cognitive structure mediate between
the environment and the individual's behavior.

However,

Berlyne insists that these "internal responses" operate in

accordance with the same laws of behavior governing overt
responses (1965, pp. 14-19).

He has gone on to explore the

effects of what he labels "conceptual conflict" upon human

behavior and, in so doing, has translated many important
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Piagetian notions into the language of the
S-R psychologist.
He has also developed and investigated
a theory of "directed
thinking" ("thinking whose function is to
convey us to
the

solutions of

a

problem" (Berlyne, 1965,

p.

19))

that is

based on Maltzman's extension of Hull's notion
that response-

chaining leads to the formation of compound habit-family
hierarchies.

Berlyne contends that the combining of these

habit-families into what he terms "Transitive-Group" and
Tree - Structure" Habit-Family Hierarchies forms the mediating

structure which directs an individual's thinking and purposeful interactions with the environment.

In constructing this

theory, Berlyne touches upon many issues that are critically

related to our conceptualization of the development of an
individual's R-A profile.

For this reason it is worth

sketching the outlines of his theory of structure and direction
in thinking.

Berlyne (1965) begins by arguing that thinking evolved
as a consequence of its contribution to biological adaptation.

His argument is cast in the terminology of information theory

with the problem of the organism's functioning effectively
in his environment being conceived of as a problem of

matching his actual response to the optimal response.
sumably the organism must choose one of

a

Pre-

number of possible

alternative responses in any given stimulus situation, and,
Berlyne contends, will seek information which will reduce
the uncertainty as to which of the possible actual responses
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matches most closely the optimal response.

Because the in-

formation from the external stimulus situation
is often
insufficient to reduce this uncertainty, a
human will rely
on learning and thinking to supplant the
information avail-

able from the environment.

When repeated encounters with

similar stimulus situations occur, the individual
acquires
a set of

tion.

alternative response-chains to each stimulus situa-

For each situation these response-chains are grouped

into what Maltzman calls compound habit-family hierarchies

with the placement of any habit-family of responses within
the hierarchy dependent upon the generalized reinforcement

which that set of responses has received in the past.

Thus,

if one habit-family of responses has resulted in the indivi-

dual's making an actual response that matches the optimal

response for that situation, that particular habit-family of

responses to that particular situation will be reinforced
and repetitions of this reinforcement will result in that

habit- family

'

s

having

a

higher reaction potential in that

stimulus situation (i.e., in its being higher in the habit-

family hierarchy) than other habit-families.
This structuring of the individual's responses is re-

flected in the receptivity patterns of the individual in
the form of his rejecting initially information (i.e.,

stimulus characteristics of the situation) which would serve
as stimuli to evoke responses that are low in the compound

habit-family hierarchies.

On the other hand the individual
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Will tend to attend selectively
to those stimulus aspects
of the situation which evoke
the response patterns which
are
high in the compound habit-family
hierarchy.
If we translate
this portion of Berlyne's theory
into the language we used
Chapter III to discuss
receptivity-adaptability,

m

the

result would be the statement that
those categories of an
individual's cognitive structure which
have been associated
with behavior that has been rewarded
in a particular situation
will have higher category accessibility
than those categories which have not been associated
with rewarding behavior
sequences in that particular situation.
The portion of Berlyne's theory which is
most pertinent
to our immediate concern with how cognitive
structures de-

velop and change, is his discussion of the notion of
concep c onflict

and its role in motivating directed thinking.

Berlyne (1960) believes that an individual will experience

conceptual conflict any time

a

or more conflicting responses.
(1)

stimulus situation elicits two
This would presumably occur

when the stimulus situation is sufficiently novel that

no response pattern has acquired a greater reaction po-

tential than any other,

(2)

when the situation is associated

with response patterns with equal reaction potential, or

(3)

when the reaction potential of the previously-favored response

pattern has been reduced to

a

point equal to other response

patterns because enactment of the previously- favored response

pattern has failed to bring about the sought-after consequences.
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Berlyne believes that the individual
experiencing conceptual conflict, or uncertainty (if
we return

to the informa-

tion theory terminology Berlyne uses
interchageably with the
term conceptual conflict), will have
a drive to reduce the

uncertainly by engaging

in directed thinking which will

result in the response pattern which leads
to the successful
outcome of the situation (i.e., by discovering
the optimal
response).
By engaging in directed thinking, the
individual

provides himself with information not available in
the
immediate stimulus situation which is causing the conceptual
conflict.

He can then use this information to relieve the

conceptual conflict in one of four ways:

(1)

disequalization

of the reaction potentials of the conflicting responses;

(2)

swamping the conflicting responses by the introduction of
new response with

a

a

much higher reaction potential than all

of the conflicting responses;

(3)

conciliation of the con-

flicting responses by revealing that the conflicting symbolic responses are not necessarily incompatible;

and (4)

suppression of the "thoughts about conflict-ridden subject
matter or avoiding stimuli that tend to evoke such thoughts."
(Berlyne, 1960, p.

260)

Growth of the cognitive structure, or in the belief of
Berlyne, the development of new habit-family hierarchies,

results from the reduction of conceptual conflict when the

directed thinking engaged in by the individual leads to the
development of new "solution chains" of responses within

a
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compound habit-family hierarchy.

These solution chains can

be likened to paths leading from the
stimulus situation

through

a

number of intermediate symbolic stimulus
-response

pairs, or "situational thoughts,” representing
successive
changes in the state of the environment until
the last situational thought represents the desired state of
the environment.

For example, a quarterback who finds himself
on his

own 20 yard-line in a third-and-f if teen-yardsto-go stimulus

situation will construct a solution chain consisting of
symbolic representations of changes in the state of the
game

which will end in the symbolic representation of the state of
the game which has one of his teammates having just scored
a touchdown.

Connecting each of these situational thoughts

with the ones preceding and following it, will be what Berlyne
calls a "transformational thought," or symbolic stimulus-

response pair which represents the actions taken to transform
each stimulus situation into the one following it in the so-

lution chain.

The football quarterback would thus link each

of his symbolic representations of the stages of the game

(between his standing behind the line of scrimmage at the

twenty yard-line and the scoring of the touchdown) with

a

symbolic representation of the actions which would bring
about these developments, e.g. his completing
to the wide receiver.

a

63-yard pass

If the individual is rewarded by

success when he performs the overt responses contained in
the new solution chain, the reaction potential of

this

set

100

of responses will be increased,
thereby raising it within
the hierarchy of the compound habit family
When faced with
.

similar stimulus situation, the individual
will experience
less uncertainty or conceptual conflict
because he has high
in his repertory of responses the
new solution chain which
has successfully coped with past occurrences
of this
a

parti-

cular stimulus situation.

Further growth will not take place

until the individual experiences conceptual conflict
because
this newly acquired solution chain fails to cope
with
lus situation which has elicited it

pass does not work

in-

(i.e.

a

stimu-

the sixty-yard

the third-and- fifteen situation because

the opponents use double coverage on the wide receiver).

When such

a

solution chain fails to cope with the stimulus

situation and no other response chains in the compound habitfamily hierarchy are successful in coping with the situation,
a

new solution chain containing

a

different set of situational

and transformational thoughts must then be constructed.

In

constructing this new solution chain, the individual may give
new attention to elements of the stimulus situation which

were not previously noticed (e.g., pass coverage being used
by the opposing team)
In noting the role of conceptual conflict in directed

thinking (i.e., the development of new solution chains and
their combination into compound habit-family hierarchies),

Berlyne explicitly builds
of the cognit ivists

a

link between his theory and those

This link is his contention that directed
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thinking motivated by conceptual
conflict is at the heart
of Piaget's concept of the
role of moderate novelty
in the
process of equilibration (Berlyne,
1965, pp.

273-275).

The Conceptual Framework

Incongrui ty, uncertainty, and arousal

.

Berlyne and

Piaget have provided us with the two
essential links between
the dynamics of cognitive structure
and receptivity-adaptability.
The first link is the notion that
uncertainty (i.e.,

conceptual conflict or moderate novelty) is
the result of
an individual's perceiving a conflict
between his cognitive
representation of the environment and the actual
information
he is receiving from it or of an internal
inconsistency within his cognitive representation itself.

The second link is

the notion that this uncertainty motivates the
individual to

take some action to mitigate this conflict and thereby
escape

from the condition of uncertainty.
to the individual are;
(2)

(1)

The three choices open

to tolerate the state of uncertainty;

to seek information from the environment, stored in his

cognitive structure, or generated by directed thinking which
will allow him to reconcile the conflict between his cog-

nitive structure and the information present in the situation
by making appropriate changes in his cognitive structure;
or

(3)

to avoid exposure to,

ignore, or alter those elements

of information in the environment that are in conflict with

his cognitive structure.

His choice of either of the last
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two alternatives will determine
the pattern of receptivity
to information which the individual
will adopt, and, we will
argue below, the characteristics of the
individual’s cognitive

structure in combination with the characteristics
of the stimulus situation will determine which of
the three means of
reducing uncertainty an individual will use.
In developing a conceptual framework to
explain the

dynamics of receptivity- adaptability

,

we begin with the assump-

tion that all interactions between the individual and
his

environment are mediated at their interface by the individual's

cognitive structure.

This cognitive structure is the indi-

vidual's symbolic model of the environment and is built up
of numerous categories or concepts representing the ranges
of phenomena the individual has encountered in the environment.

The relationships between these categories reflect the in-

dividual's perceptions of the relationships between the phenomena which in the past have been present in his environment.
When the individual encounters

a

set of phenomena in the en-

vironment he arrives at an understanding of these phenomena
by sorting them into their appropriate categories in his

cognitive structure, or in the terminology of Piaget, he

assimilates them into his structure (presuming his structure
is comprehensive enough to include categories covering all

the perceived phenomena)

.

By assimilating the current elements

of the environment into his cognitive structure, or symbolic

model of the world, and presuming adequate integration and
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and differentiation of the structure,
the individual is able
to discover the relationships between
these phenomena and

between past and future phenomena.

The individual is able to

discover these relationships because they
already exist in
the structure of his cognitive representation
of the

world.

The categories into which the phenomena have been
assimilated

will be related in particular ways to other categories
in
his cognitive structure and these relationships between
cate-

gories allow the individual to predict the existence of

similar relationships between elements of the environment.
For example, if the individual perceives a bimetallic bar

about to be placed over

a

flame, these phenomena will be

assimilated into categories having to do with flames, metals,
and methods of fastening strips of metal together.

Having

assimilated this information into his cognitive structure,
the individual then takes note that the categories having to
do with metal have as one dimension their behavior in the

presence of heat and that this dimension relates it to the
categories having to do with flames.

One relationship

between the categories "metal" and "flame" in the cognitive
structure is that metals expand when exposed to heat.

If

his cognitive categories having to do wtih metals are ade-

quately differentiated, the individual will also note that
the rate of expansion is different for each of the two metals

fastened together to make the strip.

Finally, the individual

takes note of the relationship between the "methods-of-
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fastening -metal -strips -together”

categories and the "flame”

and "metal” categories and
realizes that the two strips
of
metal will be held together in
spite of the presence of heat
and in spite of the different
rates of expansion of the two
metals.
On the basis of these
interrelationships

between

the categories of his cognitive
structure the individual
may be able to predict that the
bimetallic strip, when ex-

posed to the flame, will bend in such

a

way that the faster

expanding metal strip is on the outside of
the curving strip.
If an individual encounters phenomena
in his environ-

ment which are incongruent with his cognitive
structure

-

that is, if the objects and events he perceives
in the

environment do not conform to the representations and
relationships present in his cognitive structure

-

the indivi-

dual is no longer able to predict successfully the occurrences
of those phenomena in his environment.

For example, if the

individual's categories having to do with metal and heat are
not adequately differentiated, the only relationship between

these categories which may exist in his cognitive structure
is

that when heat is applied to metal, it first softens and

then liquifies.

This individual would predict that the

bimetallic bar, when exposed to the flame, would soften and
bend down toward the floor.

If he then observed that the

bar bends up toward the ceiling, apparently having softened
as expected,

but unexpectedly defying the force of gravity,

the individual finds that his cognitive structure does not
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allow him to successfully predict environmental
phenomena
having to do with metals exposed to heat.
Such an individual
is thus placed in a state of uncertainty
regarding
the be-

havior of metals exposed to heat.
This state of uncertainty (or conceptual
conflict in
the terminology of Berlyne)

can be predicted to result in an

increase in the arousal level of an individual.

An explana-

tion of this prediction requires a short digression and
the

introduction of
IV.

a

concept developed

by Harold Kelley and J.

Thibaut (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959).

In formulating their

model for explaining the behavior of individuals interacting
in groups, Thibaut and Kelley argue that an individual has
"a

comparison level of outcomes'’ which is an indication of what

he regards as a minimally acceptable level of reward to be

received as the result of an interaction with other individulas.

The Comparison Level

(CL)

is

an individual measures the outcomes

the standard against which

(rewards or costs) of

any social interaction in which he takes part.
a

His CL is

sort of neutral point, or average outcome level to which

he has become habituated.

Any level of outcomes above his

CL is relatively satisfying and any level of outcomes below

An individual’s Comparison

his CL is relatively unsatisfying.

Level for alternatives, or CL

.

,

is

the outcome level he

can expect from the best alternative social interaction avail-

able to him.

If given the opportunity,

the individual will

take part in that particular social interaction which will

result in the best outcomes for him, i.e.

that social inter-
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action having the highest

CL,

alt

If we generalize the notions
of CL

'

s

and CL

,

alt

>

s

so
150

that they apply to any sequence of
behavior, whether part of
a social interaction or not just any sequence of behavior
involving an interaction between an
individual and the en-

vironment

-

we have a useful method of explaining
the re-

lationship between arousal and uncertainty.

The CL can then

be regarded as the general level of
outcomes to which the

individual has become habituated in his interaction
with the

environment or with which the individual is satisfied
as
result of these interactions.

a

Thus, most of the habitual

behavior patterns he follows in interacting with the environment can be predicted by him to result in his receiving outcomes roughly equal to his CL.

environment disrupts

a

If some occurrence in the

habitual behavior pattern being en-

acted in pursuit of the usual level of outcomes, the individual is no longer able to predict that he will achieve outcomes
at the CL level.

This disruption of his habitual behavior

patterns, either by the failure of his responses to have
their usual effect on the environment or by obstacles standing
in the way of his enacting the response sequence composing the

habitual behavior pattern, thus results in the individual's

experiencing uncertainty regarding what the immediate outcomes of his interactions with the environment will be.
If we presume

(as Thibaut and Kelley do)

that an individual

will always try to optimize the outcomes of his interactions
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with the environment, or as Berlyne
phrases it, always seek
to match his actual response with
the optimal response in
any situation, then we can conclude that
any uncertainty
regarding what level of outcomes he will
receive will motivate
the individual to take actions that will
restore his ability
to precidt the occurrence of environmental
phenomena
and thus

his ability to maximize the outcomes he receives
as
of his interaction with the environment.

stitutes the arousal which results from
tainty.

a

result

This motivation con-

state of uncer-

a

^

In our later discussion it is important to make dis-

tinctions between what might be regarded as positive arousal
(excitement)

,

ambivalent arousal (thrill)

arousal (anxiety)

.

,

and negative

Positive arousal could be expected to

result when the disruption of

a

habitual behavior pattern

opens up the possibility that enactment of

a

new behavior

sequence will result in higher outcomes than usual
is, when it is predictable that the CL

-

that

of the new behavior

sequence will be higher than CL, positive arousal is likely.
An example might be a gourmet who usually eats his wife's

cooking and has come to expect a certain amount of pleasure
from these meals (i.e., the habitual behavior pattern of

eating his wife’s cooking results in predictable outcomes at
^For a concise review of the concept of arousal in
motivation theory, see Appley, 1970, pp. 489-492. For a
more complete treatment of the role of uncertainty in arousal,
seeBerlyne, 1960.
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the level of CL).

If this usual eating pattern
is disrupted

by an invitation to the home of a

renowned chef from

Afghanistan, the gourmet can no longer
predict the level of
outcomes he is likely to receive as a
result of eating for
the first time a meal prepared by a
famous Afghan chef.

Though never having eaten Afghan cooking,
he believes it will
be better than the usual dinner his
wife would prepare
(i.e., predicted CL

alt

is higher than CL),

and, therefore,

the gourmet experiences pleasurable excitement
as a result
of his uncertainty regarding what the night's
dinner will
be like.

Should an individual have reason to predict that the

outcome of the disruption of his usual pattern of behavior
will result in outcomes lower than those he expected from
the habitual behavior pattern (i.e., if the predicted CL
is

alt

lower than his CL) the individual would experience negative

arousal, or anxiety, as

a

in which he finds himself.

consequence of the uncertain state
For example, if our gourmet breaks

out in hives at the sight of lamb in any form and gets itchy
eyes when he has eaten anything containing goat's milk, and

there is

a

chance that the Afghan chef will make these two

foodstuffs the central ingredients of the evening repast,
our gourmet is likely to experience anxiety as a result of
his uncertainty regarding what the night's dinner will be
like.

The actual level of arousal, whether the arousal is

pleasurable excitement or unpleasant anxiety, will increase
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as the predicted difference between
the CL

from the disruption and his CL increases.

resulting
The better, or

worse, the gourmet believes the Afghan
meal will be than
the one his wife would have prepared the
higher the arousal
resulting from the uncertainty caused by
disruption in his
usual dining behavior.
If the disruption in an individual's usual
behavior

patterns results in uncertainty that the individual can
predict will lead to outcomes either above or below his CL,

he/she is likely to experience arousal that is ambivalent
(i* e.

,

both negative and positive at the same time). An

example of

a

would be

rookie race car driver entering

a

situation giving rise to this sort of arousal

important race.
help him to

a

a

new car in an

He can predict that his fast, new car will

victory and net him fame and fortune (i.e.,

outcomes very high above his CL) or, at the other extreme,
he can predict that the new car will lead to his taking a

corner too fast and having a fatal accident (i.e.,
far below his CL).

a

CL

alt

Given these conflicting predictions,

the rookie driver might experience ambivalent arousal.

The individual's predictions as to the direction and

made
alt
likely by the disruption of his habitual behavior patterns

amount of the difference between his CL and the CL

are made on the basis of two sets of factors.

The first set

of factors are the situational characteristics accompanying
the state of uncertainty.

As mentioned in Chapter III
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(pp.

80 - 82 )

these were:

time constraints upon behavior;

presences or absence of conditions
causing physical discomfort; potential social, material,
or physical rewards
or

punishment contingencies, etc.

These situational charac-

teristics will influence the individual's
judgements regarding the eventual outcomes of a
particular situation

and will

therefore influence the extent to which his being
in

state

a

of uncertainty increases his level of
arousal.

The second set of factors which will influence
the in-

crease in arousal the individual will experience in

a

parti-

cular state of uncertainty are his combined past
experiences
in coping with uncertainty.

If the individual's past experi-

ences with uncertainty have largely been followed by rewarding outcomes

(either because he successfully overcame the

uncertainty and was able to bring about rewarding outcomes
himself, or because the outcome of uncertainty was always
a

"pleasant surprise") he is likely to experience

a

positive

arousal (excitement) and a higher level of arousal than an

individual who has not experienced anything of consequence
as the outcome of the uncertainties he has encountered.

the other hand,

On

if an individual's past experiences with un-

certainty have been followed most often by unpleasant occurrences, he is likely to experience a negative arousal (anxiety)
at a higher level than the individual who had not encountered

anything of importance subsequent to experiencing uncertainty.
These are, of course, polar cases.

Most individuals' reactions

Ill
to uncertainty would be geared
more specifically to the

contexts of their own past experiences with
uncertainty.
In the case of a certain person,

for example, uncertainty

encountered at an amusement park may always
result in pleasurable excitement whereas uncertainty
encountered during a final
exam may always result in unpleasant anxiety.
C o_g n i t iv e_

r_e s_t

rue t u r i n g and the reduction of u ncc r t a i n
t

Given that the individual is motivated to

.

greater or lesser

a

degree to reduce the uncertainty resulting from the
incon-

gruity between the environment and his cognitive structure,
the individual can, as mentioned earlier,

arousal level caused by the uncertainty,

(1)
(2)

tolerate the
seek information

which will help him reconcile the incongruency by making
changes in his cognitive structure, or

(3)

avoid those elements

of information in the environment which give rise to the in-

congruency.

If we presume that the information in conflict

with the cognitive structure is of importance to the survival
and effective functioning of the individual, then the recom-

mended action is for the individual to reconcile the incongruency by making changes in his cognitive structure.
Making appropriate changes in the cognitive structure
requires that the individual seek information, either in the

environment or stored in the cognitive structure itself

which will:

(1)

identify the new dimensions which must be

added to his cognitive categories (i.e., increase differ-

entiation of his structure),

(2)

identify the way in which
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these new dimensions result in new
relationships between
categories (i.e., increase the integration
of his structure),
and/or (3) identify how these new dimensions
should be combined
to form new categories (i.e., increase
the comprehensiveness
of his structure).
For example, the student who experiences
the incongruity between his cognitive structure
and the en-

vironment when the bimetallic bar bends toward the
ceiling

when heated may be sufficiently aroused by the resulting
uncertainty that he seeks information which will reconcile the
conflict.

He may first seek to reconcile the incongruity

without attempting any change in cognitive structure by assuming that he did not "see all there was to see" in the situation.

By

reexamining that portion of his cognitive structure

having to do

w ith
r

metals he may remember that some metals

can be attracted by a magnet.

"Aha!

There must be

a

strong

magnet pulling on the end of the bar and causing it to turn
up when the heat softens the bar sufficiently."

Having formed

this hypothesis the individual may reexamine the environment
in hopes of finding the strong magnet in the ceiling.

Fail-

ing to do so, he may seek further information from his cog-

nitive structure.

If the category "magnetism" retains high

category accessibility, the individual will be more receptive
to information fitting that category, e.g., magnets can also

repel magnetized metals.

"Alia!

The strong magnet is located

under the table below the tip of the bimetallic bar."

When

investigation disproves this hypothesis, the individual may
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abandon all magnetism explanations
(i.e., that category's
accessibility is decreased) and seek
information in other
categories.
If the puzzled student then
sees someone move a
metal ball freely back and forth through
a metal ring, then
heat the ball over the flame and be
unsuccessful in making
the ball fit through the same ring, the
student may again
give attention to the categories "heat"
and "metal"
and

perhaps grasp

a

new dimension which relates these two cat-

egories, namely, heat not only softens metal but
makes it
expand.

Further information-seeking might then be directed

toward investigation of this relationship, i.e.,
measuring
the lengths of strips of different metals before and after

heating them to see how much and how fast each one expands.
The investigation of this new relationship might then lead
to increased differentiation of his cognitive structure

(i.e.

addition of more dimensions to categories having to do with
metals) with the eventual result that our curious student

finally realizes why the bimetallic strip behaves as it does

when exposed to heat.
(1)

The points being illustrated are:

that uncertainty can be reduced, and therefore arousal

mitigated, by the individual’s making changes in his cognitive structure which make it
of his environment, and (2)

a

more accurate representation

that this restructuring requires

information-seeking on the part of the individual.
If cognitive restructuring is the most advantageous

way of dealing with uncertainty, we would presume that all
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individuals would react to uncertainty
by being open to new
information and by exhibiting a
willingness to change the
beliefs contained in the present
organization of their
cognitive structure.
Such behavior is the epitome of
the
open side of the Jones and Gerard
basic antinomy (see pp.
26-44).

But, as was stressed in our discussion
of the support

for the existence and functionality
of the closed side of the
basic antinomy, humans have a strong
tendency toward being

closed to new and conflicting information
and toward exhibiting
a desire to preserve their existing
beliefs.
We return again
to Rokeach's contention that belief-disbelief
structures

perform two opposing functions:

(1)

know and understand the world and

to help the individual

(2)

to help the individual

ward off threatening aspects of the world.

Neither Rokeach

or the consistency theorists offered an adequate explanation

of the sources of these two needs

,

but we have now reached

a

point in our conceptual framework where we can offer such an
explanation.
The heart of this explanation lies in the relationship

between uncertainty and arousal.

As noted above,

a

cogni-

tive structure enables an individual to predict the occurrence
of events in the environment.

To the extent that the indi-

vidual can make successful predictions, he will be in

a

better

position to match his actual responses to the optimal responses, i.e., he will be able to behave in a manner which

maximizes the benefits and minimizes the punishments he
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receives from the environment.

When the individual en-

counters uncertainty he experiences
arousal (positive,
negative, or ambivalent).
In an aroused state he is ready
to take action - action which gives
him the best
of the

alternative outcomes available.

But such action is pre-

dicated on knowing and understanding the world.

Hence the

need to know and understand the world has as
its source the
arousal to action that is a consequence of uncertainty.

Carried to its extreme, the individual may even have
as his

motivation to have an accurate cognitive representation of
the world the desire to take actions which place him
in sit-

uations of uncertainty so that he can experience the consequent positive or ambivalent arousal (excitement or thrill).

Should an individual find himself faced with uncertainty
that is causing him to experience negative arousal, but he
sees no possibility of taking actions that will bring his un^

certainty to

a

pleasant end, he is in need of some way of

escaping from the conditions causing him to experience anxiety

Herein is the source of the other basic need identified by

Rokeach

-

world.

Faced with uncertainties he can not overcome, an in-

the need to ward off threatening aspects of the

dividual experiences negative arousal and is thus motivated
to "ward off" these threatening uncertainties.

Structural characteristics and the difficulty of

cognitive restructuring

.

Remaining to be explained

is

the

source of the need not to know and understand reality, which
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is served by the "ward- of f- threat"
function of the cognitive

structure.

This explanation also rests on the
relationship

between uncertainty and arousal, but it also
requires further
discussion of the conditions which must be
present for cognitive restructuring to occur.

The primary condition that

must pertain for successful cognitive restructuring
to take

place is that the incongruency between the cognitive
structure
and the phenomena perceived in the environment must
be large

enough that it is noticed by the individual, yet small enough
that the changes in the cognitive structure required to re-

move the incongruency are not so large that the individual
is incapable of making them.

This condition of optimal in-

congruity is analogous to Piaget’s concept of moderate novelty
(see pp.

92-95).

If the uncertainty encountered by the in-

dividual is not within the limits of optimal incongruity,

cognitive restructuring is too difficult and not likely to
take place.

Therefore, uncertainty exceeding the level of

optimal incongruity prevents restructuring and the relief
from anxiety it would achieve.

If an individual is to

avoid undue anxiety, there must be

a

high probability that

the incongruities he encounters are within optimal limits.

Determining what this probability will be are

a

number of

factors, most of which have to do with the structural charac-

teristics of the individual's cognitive structure.
In the last chapter we identified three characteristics

of cognitive structures which were useful for describing the

117

differences between one individual's
cognitive structure and
that of another.
These three characteristics were:
(1)

comprehensiveness or the range of different
phenomena for which
there exist categories and dimensions
in the cognitive
struc-

ture;

differentiation or the subdivision of the
structure
into smaller, but related, categories
having more
(2)

exact

criteria (i.e., more dimensions defining each
category) for
the classification of stimuli; and
(3)

integration or the extent

to which sub-parts of the cognitive structure
are interre-

lated by their having common dimensions.

Greater degrees of

any or all of these structural characteristics increase
the

probability that the individual will encounter optimal incongruities between the environment and his cognitive structure.
Greater comprehensiveness increases the probability of

encountering optimal incongruity because
categories and dimensions in

a

a

broad range of

cognitive structure increases

the likelihood that one or more categories will bear some

relation to the phenomena contributing to the incongruity.
If this is the case,

the size of the incongruity is more

likely to be small enough to fall within the range of optimal

incongruity.

For example, the student struggling with the

bimetallic- strip problem is much more likely to be able to
make the appropriate changes in his cognitive structure

necessary for an understanding of the problem if his cognitive
structure contains the categories "molecules", "kinetic energy,"
and "expansion" than if he has none of these categories.
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Greater differentiation of a
cognitive structure increases the probability of an
individual's encountering
optimal incongruity by increasing
the likelihood that the
incongruity encountered is large enough
to fall within the
optimal range.
When more dimensions are used for
evaluating
phenomena encountered in the environment,
it is more likely
that an individual will notice differences
between
these

phenomena and realize they do not fit in the
same category
or do not conform to the same relationships
indicated by the

organization of his cognitive structure*

It is unlikely that

an individual whose cognitive structure
pertaining to animals

was so undifferentiated to be divided only into the
categories

"them what swims in the sea," "them what crawls on the ground,"
and

them what flies in the air" would have noticed any in-

congruity while watching the birds flying around the different
islands of the Galapagos group that might later have spurred
him on to formulate

a

theory of evolution of the species.

On

the other hand, Darwin, whose highly differentiated cognitive

structure doubtless had numerous categories for birds alone
and defined each of these categories by attention to such

dimensions as shape of tail feathers, wing structure, and the
shape of beak, did notice the differences in the beaks of the

birds on the different islands and did eventually reduce the

uncertainties this incongruity raised by formulating his
theory of evolution.

The greater differentiation of his cog-

nitive structure than that of our "them what.." naturalist
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made it more likely that he would notice
this small incongruity when observing the birds during Cook’s
visit

to the

Galapagos Islands.
The third structural characteristic, integration
of
the subparts of the cognitive structure by
their having in

common one or more defining dimensions, also
influences the
probability of the individual's encountering optimal
levels

of incongruity in the environment.

Remember that the upper

limit of optimal incongruity is set by the difficulty of
the change in the cognitive structure which must be made in

order for the structure to become congruent with the environ-

mental phenomena which have caused the incongruity in the
first place.

Any characteristic of the cognitive structure

which decreases the difficulty of cognitive restructuring in
response to

a

given stimulus situation will increase the

likelihood that the incongruities present in that situation
fall within the optimal range of incongruity.

Greater in-

tegration of the cognitive structure can decrease the

difficulty of cognitive restructuring by showing relationships between different categories which suggest their com-

bining into more comprehensive new categories or suggest
that important new dimensions be added to existing categories
to differentiate them into more discrete categories.

An

example illustrating this point might be the reactions of
two individuals with different degrees of integration of

their cognitive structures upon encountering for the first
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time a "funny mirror" or

a

mirror which distorts the re-

flections of objects in such a way as
to make them appear
much wider than they actually are.
Papu,

primitive tribesman living in New Guinea
will
serve as our example of an individual
with a cognitive
a

structure that has

a

very low level of integration.

cognitive structure contains the category "mirror"
as
result of his familiarity with the shaving mirror

Papu's
a

used by

an anthropologist who once lived with the
tribe.

His cog-

nitive structure also contains the category "eyeglasses"

because

lie

had tried on

a

pair of prescription sun-glasses

belonging to the nearsighted anthropologist, the category
"bubbles" because he had been given

a

bubble blower by the

anthropologist, the category "pool of water" because he
often drank from one near his village, and the category

"reflection" which he had experienced in connection with
both the mirror and the pool of water.
One day as Papu is hunting in the jungle he comes upon
\

a

full-length "funny mirror" propped up between two tree

trunks.

The image Papu sees in the mirror is that of an

immense tribal warrior at least three feet across at the

waist and four at the shoulders.

Succumbing to his first

instinct, Papu turns-tail and runs to hide behind the nearest
tree, but a glance over his shoulder reveals that the huge

warrior is fleeing in the opposite direction and is also
looking back over his large shoulder at the fleeing Papu.
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Papu stops.

The fat warrior stops.

look on his face.
his face.

Papu gets

puzzled

The fat warrior gets a puzzled look
on

"Oh ho," thinks Papu, "a mirror!"

gets an "Oh ho!" look on his face too.

raises an arm.

a

The fat warrior

Papu hesitantly

The fat warrior hesitantly raises his arm.

Papu smiles and returns to the mirror pleased
that he has

figured out that the presence of the fat warrior
is only
his own reflection in a mirror.
A shocked look suddenly
appears on the face of the fat warrior.

Papu has just

realized that the huge reflection in the mirror means that he,
Papy, has grown immensly fat!

Had the witch doctor put

a

strange spell on that three-toed sloth Papu ate for breakfast?
ach.

Papu and the fat warrior each reaches for his stomPapu looks down at his average-sized stomach, then at

the huge belly of his reflection, then back down at his own

stomach.

"Hmmm,"

thinks Papu, "there is an incongruity

between that portion of my cognitive structure pertaining
to mirrors and the environmental phenomenon

countered

-

1

have just en-

namely, that my reflection in this mirror is

much more obese than I."

Papu thought back to the near-

sighted anthropologist's mirror.
look any larger than he was.

No,

it had not made Papu

However hard he tried, Papu

could remember no occasion when the anthropologist's mirror
made anything appear larger than its true size.

Because the

only categories Papu was concerned with (i.e., the only

categories in his cognitive structure which had high
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accessibility) were the categories "mirror"
and "reflection"
and because he did not associate these
with the categories
eyeglasses" and "pool of water", Papu's cognitive
structure
seemed to contain no clues as to the explanation
of this

strange mirror.

Consequently Papu was uncertain as to the

properties this mirror might have.
anxious.

Papu begins to become

If this mirror has the power to make you appear
to

look fat, what other strange powers did it have?

anxiety changes to outright fear.
the mirroi

.

Papu's

He turns and flees from

The fat warrior flees in the opposite direction.

Edith Ann,

a

thirteen year-old girl living in Indiana,

will serve as our example of an individual with

structure that has

a

high level of integration.

a

cognitive
Edith Ann's

cognitive structure contains the category "mirror" because
she has several in her home.

Her cognitive structure also con-

tains the category "eyeglasses" because her older brother was

nearsighted and wore glasses to correct this, the category
"bubbles" because she had often blown soap bubbles, the category "pool of water" because she often played in an inflatable wading pool in her backyard, and the category "reflection"

which she had experienced in connection with both the mirrors
in her home and the wading pool in her backyard.

One day

Edith Ann goes to the county fair in Muncie and buys
ticket to the fun house.

a

She goes giggling and screaming

through its dark "Evil Passage," strangely slanted "TopsyTurvy Room," down its "Roller-Coaster Slide," and finally
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into its "Haunted Room."

There Edith Ann comes upon
her first
"funny mirror." At first she
thought the fat girl reflected
in
the mirror was her friend Gladys,
but then Edith Ann notices
that the fat girl seemed to be
doing everything that Edith
Ann
did.
Furthermore, the fat girl looked very
much like Edith Ann
complete with pony tail and freckled
nose.
"Oh!
A mirror,"
realized Edith Ann, "and that's my reflection.
But

fat!”

she went on to herself.

with the mirror.

I

"There must be something wrong

It's just like putting on my brother's
glasses

and having everything look bigger and out
of focus."

wasn't wearing any eyeglasses and had never seen
made anyone look fat.

mirror different
shape.

look so

-

a

But she

mirror that

Edith Ann begins to wonder what makes thi

what made it stretch her reflection out of

Then she remembers that she had seen her reflection

stretched out of shape before.

While making ugly faces at

herself in the undisturbed water of her wading pool one
boring afternoon, the barette she was wearing in her hair
had fallen into the pool causing a small splash and a series
of ripples in the surface of the water.

The rippled water re-

flected ugly faces back to Edith Ann that not only showed her

contorted mouth, wrinkled nose, and squinting eyes, but also
showed her whole face assuming weird shapes as the ripples
on the water distorted her reflection.

Edith Ann made one of

her favorite ugly faces at the fat girl in the mirror who

immediately returned the gesture in
"There must be

a

a

fatter, shorter version.

connection," she thinks.
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'Let’s see, ripples

bumps."

m

the wading pool water are like
moving

She looks carefully at the surface of
the mirror.

No bumps are apparent, only two fat blue
eyes looking back
into Edith Ann's.
Edith Ann then tried to think of other

places she had seen her reflection.

prescription sun-glasses!

"Oh yea, my brother's

Everything in them looks curved,

just like the things reflected in bubbles.

Ripples in the pool,

That's it!

my brother's glasses, and the bubbles

all had curved surfaces and they all make funny reflections.

Ah ha!

That mirror must be curved!"

Because Edith Ann had been concerned with the categoiies "mirror" and "reflection," and because the dimension

"reflective surface" is common to the categories "pool of
water," "eyeglasses," and "bubbles," Edith Ann eventually

associated these separate categories of her cognitive
structure with the most accessible category, "mirror," which
was also partially defined by the category "reflective

surface

She also noted for the first time that rippled

pools of water,

eyeglasses, and bubbles all had in common

the dimensions "curved surface" and "distorted reflection."

These relationships between the categories in her cognitive

structure led Edith Ann to hypothesize that distorted reflections result from curved surfaces.

In so doing, she

added a new dimension to her category "mirror,"

dimension "curvature of the reflecting surface."

i.e., the
No doubt

further exploration by Editli Ann would lead her to differen-
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tiate the category "mirror" into the
sub -categories "flat
mirror," "concave mirror," and "convex
mirror."
All of this restructuring was within
the capability
of Edith Ann when she encountered
the incongruity of

a

funny mirror" because her cognitive structure
was sufficiently integrated that the high accessibility
of the

catgeories "mirror" and "reflection" was eventually
transferred to other categories having the dimension
"reflective

surface

in common with these first two categories.

With

high category accessibility for "rippled pools of water,"

eyeglasses," and "bubbles" Edith Ann became more receptive
to information having to do with these categories,

especially

information which fit into, and united, these diverse categories.

The realization that objects in all these categories

had curved reflecting surfaces which distorted reflections
was just such a piece of information.

That Papu could not

make the appropriate changes in cognitive structure when he

encountered

a

"funny mirror" (even though his cognitive

structure contained the same categories as Edith Ann's)

is

due

to the lack of sufficient integration in his cognitive

structure to highlight important relationships between different categories.

Low category accessibility in these other

categories that were related to mirrors caused him to be un-

receptive to information having to do with these other categories

-

information which was crucial to his being able to

make appropriate changes in his cognitive structure.

Edith
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Ann successfully overcame the uncertainty
she encountered
and thereby escaped from the arousal,
or anxiety, brought on
by the uncertainty.
Papu failed to overcome the uncertainty
he encountered and therefore experienced
not only
anxiety,

but also sufficient fear of the phenomena causing
the un-

certainty that he fled from its presence.
The point being made by this digression into

a

dis-

cussion of the relationship between characteristics of cognitive structure and the ability to make changes in the

cognitive structure is that insufficient comprehensiveness,

differentiation, and/or integration makes it likely that many
individuals will encounter incongruities between the en-

vironment and their cognitive structures which they are
unable to remove because the incongruity does not fall

within the limits of optimal incongruity

.

^

Such an in-

dividual must then tolerate whatever level of anxiety

accompanies the state of uncertainty caused by the in-

congruity or find some way other than cognitive restructuring
to remove the incongruity.

If the anxiety accompanying the

state of uncertainty in which the individual finds himself
is too great,

the individual will find it uncomfortable and

possibly intolerable.

Herein lies the source of the need

not to know and understand reality.
3

When reality consists of

As noted later in this chapter, a cognitive structure
may be characterized by too much integration to make cognitive
restructuring likely.
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an incongruity causing a
great degree of uncertainty
and concomitantly high levels of anxiety,
the effective functioning
Of the individual may be best
achieved by enabling the

individual "to ward off threatening
aspects of reality" as
Rokeach phrased it.
In the terminology being
developed
here, this "ward-off-threat" need
can be filled by enabling
the individual to avoid any
information (from the environment or his own cognitive structure)
which calls attention
to incongruities between the
environment and his cognitive
structure which might cause him to experience
excessive
levels of anxiety.
Thus, both of the functions of cognitive
structures suggested by Rokeach have as their
source the

need to escape from the anxiety which accompanies
uncertainty
The anxiety can be escaped by coming to understand
the sit-

uation (achieved through cognitive restructuring), or,
that
avenue being closed, by

a

sort of "cognitive-hiding" from

the situation.

Whichever of the two methods of dealing with uncertainty the individual chooses, his cognitive structure

provides him with the means of carrying it out.

If he

chooses to attempt to overcome the uncertainty by gaining
a

better understanding of the environment, his cognitive

structure can help him discover important information and
reject unimportant information.

This it does by controlling

the individual's pattern of receptivity to information.

Rules of category accessibility will be applied which are
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aimed at making important categories of the
cognitive

structure highly accessible (e.g., categories having
to
do with reflective surfaces) while at the same
time making
less important categories inaccessible.

If the individual

chooses to ward off the anxiety caused by his failure
to

overcome the uncertainty

,

his cognitive structure can help

him ignore, reject, or alter information which brings to

mind the existence of the troublesome incongruity.

Again,

this is accomplished by controlling the individual’s pattern
of receptivity to information.

Rules of category accessi-

bility will be applied which make all categories having to
do with the contradictory information inaccessible (e.g.,

categories having to do with reflections will have low

category accessibility)

.

In the case of choosing to attempt

cognitive restructuring, the individual’s pattern of re-

ceptivity

is

likely to be dominated by category accessibility

rules intended to include particular kinds of information.
In the case of choosing to close off awareness of the in-

congruity, the individual’s pattern of receptivity is likely
to be dominated by category accessibility rules intended to

exclude particular kinds of information.

In either case,

the individual’s pattern of receptivity can have

a

broad or

narrow (or intermediate) scope of category accessibility.
Because of the negative connotation attached by Rokeach
et al.

and by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder to becoming closed

to information it is important to stress that closing out
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information which leads to uncertainty
is not necessarily
''bad" or disfunctional.
It is impossible for

any individual

to be able to understand all
of the complex phenomena
which
he encounters daily in his
environment; and it may be that

the anxiety caused by his concern
with not being able to

understand some of these phenomena will
seriously impair
his ability to cope with more crucial
aspects

of his world.

It is even more important to stress
that an individual

may be adopting

a

pattern of receptivity that closes out

much available information (i.e. adopting

a

pattern of

focused receptivity) not to avoid information
which leads
to uncertainty, but instead to focus his
attention only on

information which will help him overcome the uncertainty
by carrying out appropriate cognitive restructuring.

many instances the scope of

a

In

problem with which an indi-

vidual is dealing may be such that efficient problem solving
requires his focusing
of information.

attention on only

In such cases,

a

narrow segment

closing out much of the in-

formation from the environment becomes very functional.

In

fact, the ability to focus one’s pattern of receptivity when
it is called for is as important as being able to maintain
a

broad pattern of receptivity when that is called for.
Before leaving this discussion of the relationship

between characteristics of cognitive structures, anxiety,
and cognitive restructuring some additional points should be
made.

First, it should be noted that when cognitive re-
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structuring is taking place the affected portions
of the
structure cannot be used by the individual to
predict the
occurrence of phenomena in the environment.
process of making changes in

a

When in the

portion of his cognitive

structure, the individual is temporarily acknowledging
the

invalidity of that portion of the structure as an accurate

representation of the environment.

Consequently, he has no

model upon which to base his predictions about the environment, and he must instead temporarily tolerate being in

a

state of uncertainty while the cognitive restructuring is

taking place.

The process of restructuring itself will

therefore temporarily increase the amount of uncertainty
facing the individual above the level of uncertainty caused
by the originally perceived incongruity between the environ-

ment and his cognitive structure. It stands to reason that
the larger the incongruity between the environment and the

individual's cognitive structure, the larger the changes
that will have to be made in the cognitive structure.
As the amount of restructuring becomes larger, the longer it

will take and the greater the amount of uncertainty resulting from the restructuring process itself that will have to
be tolerated by the individual.

because individuals with

a

This relationship is important

higher tolerance of uncertainty will

be able to make larger structural changes than those in-

dividuals having a lower tolerance of uncertainty.

In this

manner, tolerance for uncertainty becomes another factor which
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determines the upper limit of what
constitutes optimal incongruity for a particular individual.
The greater the
tolerance for uncertainty possessed by an
individual, the
larger the amount of restructuring he can
tolerate, and
the gieater the probability that he will
encounter optimal

levels of incongruity between the environment
and his

cognitive structure.

Related to this issue is another concomitant of restructuiing.

This is the fact that the individual's ability

to predict environmental phenomena is not restored
until

he has had the opportunity to validate the changes made in

his cognitive structure.

He does this by using the newly

restructured portions of his cognitive structure to make
predictions about environmental phenomena and then he checks
to see if his predictions are borne out.

If they are,

the

structural changes are evaluated as being accurate cognitive

representations of reality and congruency between the cognitive structure and the environment is assumed by the individual to have been restored.

^

If the predictions are not

borne out, congruency is assumed by the individual not to
have been restored, further restructuring is necessary, and

further uncertainty must be tolerated.
4lt should be noted that an individual could incorrectly perceive his environment because his pattern of receptivity
excluded incongruent elements of the environment. This would
lead the individual to believe he had made appropriate changes
in cognitive structure when in fact he had not.
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The ease with which these validations of
structural
changes can be made will influence the amount
of uncertainty
caused by the restructuring.
If the validity of the changes
is easily confirmed, for example, our
Edith Ann can check

her predictions about the relationships between
the shapes
of reflecting surfaces and the distortion of
reflections in
a

variety of curved mirrors, an individual will not be in

doubt about the validity of the new portions of his cognitive
structure very long.

By contrast, it may take a very long

time for an individual to validate the cognitive changes
he has made with regard to those sections of his cognitive

structure dealing with morality or religion since predictions

concerning the importance of

a

particular moral code or

the powers of a diety may be very difficult to evaluate.

The

longer the time it takes the individual to validate to his

satisfaction the structural changes he has made, the longer
he must exist in a state of uncertainty and the greater the

total amount of arousal he must tolerate.

An individual

with a history of success in overcoming uncertainty and consequently

a

greater tolerance for uncertainty may be able

to devote long periods of time to validation attempts be-

fore he begins to experience undue anxiety.

An individual

with a history of failures in overcoming uncertainty and
consequently a smaller tolerance for uncertainty may be
able to devote only a short time to validation attempts

before his anxiety level forces him to assume prematurely

133

that the changes made during
cognitive restructuring are
valid, to abandon them and return
his cognitive structure
to the state it was in prior
to encountering the incongruity
that fostered his attempts to
make the changes in the first
place, or to make additional changes
in his cognitive structure.
It should also be noted that some
portions of a cognitive

structure are more "central” than others
in the sense that
large portions of the cognitive structure
are related to them
in such a way that changes in these
central portions of the

structure will require changes to be made in the
related

peripheral sections.

It is this property of particular

portions of a cognitive structure to which Harvey, Hunt,
and
Schroder (1961) were addressing themselves when they
dis-

cussed the centrality-peripherality dimension of conceptual
systems

Centrality-peripherality refers to the
degree of essentialness of a concept to
the larger constellation of concepts, the
total self-system or a subsystem of the
self, which might or might not be the
same.
There are numerous ways in which
centrality may be reflected. A conceptual linkage or sub j ect- ob j ect
relationship could be completely destroyed
or severed, and its effects on other
concepts and the larger system noted...
manifestations of greater centrality that
may be elicited by ... refutation (or confirmation) include:
higher affective arousal,
either negative or positive; a more intense
feeling of threat and anxiety in conditions portending violation to the directionality of the concept(s); heightened sensitivity and openness or receptivity
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to those stimuli
perceived
as confirmatory; and
increased
closedness to negatively
rele-

vant objects.

(1961, p p

.

75-76)

Making changes in these
centra! portions or categories
of the cognitive structure
necessarily causes more
uncertainty
than do changes in peripheral
sections or categories.
This
is because these central
parts of a structure, by
definition,
are integrated with large
numbers of peripheral categories
which will be affected by the
restructuring.
By involving
larger portions of the cognitive
structure
in the restruc-

turing effort, more of the
environment becomes unpredictable
and greater uncertainty for the
individual results. A
corollary to the notion that restructuring
of central portions
of a cognitive structure is more
difficult is the possibility
that increased integration (which
we demonstrated earlier
119-126) can facilitate restructuring) may
make cognitive
restructuring more difficult. Such a notion
would agree
with the observation that the most significant
discoveries
(pp.

of a scientist's career, that is, those
that constitute

major revisions of previously accepted theory, are
made early
in his career.

He may make many significant extensions of

this original discovery late in his career, but with the in-

creasing complexity of interrelationships he builds up in
that portion of his cognitive structure (i.e., with higher

levels of integration), it is less likely that the scientist
will change his basic point of view' or approach enough to
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favor his making discoveries which represent
significant

departures from the body of theory he has been
building up
during his career.
To do so would require making
changes

in portions of his cognitive -structure whose
integration with

many other sections would escalate the size of
the cognitive

restructuring undertaken very rapidly.

This postulated re-

lationship between level of integration and significance of

discoveries would not be expected to apply in those many
cases where the discovery is accidental, i.e., where the

scientist is working toward clear aims, but makes

discovery because he encounters

a

a

surprise

notable incongruity be-

tween the results of his efforts and the hypotheses he had

been trying to validate.
An example of a highly central set of concepts or

categories in an individual's cognitive structure might be
those having to do with material possessions.

If the indi-

vidual defines these categories partially, but significantly,
by the "good" portion of the dimension "good-bad," many of

the individual's cognitive categories are going to be organized
in such a way as to facilitate behaviors whose effect on the

environment is to help the individual acquire material
possessions.

If the individual encounters information in

the environment that suggests "goodness" is not the appro-

priate portion of the "good-bad" dimension which should
define categories having to do with material possession,
but instead indicates that it is the "bad" portion of the
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dimension which appropriately defines these
categories, then
the individual has discovered a large
incongruity between
his cognitive structure and the environment.
A
reorgani-

zation of his cognitive structure to make it
congruent with
this new information would effect large
portions
of his

structure and upset their functioning as

a

means of evalua-

ting a broad range of environmental phenomena.

Such

a

set

of structural changes would have, the potential for
changing
the individual’s entire life style, e.g., from that of

wealthy industrialist to that of

a

a

proper ty- less balladeer.

Needless to say, the uncertainties raised by contemplating
such

a

change would be immense and therefore the arousal

created very great.
Also contributing to the immensity of the uncertainty
and arousal accompanying the restructuring of highly central

portions of

a

cognitive structure is the fact that the

appropriateness of such changes, i.e., whether or not they
have succeeded in restoring congruency between the cognitive

structure and the environment, is often very difficult to
validate.

Thus the period of time during which uncertainty

must be tolerated is often greater when central categories
are involved in restructuring.

All of these points about

the property of centrality lead to the conclusion that re-

structuring of central portions of

a

cognitive structure is

more difficult and therefore less likely to be attempted
as a means of avoiding anxiety than is restructuring of
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peripheral portions of

a

cognitive structure.

Ihese considerations all point out that
the amount of
uncertainty caused by the restructuring
process itself sets
limits on an individual’s ability to
overcome uncertainty by
cognitive restructuring.
The difficulty of validating the

structural changes, the centrality of the
categories involved
in the restructuring, and the individual's
own tolerance

for uncertainty join with the three structural
characteristics

discussed earlier (comprehensiveness, differentiation,
and
integration) in determining the probability that the individual will encounter optimal levels of incongruity which will
lead to the growth of his cognitive structure.

play

They also

role in determining the patterns of receptivity

a

a

person is likely to adopt under different circumstances.
is this

It

relationship between cognitive structure and recep-

tivity-adaptability to which we now turn our attention.
Cognitive structure and receptivity-adaptability

.

W

have characterized receptivity-adaptability as the ability of
an individual to adopt and maintain patterns of receptivity
to information which are appropriate to the different problem-

solving situations he is likely to encounter.

which an individual

lias

The extent to

this ability will be determined largely

by the characteristics of his cognitive structure because

these will set limits on his ability to adopt and maintain
the widely varying patterns of receptivity required by the

different situations he is likely to encounter.

In order to
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explain why this is the case it is
necessary to recall some
of the discussion presented in
Chapter III.
(see pp. 77-80)

It will be remembered from Chapter
III that patterns

of receptivity can be characterized
by attention to two

different elements of the receptivity pattern.

One of

these elements is the scope of receptivity
to information.
It was described as being the range of
categories in the cog-

nitive structure with high accessibility.
vidual could be said to have adopted, or

require

,

a

Thus, an india

situation to

pattern of broad receptivity (i.e.

,

many diverse

categories having high accessibility) or perhaps

a

pattern

of focused receptivity (i.e., only a narrow set of categories

have high accessibility).

The other element of a receptivity

pattern was the type of rule governing which categories in
the cognitive structure would have high or low accessibility.

The types of category accessibility rules identified were:
(1)

content- orientation rules;

(3)

source-orientation rules; and

valence rules.
adopted, or

a

(2)

process -orientation rules;
(4)

belief- or attitudinal-

Thus, an individual could be said to have

situation said to require, the application of

certain rules, e.g., content-orientation rules intended to
include specific types of information or perhaps source-

orientation rules intended to exclude specific types of
information.
If we presume that an individual will encounter, over

time, a number of problem-solving situations requiring widely
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varying patterns of receptivity, it follows
that his receptivityadaptability will be limited by his ability to
adopt and
main-

tain the appropriate receptivity patterns.

Therefore, the

individual will have to be capable of assuming and
maintaining
a broad scope of receptivity at times
and a focused
scope of

receptivity at other times.

Likewise, there will be some

times when the individual will have to apply only certain
types
of rules

(e.g., content- or process - or ientation rules) to

govern category accessibility rules and other times when he will
have to apply other types of category rules (e.g., source-

orientation or attitude-valence rules) to control the scope
of his receptivity.

The comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration
of an individual's cognitive structure will influence his

ability both to adopt and maintain the proper scope of re-

ceptivity and to apply the appropriate category accessibility
rules.

With respect to the scope of receptivity, compre-

hensiveness will set the limit on the breadth of the scope
of receptivity an individual can adopt and maintain.

greater the range of categories in

a

The

structure, the broader

the potential range of categories with high category accessi-

bility.

For example, a problem situation requiring attention

to information falling into the categories "mirror," "re-

flection," "eyeglasses," "pool of water," and "bubbles"
is a

breadth of receptivity whose scope exceeds the compre-

hensiveness of the cognitive structure of

a

New Guinean whose
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world has contained no mirrors, eyeglasses, or bubbles.
In a similar fashion, effective urban planning requires

attention to categories of information ranging from the
technology of mass transit systems to sociological variables

which determine the cohesiveness of

a

community and on to

principles of aesthetics and architectural design necessary
for creating living spaces that are both functional and

aesthetically pleasing.

An individual capable only of re-

sponding to information in the categories "politics" and

"economics" will be unable to adopt and maintain

broad

a

enough scope of receptivity to deal effectively with the

problems of urban planning.
Increased differentiation increases the breadth of an

individual's scope of receptivity also.

Differentiation

increases the potential number of dimensions available for

evaluating any phenomenon perceived in the environment or

recalled from memory.

If only a single dimension is used

for classifying a stimulus, it will immediately be put in

only one category, or, at most, one closely related set of

categories.

If a number of dimensions are used for classify-

ing a stimulus, any category defined by one or more of these

dimensions can potentially have high accessibility for an
element of information contained in the phenomenon.

Thus,

one individual may evaluate political candidates according to
eign
the single dimension "dovish-hawkish" with respect to foi

policy.

The only categories in this individual

s

cognitive
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structure having high accessibility
are those partially
defined by the dimension "dovish-hawkish,"

e.g., the cate-

gories "candidates' positions on war
in Southeast Asia,"
"candidates' positions on ABM systems,"
"candidates' positions
on defense spending," etc.
These categories represent the
scope of his receptivity pattern regarding
the foreign policy
positions of all candidates. An individual with a
more

highly differentiated cognitive structure in the
area of
foreign policy might evaluate candidates on the
dimensions
amount of military aid that will be given to dictatorships,"

"amount of economic aid given to dictatorships," "amount
of
trading that will be done with colonial powers and nations

practicing apartheid," "amount of foreign aid that will be
given to neutral, developing nations," "amount of trading
that will be done with communist nations," "amount of tariff

restrictions that will be placed on foreign imports,"
"desire to achieve at least partial nuclear disarmament,"

"willingness to use military pressure to prevent nationalization of U.S. -owned businesses abroad," "amount of support
that will be given the United Nations and other supra-

national institutions," "willingness to cooperate with other
nations on scientific and environmental problems," and

"willingness to trade musk oxen for panda bears in the pursuit of international peace."

The individual defining his

cognitive categories pertaining to foreign policy by these
eleven dimensions instead of the single "dovish-hawkish"
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dimension can adopt,

much broader scope of receptivity
to
information about candidates’ foreign
policy positions
a

be-

cause any category partially defined by
any of these dimensions would be likely to have high
category accessibility.

Increased integration of cognitive structures
increases
the potential for adopting and maintaining
broader
scopes of

receptivity by making possible the activation (i.e.,
the
raising of the accessibility) of a number of
categories by
their having in common one or more defining dimensions.
example, our New Guinean friend, Papu, had

a

For

narrow scope of

receptivity because the dimension "reflective surface" did
not connect the categories "mirror," "eyeglasses," and "pool
of water" with the result that the high category accessibility

of "mirror" was not transferred to the other categories.

Edith Ann had

a

broader scope of receptivity because the

dimension "reflective surface" did connect all these categories
with the result that the high category accessibility of "mirror,"
was transferred to the other categories.
If higher levels of structural development

(i.e.,

comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration) permit
an individual to adopt broader scopes of receptivity, so too
do they better enable him to adopt and maintain narrower,

focused scopes of receptivity.

Focused receptivity is attained

by keeping the category accessibility of a few relevant cog-

nitive categories higher than the accessibility of the many
other less relevant categories of the cognitive structure.
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ihe key in maintaining focused receptivity is
continuity.
If the higher accessibility of the few relevant
categori<es

drops below that of any other category, the individual’s

attention can be side-tracked to less relevant information
causing him to miss important pieces of information belonging
in the crucial categories with temporarily lowered accessi-

bility.

focused receptivity therefore requires conti nuously

higher accessibility in the relevant categories than in all
other categories.

Maintaining this continuously high accessi-

bility is facilitated by the individual’s receiving

a

constant

flow of information which he perceives as useful in making

progress toward achieving

a

match between his actual response

and the optimal response for the situation in which he finds

himself.

In some cases this information will be of the sort

useful for making predictions about environmental phenomena
on the basis of his cognitive structure as it currently

exists; at other times this information will be of the sort

useful in the process of making appropriate changes in cog-

nitive structure that will remove an incongruency between
the individual's cognitive structure and the environment.

An example of this relationship between continuity of

information flow into high accessibility categories to maintain a focused pattern of receptivity is given by the ex-

ample of a bey who undertakes the building of

a

treehouse.

His receptivity to information will be focused on those

categories of information having to do with this activity only
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i.e., he will have high category
accessibility for information
regarding tree branch configurations,
pieces of scrap wood,
boxes of rusty nails in the barn, etc.
while he will have low

category accessibility for information
regarding blossoms in
the trees, birds in trees, old rubber tires
in the barn,

boxes of old shoes in the barn, etc.

As long as there is in-

formation being assimilated into the "treehouse focus"
categories of the boy's cognitive structure which permit
him to

predict successfully

sequence of interactions between his

a

behaviors and the environment that bring him closer to
achieving his goal of

a

tree-house, he will be able to main-

tain this focused pattern of receptivity.

When, however, he

runs out of long nails, returns to the barn to look for more,

and finds none

,

the flow of useful information into the

"treehouse focus" categories is interrupted.

There are no

longer stimuli in the environment whose assimilation into
these high- accessibility categories will help the boy

approximate his actual response to the optimal response, i.e.,
there are no longer any nails he can use for fastening the

floor of the treehouse to the branches of the tree.

His

unsuccessful attempts to use shorter nails and then screws to
attach the treehouse to the tree cause the boy to look for
other similar fasteners.

Failing to find any such objects,

the accessibility of the "treehouse focus" categories may

drop below the accessibility of other categories in the boy's

cognitive structure, e.g., the category "old rubber tires."
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If such becomes the case, the
boy's pattern of receptivity

will have lost its focus, perhaps
only to gain a different
focus, e.g., a focus on those
categories having to do with
making a swing out of the old rubber
tire he noticed during
his last trip to the barn to look for
nails.
The necessity of maintaining continuously
high accessibility in only the relevant categories
applies also to less

overt activities such as productive thinking.

As long as an

individual continues to be able to generate
information stored

m

his cognitive structure or present in the
environment which

allows him to make progress toward his goal, category
accessi-

bility in the relevant categories will remain high enough to

maintain the focused pattern of receptivity.

The only thing

likley to disrupt this focus is the interruption of this

continuity or the appearance of some stimuli in such intensity
that it raises the accessibility of some other unrelated

category above the accessibility of the categories contained
in the focus.

5

(see p.79)

Greater differentiation of the cognitive structure makes
it more likely that the individual will receive a continuous

flow of information into the categories included in the focus
of his receptivity pattern.
5

This is due to the fact that

A special case of disruption of a focused pattern of
receptivity is fatigue.
Sufficient fatigue would constitute
an intense stimulus capable of raising the individual's accessi
bility in such categories as "rest," "sleep," etc. until they
are more accessible than the categories originally within the
focus of the pattern of receptivity.
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greater differentiation means
that more dimensions, or
aspects, of a stimulus situation
will eventually be assimilated by the individual.
For example, a man who divides
the
category "automobile engine" into
the sub-categories "battery,"
"carburetor " and "main part of the
engine" will run
,

out of

information as to why his car will not
start as soon as he has
determined that the battery is not dead,

the car is not out of

gas, the engine not flooded, and the
"main part of the engine"
not broken because "it seems to turn-over
okay." A mechanic

may divide the category "automobile engine"
into the sub-

categories "engine block," "fuel system," "lubrication
system," "cooling system," and "ignition system"
and it is

piobable that he would break each of these down into
smaller
categories (e.g., "ignition system" is broken down into the

"primary system" and the "secondary system") and these smaller
categories down into still more discrete sub- categories (e.g.,
the "primary system" is broken down into "battery," "igni-

tion switch," distributor contact points," "condenser,"

"primary coil winding," and 'fesistor")

•

As a consequence

of his greater cognitive differentiation with respect
to automobile engines,

the mechanic's focus on the

starting problem will include more dimensions for evaluating
the problem with the result that he "can get more information

out of the situation" and will be less likely to have exhausted
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the flow of useful information
before locating the source of
the problem, e.g., the contact
points are badly burned.

Greater integration of the cognitive
structure may also
facilitate an individual's efforts to
maintain a focused
pattern of receptivity.
Continuously high category accessibility, remember, is dependent on the
availability

of informa-

tion which the individual can assimilate
into his cognitive
structure for use in predicting what actual
response will
match most closely the optimal response.
If there is little

integration between sub-parts of

a

cognitive structure, the

individual may exhaust the supply of information included
in
the narrow range of categories with high accessibility
and

become side-tracked when their accessibility drops below that
of an irrelevant category.

By contrast, greater integration

of these categories with other parts of the cognitive struc-

ture may result in the individual's noticing that one or more

other categories he had thought irrelevant to the problem have
an important dimension in common with the categories included
in the focus.

^

When this occurs the individual can raise the

category accessibility of just these few relevant categories
and include them with the other high-accessibility categories

without disrupting the focus of the receptivity pattern.

By

^Note that increased integration of the cognitive structure may also be detrimental to maintaining a focused pattern
of receptivity.
This would be the case when relationships between categories cause the individual's attention to stray to
'delated" but problem- irrelevant categories.
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so doing he makes available
a whole new set of
information

which may allow him to make successful
predictions regarding
what the optimal response in the
situation is.
For an example of this, we can
return to our treehouse
builder who has temporarily shifted his
attention to rubbertire swings.
When we left him he seemed to have
exhausted
the information in categories having
to do with fastening the

floor of his treehouse to the tree and was
wandering through
the barn looking for the materials to build
a swing.

suming he has

a

Pre-

sufficiently integrated cognitive structure,

his stumbling upon a box of U-bolts may rekindle
his inter-

est in (i.e., focus his receptivity)
his treenouse.

the task of completing

This will be the case if his cognitive struc-

ture connects the categories "nails," "screws," and "bolts"
by the common dimension "utility as a fastener" and results
in the accessibility of the category "bolts" being raised by

the boy's noticing the box of U-bolts.

As he rummages through

the box of U-bolts and through his memory, the boy recalls

that U-bolts are often used for fastening things to cylindrical

objects, e.g., a car's leaf springs to its axle.

Eureka!

Tree limbs and axles are both of the same shape so U-bolts
may work as a means of fastening the treehouse to the tree.

Unfortunately, the boy discovers that none of the U-bolts are
large enough to fit around the tree limbs.

But the category

"bolts" still has high category accessibility and the boy
decides to look for some long, straight bolts that he can
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bend into sufficiently large U's to fit
around the tree
limbs.
Blaah!
No luck here either.
The only bolts

he finds

which are long enough are also too hard for him
to bend.
Bend!

Bendableness (pliability to those without fluency
in
treehouse builders' colloquialisms) is a dimension
that

connects the category "bolts" with another

"baling wire."

category, i.e.,

Not only is the category "baling wire"

connected to the category bolts, but it is also connected to
the categories "nails" and "screws" by its having in common

with them the defining dimension "utility as

a

fastener."

His integrated cognitive structure serves the boy well.

Baling wire is easily found around any old barn, can be bent

around tree limbs easily, poked through nail holes made in
the floor of the treehouse, the ends tied and then twisted to

pull the wire tight, and the .treehouse is complete.

The boy

was successful in regaining and maintaining a pattern of re-

ceptivity focused on treehouse building because his integrated cognitive structure facilitated the continuous flow
of new information into those categories having to do with

building treehouses and thereby kept their category accessibility from dropping below that of other categories.
A boy with the same cognitive categories as our successful treehouse builder, but lacking sufficient integration be-

tween them, would probably have run out of useful new infor-

mation about fastening treehouses to trees as soon as he had
run out of long nails.

With no common dimensions providing
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ready connection between the
category "nails" and any
of the
other potentially relevant
categories of fasteners, this
other
boy would have access to no new
sources of information on how
to solve the problem.
Consequently, the accessibility
of the
categories in his cognitive structure
having to do with building treehouses would be likely
to drop below the accessibility
of other categories, and the boy's
receptivity would lose its
focus on the problems involved in
treehouse construction.
Having seen how higher levels of structural
development facilitate an individual's being able
to adopt and maina

tain greater breadth or focus in the scope
of his receptivity
to information, we can now go on to
investigate the way in

which these same structural characteristics influence
the individual's ability to apply category accessibility rules
that
are appiopriate to the situations he encounters.

High re-

ceptivity-adaptability requires that an individual not rely
on the use of inappropriate types of rules to govern category

accessibility, but the principles embodied in our conceptual

framework for explaining the dynamics of cognitive functioning
and their influence on receptivity-adaptability lead to the

prediction that some individuals would have

a

tendency to

rely on the use of source-orientation and/or attitude- valence
rules at times when it may be inappropriate to the situation.

Such would be the case when an individual with

structure characterized by

a

a

cognitive

low level of structural develop-

ment (i.e., low levels of comprehensiveness, differentiation,
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and integration) encounters
environmental situations causing
him to experience excessive levels
of uncertainty - levels
that lead to his experiencing high
anxiety.
The reasoning supporting such a
conclusion takes us
back to some points made earlier in this
chapter (see pp.109130)
During this earlier discussion it was argued
that an

individual's tolerance for uncertainty in any
situation (i.e.,
the extent to which he reacts to uncertainty
by experiencing
anxiety) is partially determined by the past
success he has
had in overcoming uncertainty in similar situations.

argued that

a

It was

low level of structural development lowered the

probability of encountering optimal levels of incongruity
between his cognitive structure and the environment; that this

decreased his ability to make appropriate changes in cognitive
structure to overcome uncertainty; that this led

to his

often failing to successfully overcome uncertainty (i.e., make

accurate predictions about what behavior sequences would lead
to favorable outcomes from his

ment)

;

interactions with the environ-

and that this in turn led to his experiencing anxiety

when he encountered uncertainty.
An individual with a low tolerance for uncertainty will
be motivated to escape from the concurrent state of anxiety
as quickly as possible.

If he does not readily perceive the

appropriate changes he must make in his cognitive structure in
order to remove the incongruity causing the state of uncertainty,
t

another path open to him is to seek information from

a

source
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which has consistently helped him
out of uncertain situations
before.
Often this source, whether
an ideology, single in-

dividual, or group or class of individuals,
will constitute
an authority figure for the
anxiety-prone individual. Such an
authority figure is obeyed because the
individual has come to

believe that the source possesses the most
accurate available knowledge of the environment (i.e.,
the best ability to
predict environmental phenomena) and therefore,
the individual's
failure to obey the authority figure is likely
to lead to un-

anticipated and unfavorable outcomes from the individual's
interactions with the environment.

authority figure or just

a

Whether

a

source is an

trusted source with regard to situ-

ations similar to that causing the uncertainty, the anxiety-

prone individual is likely to apply

a

source-orientation rule

to govern the category accessibility of his receptivity pattern,

that is, his category accessibility will be governed by the

dominance of rules to the effect that "those categories having
to do with any information from this particular source will

have high accessibility."

If this source does not have a

monopoly on the information relevant to the solution of the
problem facing the individual, his reliance on that source-

orientation rule will be inappropriate to the situation.

In

the case of the prejudiced individual as characterized by

Adorno

et_

aJ.

and Rokeach

e_t

a 1_.
,

the inverse form of a source-

orientation rule often governs the category accessibility of
his receptivity pattern.

By the inverse form, it is meant
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that the rule is applied to exclude information
emitted by

certain sources as in

a

rule to the effect that "those cate-

gories having to do with information from radical,
hippie
freaks will have very low accessibility."

The over-reliance

on the use of either form of source-orientation
rule will

mean lower receptivity-adaptability for an individual
since
it hampers his using the most appropriate category
accessi-

bility rules for each situation he encounters.

Essentially the same argument, can be made regarding the

likelihood that an individual with

a

low level of cognitive

development will exhibit an over-reliance on belief- or
attitude -valence rules to govern category accessibility when
he encounters uncertainty.

Failing the ability to under-

take the necessary cognitive restructuring, such an individual
can mitigate the anxiety caused by the uncertainty by lowering
his receptivity to any information which contradicts the be-

liefs and attitudes implicit in his cognitive structure (This

would again be the inverse form of

a

rule since it is intended

to exclude particular kinds of information.) and/or by raising

the accessibility of only those categories having to do with

information which supports his attitudes and beliefs.

For

example, in the unlikely case of an anxiety-prone Hindu mystic
who is experiencing uncertainty because of the teachings of
a

Calvinist missionary, the likely defense against anxiety

would be the adoption of

a

pattern of receptivity dominated

by a belief-valence rule to the effect that "All categories
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having to do with information which conflicts
with the teachings of the ancient and holy Sanskrit
writings upon which I
base my beliefs will have very low category
accessibility.”
Again, the consequence of over-reliance on the
use of

a

par-

ticular type of category accessibility rule--in
this case

a

belief -valence rule- -may be that the individual will
be unable
to adopt and maintain appropriate patterns of
receptivity.

He would therefore have low receptivity- adaptability

Situational characterist ics and receptivity- adaptability
Gr-eat stress has

.

been laid in our discussion upon the point

that an individual’s patterns of receptivity to information

need to be adaptable to situational circumstances.
cept of an R-A profile was introduced as

a

The con-

means of characteriz-

ing the extent to which an individual is successful in making
the adaptations necessary to achieve a match between his patterns
of receptivity in differing situations and the patterns of

receptivity which would be most appropriate to those different
situations.

We have just reviewed the ways in which the levels

of comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration of an

individual's cognitive structure will influence his ability
to adapt by adopting and maintaining appropriate patterns of

receptivity, but we have not yet discussed how the characteristics of the situations themselves influence the likelihood
of an individual's adopting one or another pattern of recep-

tivity.
In Chapter III

(pp

.

80-82) we classified the character-
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istics of situations into two categories:

(1)

those in-

fluencing the arousal level of the individual and

(2)

those

influencing the complexity of the potential information input

available to the individual.

We will discuss first how the

characteristics influencing the individual's arousal level
interact with the characteristics of the individual's cog-

nitive structure to influence the type of receptivity pattern
the individual will adopt.

The situational characteristics

we have categorized as influencing the arousal level of an

individual included:
1.

time constraints placed upon behavior;

2.

physical conditions contributing to the
comfort or discomfort of the individual;

3.

social, material, or physical rewards or
punishments contingent upon the outcome
of the situation;

4.

the individual's involvement, investment,
or interest in the situation; and

5.

the individual's committment to influencing the outcome of the situation.

Because it is difficult, and unnecessary for our purposes
here, to make clear distinctions between these different

situational characteristics, we have combined them all into
the single variable arousal level

Our interest lies only

.

in their potential influence on the patterns of receptivity

different individuals will adopt.

It

is

their contiibution

to determining the arousal level of an individual

cussed in this chapter earlier, pp

.

(as dis-

104-111) that is important
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because arousal level is likely to be
a major determinant
of the receptivity patterns adopted
by an individual in a
particular situation.
The relationship between arousal and
performance is

apparently best described by an inverted,
U-shaped curve, 7
i.e., both extremely low and extremely
high level's

of arousal

are detrimental to performance while moderate
levels of

arousal improve performance.
(1967, pp.

Schroder, Driver, and Streufert

67-105) have demonstrated that his relationship

also apparently holds with respect to what they term
"com-

plexity of information processing," and the way in which they
measure information processing complexity is similar in
some important aspects to the way in which we have charac-

terized patterns of receptivity to information.

The five

variables used by Schroder, Driver, and Streufert as measures of information processing complexity were:
1.

the number of kinds of information tracked;

2.

the number of ways information was combined;

3.

the number of sources of information used;

4.

the amount of discrepant information generated; and

5.

the number of higher-level strategies developed
.

an example of the empirical support for the existence of this relationship between arousal level and performA neuro -phychological
ance see R.B. Malmo, "Activation:
367-386, 1959.
66
dimension," Psychol Rev
7 For

.

.

,

,
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Three of these variables can be
interpreted as being characteristics of an individual’s pattern of
receptivity.
The

number of kinds of information tracked would
be an indication of the individual's scope of receptivity
(i.e.

the

range of categories having high accessibility)
since the

broader the scope of receptivity the greater the
number pf
kinds of information to which the individual is
receptive.
The number of sources of information used would be
an indi-

cation of the extent to which source -orientation rules were

being used by the individual to limit the range of categories in his cognitive structure with high accessibility.

And finally, the amount of discrepant information generated

would be an indication of the scope of categories in the individual's cognitive structure from which information is
drawn to supplement information available in the environment.
If we extrapolate from the findings of Schroder,

Driver, and

Streufert on the basis of this similarity between their

measure of information processing complexity and our concept
of patterns of receptivity, we can conclude that the scope
of an individual's receptivity patterns will bear an in-

verted, U-shaped relation to the arousal level of the individual

.

Schroder

et_

al.

(1967

,

pp

.

108-124) have also demonstrated

that individuals and groups of individuals having cognitive

structures with greater degrees of differentiation and integration will exhibit greater information processing complexity
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than individuals or groups of individuals
having less differentiated, less integrated structures.
Though the difference
is insignificant at extreme levels of
arousal, the difference
becomes very significant within the range of arousal
levels
that are most conducive to greater complexity
of information

processing.

Again, if we extrapolate from the Schroder et al.

findings we can reasonably conclude that the effects of
arousal
level upon scope of receptivity adopted by individuals with

more developed cognitive structures will be different from
the effects of arousal upon the scope of receptivity adopted

by individuals with less developed cognitive structures.
In addition to similarities between their measures of

information processing complexity and our concept of patterns
of receptivity,

these extrapolations from the findings of

Schroder

can be justified by some logical deductions

et_

al_.

from our earlier discussion of the relationship between un-

certainty and arousal level (see pp. 106-111).

In this dis-

cussion the point was made that an individual's desire to
optimize the outcomes he receives as

a

result of his inter-

actions with the environment constitutes his motivation to

restore predictability to the environment.

The size of the

discrepancy between his Comparison Level for outcomes

(CL)

and his Comparison Level for alternatives (CL^^) predicted
by the individual to result from the disruption of his

habitual behavior patterns determines the arousal level
of the individual.

Since the cause of the uncertainty will
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be those elements of information
in the environment which

disrupt the congruity between the individual's
cognitive

structure and the environment, this arousal will
be associated
initially with these incongruent elements of
information.

Attempts to restore predictability will necessarily
involve
these primary categories

(i.e., those categories directly

related to the incongruent elements of the environment) and
the individual will give these categories high accessibility,

provided the individual eschews information avoidance strategies.

In this manner arousal has the consequence of raising

category accessibility in the categories most directly related to the incongruent stimulus elements (the primary categories)

.

How high the accessibility of these primary cate-

gories will be raised will depend on the individual's arousal
level

(i.e., the size of the discrepancy between his CL and

CL

•

a 2^.)

If the arousal is not too high,

gories may have an accessibility on

a

these primary cate-

par with

large number

a

of categories in the individual's cognitive structure and

the pattern of receptivity adopted by the individual will

have

a

relatively broad scope.

If the arousal level is

sufficiently high, these primary categories may acquire an

accessibility which is much higher than all other categories
in the individual's cognitive structure and the pattern of

receptivity adopted by the individual will have
focused scope of receptivity.

a

narrow,

Thus, moderate levels of

arousal would be expected to result in moderately broad
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scopes of receptivity while higher levels of arousal would
be expected to result in focused receptivity patterns.

This deduction is consistent with our earlier extrapolation

from the findings of Schroder

et_

al. (see pp

.

155-158).

This effect of increased arousal upon the scope of

receptivity adopted would appear at first to be quite functional for the individual.

It immediately focuses his attention

upon those categories of information which have disrupted his
ability to successfully predict environmental phenomena and
to insure his receiving optimal outcomes from his interactions

with the environment.

With his attention focused on the cate-

gories related to the incongruity between the environment
and his cognitive structure, the individual can begin to

gather information which will allow him to make the appro-

priate changes in his structure and thereby restore congruity
and predictability.

But as we noted with regard to the prob-

lem of an individual’s maintaining a focused receptivity

pattern, successful cognitive restructuring may require

broadening the scope of receptivity to include some categories which initially appear to have only secondary rele-

vance to the problem of overcoming the uncertainty facing
the individual.

It will be recalled that oui

treehouse

accessibility
builder only solved his problems by raising the
of a few additional key categories

("bolts" and "baling wire")

elements
thereby making himself more receptive to crucial

fallen outside the focus
of information which had previously
of his receptivity pattern.

Therefore, it is important to
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note that arousal may have the effect of
decreasing the
scope of an individual's receptivity pattern to
such

a

narrow focus that it becomes detrimental to his efforts
at
cognitive restructuring.
This detrimental effect of arousal can be mitigated by
the influence of integration in the cognitive structure.

Integration is the interconnection of parts of the cognitive

structure by their having in common one or more defining
dimensions.

If arousal has raised the accessibility of a

few primary categories

(i.e., those directly related to the

incongruent elements causing the uncertainty, and hence,
the arousal)

,

sufficient integration will result in the

generalization, or transfer, of high category accessibility
from these categories to important secondary categories

related to the primary categories by important dimensions.
The effect of this transfer of high category accessibility
to other categories is to broaden the individual's scope of

receptivity and to mitigate the focusing effect of the initial arousal.

It can thus be argued that individuals with

more integrated cognitive structures will adopt and maintain

broader scopes of receptivity at

a

given level of arousal

than individuals with less integrated structures.

Again,

our deduction agrees with our extrapolation from the findings
of Schroder

et_

£l.

(see pp

.

158-160).

Negative arousal, or anxiety, may have an additional
effect on the patterns of receptivity an individual adopts
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in a pai ticulai

situation.

Overcoming

state of uncertainty

a

requires cognitive restructuring by the individual to remove
the incongruity between the environment and his cognitive

structure.

The process of cognitive restructuring itself

creates additional uncertainty and anxiety for the individual
that he must tolerate until the restructuring has been accom-

plished and its appropriateness validated (see pp. 129-133).
But successful restructuring requires that a condition of

optimal incongruity exist (see p. 115ff)

;

and one of the

determinants of the upper limit of what constitutes optimal

incongruity for

a

particular individual is the amount of

anxiety he can tolerate.

If he can tolerate a certain level

any conditions that contribute to the anxiety

of anxiety,

he experiences will decrease the reserve tolerance he has

Should the anxiety produced by situational

available.

characteristics (i.e., factors contributing to the individual’s
arousal level) be too high, the individual will not have

a

sufficient reserve tolerance for anxiety to allow him to

withstand the added uncertainty and anxiety caused by the
restructuring process.

An additional consequence of high

negative arousal, then, is to decrease the individual’s
reability to successfully carry out necessary cognitive

structuring

.

When the level of negative arousal

-

anxiety

-

experienced

situational characteristics is
by an individual as a result of
from attempting
high enough that it prevents the individual
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cognitive restructuring, the individual must resort
to some
other means of escaping from the anxiety brought on by
the
state of uncertainty.

The most likely are that he avoids

those stimulus elements which are incongrucnt with his

cognitive structure, distorts the incongruent elements in
such a way that they no longer appear incongruent to him,
or seeks out some source who can explain away the incon-

gruity for him.

In taking any of these escape routes from

his anxiety, the individual will adopt a pattern of recep-

tivity that differs significantly from

a

pattern intended

to help him make appropriate changes in his cognitive struc-

ture.

Instead of maintaining high category accessibility

in the primary categories initially associated with arousal,

the individual will apply category accessibility rules which

make him least receptive to information which has brought
about his state of uncertainty.

Thus, he may adopt

belief-

a

valence rule which lowers the accessibility of all categories
having to do with information which contradicts the beliefs
implicit in his present cognitive structure, adopt

a

content-

orientation rule which lowers the accessibility of all categories whose content is concerned with the information

associated with the incongruity which has led to his arousal,
or adopt a source-orientation rule which raises accessibility
in those categories having to do with information

1

rom soui ces

which support, rather than contradict, his present beliefs,
or finally, adopt a source-orientation rule which raises
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accessibility in those categories having to do with
information from a source he believes understands what
he cannot
(i.e., understands and can explain the apparent
incongruity

between the individual’s cognitive structure and the
environment)

and whose advice will therefore protect him from re-

ceiving outcomes which are below his Comparison Level (CL)
Each of these possibilities demonstrates that the effect of

excessive levels of negative arousal will be the adopting
by the individual of receptivity patterns dominated by cate-

gory accessibility rules intended to protect the individual

from experiencing further anxiety.

It should also be noted

that most such category accessibility rules are intended to

exclude particular elements of information in contrast to rules

intended to include particular elements of information.

The

former we have been calling inverse forms of rules.
As we noted when discussing the effects of structural

characteristics upon the individual's tolerance of uncertainty
(see pp. 125-127), greater structural development increases the

likelihood of an individual's having

a

higher tolerance for
is more likely to have

uncertainty, because such an individual

successfully overcome past encounters with uncertainty by
restructuring.

Given this greater tolerance of uncertainty,

the same situational characteristics which would result in

a

high level of arousal in an individual with a less developed

cognitive structure may result in only
arousal for the individual with

a

a

moderate level of

well developed stiuctuie.
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Consequently, this latter individual will have

greater

a

reserve of tolerance of anxiety which is available to help
him withstand the uncertainty and anxiety that result from
the process of restructuring.

He therefore has

a

higher

limit for what constitutes optimal incongruity and will have
a greater ability to overcome uncertainty.

This leads to

the conclusion that individuals with different degrees of

cognitive development will rely on different kinds of category accessibility ruies even though the situational charac-

teristics they face are similar.

The individual with greater

structural development will rely more on category accessibility
rules that focus his receptivity on the information elements
that are incongruent with his cognitive structure, whereas the

individual with less structural development will, under the
same situational characteristics, rely on rules that divert
his attention from these incongruent elements of information.
We can summarize the effects of situational characteristics

that contribute to arousal on receptivity patterns adopted by
an individual as follows:
1.

2.

3.

Situational characteristics that
contribute to high levels of arousal
tend to decrease the scope of receptivity adopted by an individual.
This effect is increasingly mitigated as the
degree of cognitive development of the individual increases.

Situational characteristics that contribute to high levels of negative
arousal tend to increase an individual
reliance on category accessibility

'
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rules intended to protect
the individual from experiencing further anxiety.
4.

This effect is mitigated to
the extent that the individual
has a higher degree of cognitive
development which decreases the
negative arousal he is likely
to experience when in a state
of uncertainty.

We turn now to how the second category of situational

factors

-

those contributing to the complexity of the po-

tential information input to the individual

influencing

-

the patterns of receptivity individuals are likely to adopt.
As was the case in our treatment of situational factors in-

fluencing an individual's arousal level, we will combine all
of the factors which contribute to complexity into the single

variable information input complexity

.

However, it is help-

ful to identify the six or so factors that we will include
in the variable complexity and to stress that a more so-

phisticated treatment than is possible in this dissertation

would investigate both the qualitative and quantitative
differences each of these factors has on the patterns of
The first of

receptivity individuals are likely to adopt.

these factors is the extent to which the information present
in the situation is static

time) or changing (i.e.

(i.e., continuously available over

present in the enviionment only parts

at a time in some sort of temporal sequence)

.

The greater

the
the changeability of the information, the more complex

problems of combining separate elements of information becomes
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because the individual does not always have direct access
to all the information and must combine different
elements

of information from different time periods with

the.

risk

that his memory of them may not always be accurate.

The

number of sources from which the information comes

is

second factor which influences the complexity of

situation.

a

a

The greater the number of sources,, the greater the complexity

because information about the source as well as the information emitted from the source must be considered by the in-

dividual.

A third factor is the size of the incongruity

between the information available in the environment and the
individual’s cognitive structure (i.e., the novelty vs. familiarity of the information)

.

A fourth factor is the intricacy of

the relationships between the elements of information.

The

more intricate the relationships, the more difficult and

complex is the job of discovering them and including them in
the cognitive restructuring that may be necessary to overcome

Also complicating information inputs to the

uncertainty.

individual will be the pattern of stimulus intensity present
in the situation.

If the pattern of stimulus intensity is

relatively simple and calls attention to appropriate categories
of stimuli (e.g., a lion’s roar calls attention to the most

immediate problem facing the individual hearing it, gives
the approximate location of danger, and raises accessibility
do
in those categories of the cognitive structure having to

with escape)

,

the processing of information will be simpler
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than if

a

to aid,

or perhaps even hinders,

more complex pattern of stimulus intensity fails
the individual’s giving

attention to the appropriate elements of information.

For

example, the problem of discovering "who done it?" in an
old Perry Mason episode is often complicated for the viewer
by his attention being drawn to misleading clues presented
in dramatic episodes, while the more clever Perry Mason dis-

covers the critical pieces of evidence by giving attention
to small details whose presentation is accompanied by little

intensity and which go unnoticed until Mason draws attention
to them in the courtroom or during the epilogue.

Finally,

the size of the information load upon the individual will

also be a factor in determining the information input com-

plexity of the situation.

Information load can be of at

least three types:
1.

2.

the number of elements of information
present in the situation which must be
combined correctly to allow the individual to make appropriate changes in
his cognitive structure;

the amount of information the individual must generate from his cognitive structure to supplement the
information present in the environment and
;

3.

the number of elements of irrelevant
or inconsequential information which
must be rejected or ignored by the
individual in his attempt to identify
the crucial elements of information.

in any of these three
The greater the information load present

the individual.
forms, the more complex the situation for
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In exploring the influence of
these factors which contribute to complexity of information
input, we can again

begin with work done by Schroder,
Driver, and Streufert (1967)
on human information processing.
In their investigation of
the effects of environmental complexity
(defined
as the

number of dimensions of information presented
in

a

time span,

the diversity of information, and the
number of alternatives

each unit of information adds) Schroder et al.
66)

(1967, pp.

54 -

again discovered that an inverted U-shaped curve
best

described the relationship between complexity of the environment and complexity of information processing.

As in

our discussion of the effects of arousal on patterns of

receptivity, we will again assume it legitimate to generalize
from the Schroder

et

al

.

findings regarding information

processing complexity to patterns of receptivity to information.

In this case we will presume

that their findings

suggest an inverted, U-shaped relationship between input com-

plexity (produced by any combination of the six factors just
identified above) and the breadth of the scope of receptivity

adopted by individuals in general.

Thus, we would expect low

levels of complexity to result in focused patterns of receptivity, moderate levels of complexity to lead to broader scopes
of receptivity, and excessively high levels of complexity to

lead to highly focused patterns of receptivity.

Once again

these assumptions can be supported by logical deduction from
the conceptual framework we have developed up to this point.
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The practical effect of increases in
any of the situational variables contributing to complexity
is to increase the
number of stimulus elements potentially
contributing to the

incongruity between the environment and an
individual's cognitive structure.
For the reasons discussed earlier

(see pp.

156-158), each of the incongruent elements will initially
be
associated with whatever arousal the individual
experiences,
and this arousal leads to higher category accessibility
in

those categories associated with the incongruent elements.
Thus, an increase in the number of incongruent elements,

which results from increased complexity, leads to high
accessibility in more categories
plexity leads to

a

-

that is, increased com-

broader scope of receptivity.

For example, the hero of an Italian-made western, who
is being held in the Taco-Tio Junction jail and is facing the

prospect of being hanged next week when the circuit judge comes
to Taco-Tio Junction to hear his case and sentence him, is

faced with

a

relatively uncomplicated situation.

If he is to

avoid putting in an appearance at the hanging, he must escape

from the one-room jail in which he is being held.

mation available to the hero-prisoner

is

The infor-

that there is one

barred-window in the jail cell which looks out on the alley
behind a Chinese res taurant

,

there is a no t- too-br ight deputy

in the next room who brings him his meals and spends most of the

rest of his time sleeping with his feet on the desk, the stable
is next door to the jail

(if the hero's sense of smell is
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accurate), most of the town takes

siesta every day be-

a

tween 1:00 and 3:00 in the afternoon,
and finally, the key
to the jail cell is left on top
of the deputy’s desk. Given
this relatively uncomplex situation,
the hero-prisoner is
likely to have a relatively narrow scope
of receptivity
which includes a focus on ways in which he
might either escape through the barred-window or get possession

of the key

to the cell door.

With either of these accomplished, the hero-

prisoner could then go to the stable between 1:00 and
3:00,
steal a horse, and make his escape on horseback by
following
the dry river bed which runs behind the Chinese
restaurant.
In contrast,

the hero of a Japanese version of

Bond-style adventure is faced with

a

a

James

more complex situation.

He. is being held prisoner in an Eastern-Bloc

prison that

features computer controlled cell-door locks, electrified grills
as

the floors in all of the cell-block corridors, alarms trig-

gered by photo-electric cells on all the doorways leading from
the cell-blocks, armed robot guards patrolling the prison

building and programmed to attack anything which moves unprotected by
inf ini turn

a
.

special tellurium badge, and so on almost ad

With all of this information available to the

amazing hero, he is likely to have a broad scope of receptivity which includes high accessibility in the many categories having to do with overcoming the immense complexity of

obstacles to his escape.
input complexity

lias

This is presuming that the level of

not become so excessive as to begin to
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decrease the scope of his receptivity.
Such a point is reached when the
complexity of the
situation results in such a large
incongruity between the individual s cognitive structure and
the environment that cognitive restructuring is so difficult
as to preclude its being
an available means of escaping the
anxiety the individual is
experiencing
the situation.
When this point has been reached,
the function of the cognitive structure
switches from helping
the individual to understand the environment
to the function of
helping to protect him from its threatening aspects,
in this

m

case excessive anxiety.

This is achieved by adopting

a

pattern

of receptivity which protects the individual from
further ex-

posure to the information which has given rise to his uncertainty, and hence., to his anxiety (see pp. 125 - 129 ).

Having reached this level of complexity, further increases in
input complexity will have the effect of narrowing the scope
of receptivity adopted by the individual as the accessibility

of more and more categories is lowered to protect him from

incongruent elements of information.
agree with the findings of Schroder

These conclusions
ert

a^L.

that complexity at

first increases the complexity of information processing until an optimal level of complexity is reached and then further

complexity will cause decreases in information processing complexity.
The level of input complexity will also affect an in-

dividual's patterns of receptivity in terms of the category

accessibility rules he uses to govern his receptivity.

Up
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to the point where increasing
complexity first begins to have

the effect of decreasing the scope
of his receptivity, it is
likely that the individual will have
relied largely upon con-

tent-orientation and approach-orientation
rules to govern his
category accessibility.
It is also likely
that any rules,

regardless of which of the four types, will
be used primarily
with the intention of including (receiving)
certain kinds of

information in the cognitive structure for the
purpose of
helping in the restructuring process.
Once this
point of

optimal complexity has been passed, it is more likely
that the

individual's pattern of receptivity will be dominated by source

orientation and att itude-valence rules; and it is also likely
that, whatever types of rules are used to govern category

accessibility, they will be primarily intended to exclude
certain kinds of information from the individual
to protect him from experiencing anxiety.

1

s

awareness

These relation-

ships between complexity and the scope of receptivity and the
types of category accessibility rules dominating the individual

pattern of receptivity are depicted in Figure 4.1.
As in the case of their investigation of the effects of

arousal on information processing complexity, Schroder

et.

al

found that individuals and groups of individuals whose con-

ceptual systems (i.e., cognitive structures) were characterized
by greater differentiation and integration reached optimal

levels of information processing complexity at higher levels
of environmental complexity than individuals with cognitive

content and approach
rule domination
(inclusion)

*

source and valence
_rule domination
(exclusion)

'

FIGURE 4.1
THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATION INPUT COMPLEXITY
UPON PATTERNS OF RECEPTIVITY LIKELY TO
BE ADOPTED BY AN INDIVIDUAL

structures which were less differentiated and less integrated
(Schroder

et_

aJ.

pp.

108-124).

And once again we will hypo-

thesize that this same relationship is likely to hold between
the degree of

cognitive development and the scopes of re-

ceptivity adopted by an individual.

The more developed (i.e.,

the more comprehensive, differentiated, and integrated) an

individual's cognitive structure, the higher the level of input complexity he can handle before his receptivity patterns

will begin to assume narrower, and narrower scope.

This

conclusion can be supported by the argument that for individuals
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with more developed cognitive structures,

a

higher level of

compelxi ty will have to be reached before the
size of the incongruity between structure and environment
exceeds the range
of optimal incongruity for these individuals.

They are able

to handle a higher level of complexity
by cognitive re-

structuring than the individuals with less developed
cognitive
structures (see pp. 115-129).
the lattei

At this same level of complexity,

individuals will find that their optimal levels of

input complexity have been exceeded and that the incongruity

between structure and environment has been exceeded with the
result that successful cognitive restructuring becomes unlikely.

The only recourse left to such an individual at this

level of complexity is to adopt

a

pattern of receptivity that

minimizes his exposure to the incongruent elements of information in the situation that caused him to experience uncertainty
and anxiety.

By the same token, this difference between levels

of cognitive development and its effect on determining op-

timal levels of input complexity for the two types of individuals also explains why at the same level of environmental

complexity the less cognitively developed individual will adopt
a narrow scope of receptivity which is characterized by the

dominant use of source-orientation and attitude-valence rules
intended to exclude specific kinds of information while the
more cognitively developed individual will have adopted

a

broader scope of receptivity characterized by the dominance
of content- or ientation and approach- or process-orientation
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rules intended to include specific kinds
of information.
In closing this discussion of the
effects of situational

characteristics on the patterns of receptivity
adopted by
individuals in general and the mitigation of
these

effects by

higher levels of cognitive development, it
stress two points.

is

important to

First, though the discussion has been

phrased in terms of total cognitive structures, it is
most
pi obable

that levels of development of different sub-parts

of a single individual's cognitive structure will vary
greatly.

For example, with respect to politics, an individual's cog-

nitive structure may be characterized by

comprehensiveness

1

,

differentiation

,

a

high degree of

and integration while with

respect to aesthetics in art and architecture, his cognitive
structure may be characterized by very low degrees of com-

prehensiveness, dif f erentiation
Second,

a

,

‘

and integration.

broader scope of receptivity need not be

"better" than a narrow scope of receptivity judged in terms of
their helping the individual cope effectively with
tion.

situa-

a

It is very conceivable that a situation characterized

by high input complexity requires attention only to

a

small

amount of the total available information, or perhaps,

attention only to information being emitted by one of
number of sources.

a

large

In a case such as this, a broad scope of

receptivity may handicap an individual by causing him to
divide his attention among both relevant and irrelevant elements of information.

It is therefore possible that some

situations will favor better performance by individuals with
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less developed, rather than
more developed, cognitive

structures

With this last point we have reached
the end of the
development of the conceptual framework
being offered as an
explanation of why individuals may differ
in their ability to
inarch their patterns of receptivity
to the requirements of
different problem-solving situations. We
move on now to a
discussion of how some of the assumptions
and hypotheses included in this conceptual framework could be
studied and to
a

description of

a

first minor attempt to investigate re-

ceptivity-adaptability.

CHAPTER

V

HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY, AND RESULTS
In Chapter IV we developed a conceptual framework for

explaining why individuals might vary with respect to their

receptivity-adaptability.

The purpose of developing this

conceptual framework was to provide us with some sort of

a

logically conceived outline for investigating individual differences in receptivity to information that influence problem-

solving ability, especially problem-solving that involves

utilization of information from social sources (see discussion
in Chapter I, pp.4-6).

As mentioned in Chapter

I,

the empir-

ical problems investigated in this dissertation constitute

only

a

first step on the way to

a

full-scale investigation

of individual differences in receptivity-adaptability, but
it

is

appropriate here to give an indication of what some of

the components of that large-scale investigation would be.
A Larger Scale Investigation
of Receptivity-Adaptability

First of all, presuming that receptivity- adaptability

proves to be a useful heuristic concept, the ultimate goal
of a full-scale empirical undertaking would be the identification
of variables which are the sources of differences in R-A among

individuals and which also might be susceptible to conti ol
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by educators working to improve students' problem-solving
skills.

Obviously, an important step in reaching this goal

would be the development of

a

reliable instrument for

characterizing an individual's R-A profile.

The format

such an instrument might take was described earlier (see pp
73-91), but before it could be constructed several sub-tasks

would have to be completed.
1.

These include:

developing a means of measuring the
scope of receptivity adopted by the
individual (see pp 74-75);
.

2.

developing a means of identifying the
dominance of particular forms of category accessibility rules over the
pattern of receptivity adopted by the
individual (see pp. 78-80);

3.

developing a means of manipulating
the amount and type (positive, negative,
or ambivalent) of arousal experienced
by the individual in particular situations in which his receptivity
patterns are being recorded (see pp.107110

4.

)

;

developing a means of manipulating the
amount and type of information input
complexity experienced by the individual
in particular situations in which his
receptivity patterns are being recorded
(see pp .165-168)

5.

;

and

developing a means of determining what
an appropriate pattern of receptivity
is for each of the particular situations
in which the individual's receptivity
patterns are being recorded (see pp 82-91).

and if an
If these tasks were successfully completed

profile
instrument for characterizing an individual's R-A

with the inveswere developed, the study could then proceed
by the conceptual
tigation of several major hypotheses suggested

framework.

5.1 below.
These hypotheses are given in Figure
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TABLE 5.1

MAJOR HYPOTHESES REGARDING RECEPTIVITY-ADAPTABILITY

Receptivity-adaptability increases as the cognitive
plexity (d. e., the comprehensiveness, differentiationcomand integration) of salient portions of the individual's
cognitive structure increases.

1.

a.

b.

Scope of receptivity is capable of greater variation
as cognitive complexity increases;
Dominance of source-orientation and attitude- valence
rules decreases as cognitive complexity increases.

2.

An individual's choice of receptivity patterns when he/
she encounters an incongruity between his/her cognitive
structure and the environment will be influenced by whether the individual is engaged in attempts to escape the
uncertainty by avoiding the information (stimuli) calling
attention to the incongruity.

3.

A focused pattern of receptivity can be maintained only
if there is a reasonably continuous supply of "helpful"
information available.
t

4.

An individual's scope of receptivity is influenced by the
amount of arousal he/she is experiencing, and in general,
this effect is best described by a bell-curve with arousal
level plotted along the ordinate and scope of receptivity
plotted along the abscissa.

5.

The effect of greater cognitive complexity upon the relationship described in Hypothesis 4 is to move the shape
of the function away from a bell-curve toward an inverted,
U-shaped curve, that is, increased cognitive complexity
mitigates the effect of arousal upon scope of receptivity.

_G.

7.

An individual's receptivity pattern will be increasingly
dominated by source-orientation and attitude -valence rules
as his arousal level approaches extremely high or extremely
low levels.
As an individual's cognitive complexity increases, the
effect of extreme levels of arousal upon the dominance of
source- or ientat ion and attitude- valence rules over his/her

receptivity pattern is mitigated.
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TABLE 5.1 (Continued)

8.

An individual's scope of receptivity is influenced
by the
information input complexity characterizing the
situation
and
general, this effect is best described by a bellcurve with information input complexity plotted along
the
ordinate and scope of receptivity plotted along the ab-

m

scissa.

9.

The effect of greater cognitive complexity upon the relationship described in Hypothesis 8 is to move the shape
of the function away from a bell-curve toward an inverted,
U-shaped curve, that is, increased cognitive complexity
mitigates the effect of information input complexity upon
scope of receptivity.

10.

Extreme levels of information input complexity (i.e., very
low or very high) cause an increase in the dominance of
source-orientation and attitude- valence rules over an
individual's receptivity pattern.

11.

As an individual's cognitive complexity increases, the
effect of extreme levels of information input complexity
upon the dominance of source-orientation and attitudevalence rules over his receptivity patterns is mitigated.

It is worth noting a second time that any investigation

of the relationship between receptivity-adaptability and the

complexity of cognitive structures must take into account the
likelihood that the degrees of comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration of different sub-parts of

individual’s cognitive structure will vary greatly

a
.

single

1

Driver, and Streufert (1967) hypothesize that
^-Schroder
and Vannoy (1965), in a comprehensive factorcase,
the
this is
ial analysis of 20 instruments which purported or could be construed as measuring cognitive complexity did not find evidence
that the instruments measured a common, general trait that could
Vannoy concluded that a
be considered cognitive complexity.
number of factors contributed to the complexity of an individual's interactions with his environment.
,

,
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The implication of this possibility is that cognitive com-

plexity would have to be dealt with as

a

content-specific

variable and measured by a battery of cognitive complexity
tests rather than by any single instrument.

In addition,

it

is important to entertain the possibility that cognitive com-

plexity is

a

variable.

For, although it is probable that the three charac-

multi-dimensional, rather than

a uni

-dimensional

teristics of cognitive structure- compr ehensiveness
tiation, and integration

-

,

are interrelated (see pp.

differen72-73),

it may be the case that attention to each of the characteristics

separately is the only satisfactory way of characterizing an
individual's cognitive complexity.
If a full-scale empirical investigation of the concep-

tual framework presented in Chapter IV were undertaken, it

would be important to investigate not only the major hypotheses
given in Figure 5.1, but also to devote

a

sizeable amount of

effort to some important subsidiary hypotheses.

These have to

do with the relationships among uncertainty, cognitive re-

structuring, and arousal (see pp. 101-137).

Ihese hypotheses

are presented in Table 5.2.

Once again considerable care and effort would have to go
into the development of the instrumentation to test for
the
tolerance of uncertainty, type and level of arousal, and

of stimuli
extent of the incongruity between a perceived set

cognitive
and the appropriate sub-parts of an individual's

structure
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TABLE 5.2

SUBSIDIARY HYPOTHESES RELATED TO RECEPTIVITY- ADAPTABI
LITY

12.

A perceived incongruity between an individual's cognitive
structure and his environment places him in a position of
uncertainty regarding potential occurrences in his environment and this exposure to uncertainty causes him to experience arousal.
a.

b.

c.

Uncertainty associated with circumstances the individual predicts will eventually give him outcomes
above those he is accustomed to receiving (i.e., he
predicts his CL
alt is higher than his CL) causes him
to experience positive arousal. (Excitement hypothesis.)
Uncertainty associated with circumstances the individual predicts will eventually give him outcomes below
his CL (comparison level) will cause him to experience
negative arousal. (Anxiety hypothesis.)
Uncertainty associated with circumstances the individual predicts will eventually give him outcomes either
above or^ below his CL causes him to experience ambivalent arousal. (Thrill hypothesis.)

13.

The pattern of receptivity adopted by an individual will
change in the direction of decreased receptivity to information concerning uncertainty as that individual becomes
convinced that his condition of uncertainty will persist
unless the circumstances giving rise to it can be avoided.

14.

Cognitive restructuring takes place only when an individual
encounters an optimal incongruity between his cognitive
structure and environmental or internally generated information.

15.

The greater the amount of restructuring necessary to overcome uncertainty (i.e. the greater the perceived inconthe greater the extent of the uncertainty and congruity)
sequent arousal experienced by the individual attempting
the cognitive restructuring.
,

16.

The greater an individual's tolerance of uncertainty, the
greater the size of incongruities falling within the lange
of optimal incongruity (i.e. the larger the size of cognitive restructuring he can attempt without experiencing
excessive levels of arousal)
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The Study

Within the scope of the investigation undertaken for the
empirical portion of this dissertation were some more limited
goals intended to indicate the potential fruitfulness of large-

scale research efforts.

One such goal was to discover if

people change their patterns of receptivity to information as
the problem situations they face change.

The answer to this

very basic question would give some clue as to whether or not
it is useful to think in terms of receptivity-adaptability
as a human trait.
In the conceptual framework two categories of variables

which influence problem-solving situations were identified:
(1)

those variables which contribute to the potential infor-

mation input complexity of the situation and

(2)

those variables

'S

which contribute to the potential arousal level of an individual in the situation.

In this experiment only one element

(the problem’s scope, e.g. whether its scope includes only

legal issues or also moral, social, and environmental issues)
in the first category was manipulated in the two problem

situations subjects faced.

In one of the problems only two

elements (time-po tentially- available and money-potential lyavailable) which contribute to arousal level were manipulated
and in the other problem situation only one variable

f i oin

category (time-potentially-available) was manipulated.

this

Ihus,

to achieve
the manipulation of problem situation conditions
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the first goal of this research effort was very
limited and

crude compared to that called for in

a

full-blown investiga-

tion of this aspect of the conceptual framework.
A second goal of the research was to see if the postu-

lated relationship between receptivity and cognitive complexity
is

strong enough to show up even though the instrument used to

measure cognitive complexity presumes that it is

uni-dimensional trait rather than

a

a

general,

content - specif ic and multi-

dimensional one as conceived in the conceptual framework.

If

this were to be the case, less effort would have to be directed

toward developing a battery of content- specif ic tests of cog-

nitive complexity than if this relationship is not manifested
using this already existing version of an instrument measuring

cognitive complexity.
The third goal of the research was similar to the one
It was to see if any preliminary support for

just mentioned.

the existence of a relationship between receptivity-adapta-

bility and tolerance of uncertainty could be found using

a

test

of intolerance of ambiguity as the measure of tolerance of

uncertainty.

If such evidence were found it would be

a

first

step in the investigation of some of the subsidiary hypotheses

presented in Table 5.2.
Hypotheses

.

The specific hypotheses tested in association

with the above goals were:

Hypothesis A:

As the scope of the problem
diminishes, the scope of receptivity adopted by an in-
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Hypothesis

B:

Hypothesis C:

Hypothesis

D:

dividual will decrease.
As the available completion time

and/or available money diminish,
the scope of receptivity adopted
by an individual will decrease.
Intolerance of uncertainty as
measured by the Budner Intolerance
of Ambiguity Test is inversely
related to intra- sub j ect variation
in scope of receptivity across
problem conditions.
Cognitive complexity as measured
by the Bieri Test of Cognitive
Complexity is directly related
to intra-subject variation in
scope of receptivity across problem conditions.

It should be noted that the above hypotheses are formu-

lated only in terms of scope of receptivity to information
(i.e., the range of categories with high accessibility) and

not in terms of patterns of receptivity to information. The

decision was made to postpone studying the dominance of particular forms of category accessibility rules in this study

when it became apparent that developing

a

reliable and accu-

rate means of identifying such category rule dominance would

greatly complicate both instrumentation procedures and data
analysis
Subjects and experimental design

.

The subjects used in

the experiment were sixty- four male and female college students

enrolled in the ubiquitous introductory psychology course.
Each subject's scope of receptivity was measured under four

conditions in each of two different problem situations.

Iheii

scores were then analyzed to determine if there were signifi-

cant changes in scope of receptivity across the foui conditions
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and to find if there were any relationships
between

a

sub-

ject's variation in scope of receptivity across
conditions
and his/her scores on a test of intolerance of
ambiguity and
on a test of cognitive complexity.

The experiment was set up as two separate analyses of

variance designs each with one between- sub j ect and two withinsubject variables.

A subject's scores on the Budner (1962)

Intolerance of Ambiguity Test was the between- sub j ects variable
in the first analysis of variance and the scores on the Bieri

(1955)

Cognitive Complexity test the between- sub j ects variable

in the second analysis of variance.

In both cases the be-

tween- sub j ects variable had two levels arrived at by

a

median-

split of the subjects into equal groups of high and low scoring
sub j ects

The two within- sub j ect variables were problem scope and

time/money potentially available in both of the analyses of
variance.

Each of these two variables also had two levels

yielding four conditions for each problem situation:
Condition

1

--

Broad Problem Scope, Ample Time/
Money

Condition

2

--

Broad Problem Scope, Limited Time/
Money

Condition

3

--

Narrow Problem Scope, Ample Time/
Money

Condition

4

--

Narrow Problem Scope, Limited Time/
Money

The experimental design resulting from this arrangement
of be tween- sub j ect and within- sub j ect variables is represented
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in Table 5.3 below.

In this table,

and

'A'

'C'

are In-

tolerance of Ambiguity and Cognitive Complexity
respectively,
*P' is problem scope and
is time/money available.
1

'

TABLE 5.3
THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

T

1

Y l* 1- 1*

T

Analysis of Variance

1

Analysis of Variance

2

2

1

A 1 ?1
b 32

A 2 ?33
*64

Y

Procedure.

Subjects were given

a test

6 4

*

2

•

2

*

2

packet consis-

ting of written directions, eight hypothetical problem situa-

tions, and two electronically- scored answer sheets.

(See
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Appendix

for copies of the test
instruments.)

Subjects were

then directed by the experimentor
to print their names,
class
year, and sex on the answer sheets
in the appropriate spaces
and given directions on how to mark
their answers for the

three separate parts of the experiment.

They were then told

that each part of the experiment should
be completed taking
as much time as needed before obtaining
the next part of the

experiment.

This procedure was to be followed until all
three

parts of the experiment had been completed and
turned in to
the experimentor.

Subjects, after being given an opportunity

to ask clarifying questions about the above
directives, were

instructed to begin working on Part
directions that accompanied it.

I

after reading the written

The subjects each completed

the three parts of the experiment in order, turned the tests

and answer sheets in, were given a brief, written explanation
of the purpose of the experiment, and allowed to leave.

Measuring Instruments
containing

The first part of the experiment

.

the eight hypothetical problems actually consisted

of the four conditions identified above for each of two prob-

lem situations.

The basic format of the instrument consisted

of a written description of

a

hypothetical problem situation

and an accompanying list of several elements of information

potentially available to the problem-solver.

Each of the two

problem situations was written in four variations intended to
require changes in scope of receptivity appropriate to efficient solution of the problem.

For the purpose of the study,
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receptivity was defined as an individual's
"taking into
consideration" a particular element of
information on the list
accompanying the problem situations. This
definition is
an

attempt to make a distinction between
receptivity and per ce gtion which implies only having a
sensory awareness
,

of a

stimulus, and also to make

a

distinction between receptivity

and persuasion, which implies acceptance of the
value communi-

cated in an element of information.
In actually working through the two problem situations,

each subject read the description of the problem situation
for
that condition, rated each of the twenty accompanying informa-

tion items as critical

,

important

,

relevant

,

po s s ib ly relevant,

or irrelevant to solution of the problem under that condition,

and repeated this procedure until all four conditions of the
two problem situations were completed.

In the case of the

first problem situation, the "abortion problem," the twenty

information items were designed to fit into six categories
(religious, socio-economic, psychological, environmental,
legal, and political) of which only the fifth (legal) was

designed to be of salient importance in the "narrow scope"
conditions.

In the case of the second problem situation,

the "transportation problem," the twenty items were designed
to fit into four categories

(cost, passenger utilization,

environmental-aesthetic, and sociological) of which only the
second (passenger utilization) was designed to be of salient

importance to solution of the problem in the "narrow scope"
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conditions
These two problem situations with their twenty information items were chosen from four situations accompanied
by

from forty to sixty-five information items each.

A pre-test

and item analysis of these led to the selection of the problem

situations and information items used in the experiment.

The

first of the additional instruments completed by subjects was
the Vannoy

(1965) modification of the Bieri

Cognitive complexity (which itself is

a

(1955)

test of

modification of

Kelly's (1955) Role Construct Repertory Test).

The Bieri

test is based on Kelly's theoretical formulations regarding
the existence of personal constructs in each individual.

An

individual's system of constructs was hypothesized to function
as the structure through which an individual perceived his

environment and is thus akin to the concept of cognitive

structure presented in Chapter III.

Bieri conceived of cog-

nitive complexity as the degree of differentiation in an in-

dividual's construct system and designed the test of cognitive

complexity to measure the extent to which persons used more or
fewer distinct dimensions to describe persons in their lives.

Presumably, the more similarity among descriptions of different persons by an individual, the less distinct the dimensions

being used and the less differentiated his construct system.
The Bieri test was selected as the measure of cognitive

complexity in this study for several reasons despite its being
based on only one of the three dimensions of cognitive structure
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(viz.

differentiation) identified in the conceptual
framework.
Chief among these reasons was that it is a
more easily
administered and scored test than others which are
,

available.

Also the theoretical assumptions underlying the
development of
the Bieri test are more similar to those presented
in Chapter
III

(wherein the nature of cognitive structures is discussed)

than any other test of cognitive complexity excepting the

Schroder Sentence Completion Test.

The Schroder test was not

used because its complex scoring procedures precluded its use
in the experimental design chosen for the study.

Bieri test, however inadequate as

a

Finally, the

measure of cognitive com-

plexity, was judged by Vannoy (1965) to be the best general

measure of cognitive compelxity of the twenty he analyzed because it seemed to tap to some degree all three of the major

components of complexity identified by Vannoy.
The other instrument used in the study was Budner's
(1962)

Intolerance of Ambiguity Test.

selected because it purports to measure

This instrument was
a

trait, tolerance of

ambiguity, which could be presumed to be similar to tolerance
of uncertainty, whose relationship to receptivity-adaptability

was of concern in this study.

The instrument was left essen-

tially unaltered with the exception that, to permit mechanical
scoring, the number of possible subject responses to each

statement on the test was reduced from six to five.
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Results

.

Hypothesis A:

As the scope of the problem
diminishes, the scope of
receptivity adopted by an

individual will decrease.

The most basic proposition discussed
in the theoretical

portion of this thesis and investigated in
its empirical
portion is the notion that individuals
significantly alter
their patterns of receptivity to information
as the conditions
of the problem situations they face change.
To the extent that
one factor contributing to information input
complexity is a
test of this basic notion the results of the study
give it

support.

Specifically, the results support the hypothesis that

a change in the problem’s scope,

one factor contributing to

information input complexity, is associated with

a

change in

an individual's scope of receptivity to information.

Table 5.4

presents the analysis of variance table pertaining to Hypothesis A.

The first column in Table 5.4 gives the variables and

their combinations included in this analysis of variance.
two of the table gives the data pertaining to Variable

scope of the problem.

P.

Line
the

As mentioned in the description of

the experiment given earlier, two levels or problem scope

were present in each problem:

problem scope.

broad problem scope and narrow

The variance attributable to the main effect

of this problem scope variable was significant at the .01

level of significance as shown in the sixth column of the
table.

The F-Test value for the main effect of the problem
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TABLE 5.4

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH INTOLERANCE OF
AMBIGUITY AS THE BETWEEN-SUBJECTS VARIABLE

Sources

Sum

of

Variance

l

Degrees

of

of

Squares

Mean
Square

Freedom

Expected
Mean
Square

F

Statistic

Relevant
Hypotheses

A

160.9

1

160.9

256.0

P

14716.8

1

14716.8

256.0

160.8*

A

T

11580.

1

11580.5

256.0

•157.9*

B

0.457

A X P

0.0

1

0.0

128.0

0.0

C

A X T

5.5

1

.5.5

128.0

0.1

C

P X T

2265.5

1

2265.5

128.0

5.5

1

5.5

21688.8

62

349.8

8.0

SP (A)

5680.

62

91.6

4.0

_

ST (A)

4522.9

62

72.9

4.0

_

SPT(A)

1168.9

X P X T
S (A)

KEY:

A
P

T

=
=
=

1819
^Significant at the
62

64

120.5*

A and B

0.3

.

_

_

-

2.0
.01

C

level.

Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity
Problem Scope
Time/Money Available

scope was 160.8 while the value required for significance with
one and sixty- two degrees of freedom is 7.08.

Further evidence of the study's support for Hypothesis

A is given when the mean subject score in the broad problem- scope

conditions are compared with the mean subject score in the narrow
problem- scope conditions.

Table 5.5 gives the cell means for both

variable.
the problem- scope variable and the time/money-available
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TABLE 5.5
CELL MEANS FOR THE PROBLEM- SCOPE AND
TIME/MONEY AVAILABLE VARIABLES

T

Narrow
Problem Scope

p

P

i

2

Row
Means
(T Main Effect)

i

Time/Money
Available
T

Broad
Problem Scope

(I)

(3)

29.19

(7)

35.70

32.44

2

Time/Money
Available

(2)

(4)

34.29

(8)

49.42

41.96

Column
Means
Main Effect)

(5)

(6)

31.84

42.56

Table 5.6 shows the results of using Tukey's BSD method
of multiple comparisons

(Tukey, 1951).

The Tukey test indicates

whether or not the difference between means is significant
and,
is

in addition to indicating the significance of main effects,

an aid to interpreting the significant interaction effects

between problem scope (Variable

P)

and time/money available

(Variable T)
The first column in Table 5.6 indicates which cell means
are being compared, for example, to determine whether the

difference between the mean score under narrow problem- scope
conditions and the mean score

under broad problem- scope con-

ditions is significant, the number five and number six cell
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TABLE

5

.

6

DIFFERENC:ES BETWEEN TREATMENT MEANS WITH
SIGNIFICANCE
DETERMINED BY TUKEY HSD METHOD OF MULTIPLE COMPARISONS

Cell
Comparisons
5-6

Effects

Problem Scope
Main Effect

7-8

T ime /Money

Differences
Between Means

Relevant
Hypotheses

10.72*

A

9.52*

B

Main Effect

Problem Scope

1-4.

20.23*

A

$

B

1.21

A

$

B

and
T ime/Money

Interaction
2-3

Problem Scope
and

Time/Money
Interaction
(Opposed)
1-3

Problem Scope
with
Ample
Time/Money

6.5*

A

2-4

Problem Scope
With
Limited
Time/Money

14.93*

A

1-2

Time/Money
With
Broad
Problem Scope

5.30

B

3-4

Time/Money
With
Narrow
Problem Scope

13.72*

B

Problem Scope
Compared to
Time/Money

1.50

-

1/2 (7 + 8)
1/ 2(5+6)

-

^'Significant at .01 level
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means from Table 5.5 are compared.

In this case the differ-

ence is significant and we can
conclude that the main effect
of problem scope upon scope of
receptivity was not a chance
occurrence.
This result thus supports Hypothesis
A.

Hypothesis B:

As the time and/or money available for problem completion
diminishes, the scope of receptivity adopted by an indi-

vidual will decrease.
As

m

the case of Hypothesis A, Hypothesis

B

was for-

mulated to investigate the validity of the
notion that changes
in problem situations will cause individuals
to alter
their

patterns of receptivity to information.

concerned

variable that affected the information input com-

a

plexity of

While Hypothesis A

a

problem situation, Hypothesis

B

concerns variables

which affect the arousal level of the individual in the problem situation.

The specific variables mentioned in Hypothe-

sis B are the time and the money available for problem solution.

As shown in the third line of Table 5.4 above, the ini-

tial analysis of variance did indicate that time/money avail-

able (Variable T) was a significant source of variance.
F

The

statistic for Variable T (time/money available) was 157.9,

while the

F

required for significance at .01 level was only 7.08.

As in the case of Hypothesis A, when the significance of

the main effect of time/money available (Variable T)

by comparing the appropriate cell means

(numbers

7

tested

is

and

8

in

Table 5.5) and subjecting them to the Tukey test, the results again support Hypothesis

B.

The difference between the
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mean score of subjects under the
limited time/money available conditions and their mean score
under the ample time/money
available conditions is 9.52, as shown
in the third column of
Table 5.6, while a difference of only
5.41 would
be

signi-

ficant at the .01 level.
As mentioned earlier, the Tukey test for
multiple com-

parison of means allows us to go beyond the data
given in the
initial analysis of variance which shows that the
main effects
of problem scope

ble T)

(Variable

P)

and time/money available (Varia-

and their interaction effect (see line

are significant.

6

of Table 5.4)

The nature of the interaction between these

two variables becomes more clear when we refer again to
the

results of the Tukey multiple comparison analysis presented
in Table 5.6.
As the third and fourth rows of the table show, the in-

teraction between problem scope and time/money available

complementary in nature.

is

That is, when the two variables

are both operating to decrease an individual's scope of re-

ceptivity, their combined effect
them operating singly (row

3

is

much greater than either of

of the table)

;

and when the two

variables are operating in opposition to one another their

interaction has the effect of cancelling each other out
(row

4

of the table)

This complementarity between problem scope and time/

money available is also shown by the comparisons presented in
rows 4, 5, 6, and seven of Table 5.6.

The fourth and fifth
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rows contain data suggesting that
the effect of problem scope
under conditions of limited time/money
available is much stronger than under conditions of ample
time/money available.

Simi-

larly, the sixth and seventh rows of
the table show that time/
money available has a significant effect
upon scope of re-

ceptivity when the problem scope is narrow,
but that the effect of
time/money available does not reach significance
when the problem scope is broad.
This last finding gives rise to an interesting
implication regarding the interaction effects of the two
variables

(problem scope and time/money available).

As argued in the

theoretical chapters of this dissertation, it is usually quite
functional foi an individual to decrease his scope of receptivity when either the problem scope or the availability of

time/money is decreased.

At first glance the complementarity

of these two variables when they interact would also seem to
be quite functional.

However, there are cases when this com-

plementarity may be disfunctional

.

For example, when problem

scope is broad it is probably more important for an individual
to be responsive to decreases in time/money available for prob-

lem solution than it is when the problem scope is narrow

.

Yet

this situation would call for the individual to respond to
the two variables in an inverse fashion resulting in the seventh

row of Table 5.6 showing
means.

a

significant difference between

This implication suggests that an individual with high

receptivity-adaptability would have to do more than just follow
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a

natural tendency to decrease his scope of receptivity
as

more and more variables individually change in
for a decrease in receptivity.
iiave

to consider what sort of

a

direction calling

Rather, the individual would
an.

interaction between the varia-

bles would result in the most appropriate pattern of recep-

tivity for that particular problem situation.
A final comparison made in Table 5.6 does not pertain

directly to either Hypothesis A or
passing interest.
sults of

a

B

,

but is nevertheless of

The eighth row in the table shows the re-

comparison between the effects of problem scope and

time/money availability.

Since the difference in means is

not significant, it suggests that neither of the two variables
is

significantly stronger than the other.
Hypothesis C:

Intolerance of uncertainty as
measured by the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Test is inversely related to intra- sub j ect
variation in scope of receptivity
across problem conditions.

Hypothesis D:

Cognitive complexity as measured
by the Bieri Test of Cognitive
Complexity is directly related
to intra- sub j ect variation in
scope of receptivity across
problem conditions.

The other two hypotheses investigated in this study con-

cerned the relationship of intra- sub j ect variance in scope of

receptivity across problem-situation conditions to subject
scores on the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Test (Hypothesis
C)

and the Bieri Test of Cognitive Complexity (Hypothesis

The data pertaining to Hypothesis

C

is

D)

.

contained in rows 4,5,

and

of Table 5.4 above.

7

The data pertaining to Hypothesis

D

essentially parallels that of Hypothesis

a

separate table, Table 5.7 below.

C but

is given in

TABLE 5.7

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH COGNITIVE
COMPLEXITY AS THE BETWEEN-SUBJECTS VARIABLE

Sources

Sum

of

of

Variance

Squares
20

C

.

Degrees

Mean
Square

Expected
Mean
Square

1

20.7

256.0

of

Freedom

F

Statistic

0.057

Relevant
Hypotheses

_

P

14716.8

1

14716.8

256.9

168.8*

A

T

11580.5

1

11580.5

256.0

159.0*

B

C X P

265.9

1

265.9

12 8.0

3.05

D

C X T

21.5

1

21.5

128

0.296

D

P X T

2265.5

1

2265.5

1.0

1

S(C)

21828.9

62

352.8

SP(C)

5414.6

62

ST (C)

4506.8

62

C X P X T

SPT(C)
*

KEY:

128.0

T

=

120.0

A and B

0.529

D

8.0

-

-

87.3

4.0

-

-

72.7

4.0

-

-

2.0

-

-

1

.

18.9
62
1173.4
Significant at the .01 level.
C =
P =

.

Bieri Cognitive Complexity
Problem Scope
Time/Money Available

64.0
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It is quickly apparent by looking
at the fourth,

fifth, and seventh rows of these two tables
that neither Hypothesis C nor Hypothesis D received any support
from the

study

s

results.

An F statistic of 7.08 was required for

significance and none of the interaction effects which
included
either intolerance of ambiguity (Variable A) or cognitive

complexity (Variable

C)

demonstrated even

toward reaching significance.

a

slight tendency

It should be remembered that it

was only the interaction of these two factors with the in-

dependent variables manipulated in the problem situations
(i.e., problem scope and time/money availability) which re-

late to the hypotheses since it was predicted that intra -

subject variatio n in scope of receptivity across conditions

would be related to intolerance of ambiguity and cognitive
complexity.

It was postulated that these two characteristics

would influence how much

a

subject responded to changes in

factors potentially contributing to his arousal level or
the information input complexity of the situation.
In the case of the Budner Intolerance of Ambiguity Test

(Hypothesis C) there are several possible interpretations of
the study's disappointing results.

It may be that Budner 's

test is an adequate measure of intolerance of uncertainty and

that the postulated relationship between this trait and

receptivity-adaptability does not exist.

It may be that the

Budner test is not an adequate measure of intolerance of un-

certainty on the other hand, which is

a

serious possibility
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since its choice was based only upon the
face validity of the
Budner test and the logical (not empirical)
relationship

between ambiguity and uncertainty rather than
upon any existing data.

Another, and more likely possibility, is that
because
the subjects were left to imagine the arousal
level they would

expei ience under the various conditions of the problem
sit-

uations, the effect of arousal level (expected to be exacerbated
by a high intolerance of uncertainty) upon subjects' patterns
of receptivity was insufficiently powerful.

This interpre-

tation gains some support from the observation that subiects

seemed to have been affected more by money as

buting to arousal than by time availability

2
.

a

factor contriIf this is

because a lack of money and its effects are more easily imagined
than

similar lack of time, an actual experiencing of factors

a

contributing to arousal level by the subjects would quite likely
have increased the possibility of a significant interaction

effect supporting Hypothesis C showing up in the results. In
other words, had the experimental design provided for

a

sufficiently strong means of inducing arousal, the postulated
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and recep-

tivity-adaptability might have shown up as

a

significant

interaction between intolerance of ambiguity and intra-subj ect

variation in scope of receptivity.
This result showed up in an unsystematic comparison of
Variable T effects in the two different problem situations.
2
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A final explanation of the failure of
the results to

give even minimal support to Hypothesis

concerns the dis-

C

m

cussion

Chapter IV of the shape of the curve describing
the
relationship between arousal and scope of receptivity
(see
pp

156-166).

Ihere it was argued that the curve describing
the
relationship is probably an inverted, U-shaped curve.

It was

also argued that some of the characteristics of
cognitive

structure that favor high receptivity-adaptability and

a

higher tolerance of uncertainty would tend to mitigate the
eff ects of arousal.

Ihis would steepen the sides of the curve,

making it less and less bell-shaped, for

a

subject with

a

greater tolerance of uncertainty but leave the major areas
under the two curves coinciding.

It

would be only in limited,

critical portions of the curves near either tail that significant differences between subjects would appear.

presents such curves for two hypothetical subjects.

Figure 5.8
Note that

the two subjects differ in their reactions to arousal only in

those portions of the curves near the tails and labelled
and ‘L’.

K
’

The significance of this occurrence is that the

arousal level induced by the problem situations would have to
fall into those limited critical regions of the arousal curve
in order for the effects of differences in tolerance of un-

certainty to manifest themselves as differences in scope of
receptivity.
jects,

It is quite possible that for most of the sub-

the act of imagining the arousal levels they would

experience in the different problem- si tuation conditions would
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FIGURE 5.8

TWO HYPOTHETICAL SUBJECTS' CHANGES IN
SCOPE OF
RECEPTIVITY AS A FUNCTION OF THEIR AROUSAL
LEVEL

KEY:

=
=

subject with high tolerance of
uncertainty
subject with low tolerance of
uncertainty

not result in an arousal level high enough or low enough to

put them in the critical areas near the tails of the curve

where inter- sub j ect differences would be greatest.

Conse-

quently, subject variability with regard to tolerance of

uncertainty was probably too small to be detected of

to be

of import.

With an eye toward such future research efforts, we should
now speculate as to why the relationship between the Bicii test

scores and the intra- sub j ect variability were not strong enough

206

to appear

m

the results.

One possible explanation is
essen-

tially the same as the last one discussed
above concerning the
Budner test: the manipulation of the arousal
- level
variable
(time/money available) was probably not strong
enough to bring
out significant differences in intra-subject
variability

attributable to inter- sub j ect differences in cognitive
complexity
.

A second possible explanation is based on the assumption
that cognitive complexity is probably a content- specif i

rather than

a

general trait.

c

trait

Assuming this is the case, and

recalling chat tne Bicri test was constructed only to measure
cognitive complexity in the area of social perception, we may

conjecture that the lack of overlap in areas of content (subparts of a cognitive structure) covered by the Bieri test and
the problem situations made stronger relationships unlikely.

This would occur if there were no consistent, positive re-

lationship between subjects' cognitive complexity in the areas
covered by the Bieri test and their cognitive complexity in
the areas

overed by the problem situations.

A third possible explanation of the lack of significant

interaction effects also concerns the construction of the
Bieri test.

As mentioned earlier

(pp.

188-190), Bieri conceived

of cognitive complexity in terms of the differentiation of

a

cognitive structure while the theoretical framework presented
in Chapter IV characterizes cognitive complexity as consisting

of the degree of differentiation and the degree of comprehen-
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siveness and the degree o£ integration of
the structure.
Thus the Bieri test purports to measure only

one of the three

characteristics of cognitive structure we have
hypothesized will
influence receptivity-adaptability. Although no
guesses were

made in Chapter IV as to which of these
characteristics is most
closely related to receptivity-adaptability, it is
not unlikely
that they have differential importance.
ejit

For example, differ-

iat ion of cognitive structures may correlate highly with
the

scope of receptivity individuals adopt under given problem-

situation conditions, but not correlate highly with adaptability
of scope of receptivity across conditions.

If this were the

case, and if integration of cognitive structures correlated highly

with both scope of receptivity and adaptability, the influence
of cognitive complexity would have been altogether lost in

this study since the analyses considered only the relation-

ship between differentiation (as measured by the Bieri test)
and adaptability (as measured by the intra-subject variation
in scope of receptivity.)

To alleviate this problem, future

research, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,

would have to measure cognitive complexity as
dimensional variable, rather than as
as

a

a

multi-

uni-dimensional variable

it was measured in this study.
In summarizing the study's results, we may say that the

data supports the notions that persons adapt their patterns of

receptivity to problem- situation characteristics, but the data
gives no support whatsoever to the notion that tolerance of
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uncertainty and receptivity-adaptability, or
cognitive
complexity and receptivity adaptability are
closely related,
although several plausible reasons for why these
relationships
could exist without appearing in the data can be
offered.

CHAPTER

VI

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
It

is customary and reasonable to conclude an empirically

oriented dissertation with

a

chapter devoted to the identifi-

cation of the implications the study has for further research
in that field or for applications in a closely related prac-

tical field.

My primary goal in this dissertation has been

to present the broad outlines of a theory regarding the de-

terminants of an individual’s receptivity to information, based
on a structuralist view of an individual's interaction with

his environment.

Only secondarily was my goal to take

a

first

step toward an investigation of the major hypotheses of which
the theory is composed.

The scope of the theoretical, or con-

ceptual framework outlined is broad.

By contrast,

the em-

pirical undertaking, that first step toward the investigation
of major hypotheses, is narrow.

As a consequence, the im-

plications of the theoretical portion of the dissertation
are broad, speculative, and pertain to suggested directions

that educational/psychological research and educational practice might take while the implications of the empirical study
are narrower and pertain to specific suggested research pro-

jects that might be undertaken.

This concluding chapter le-

flects this difference by dealing with implications in two

separate sections:

(1)

implications of the empirical study
209
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for further research;

and (2)

implications of the conceptual

framework for further research and for educational practice.
Implications of the Empirical Study
for Further Research
Two of the hypotheses investigated in the study received

strong support:

Hypothesis A:

As the scope of the problem diminishes, the scope of receptivity
adopted by an individual will

decrease

Hypothesis

B:

As the time and/or money available
for problem completion diminish,
the scope of receptivity adopted
by an individual will decrease.

Among the implications of these hypotheses

is

that in-

dividuals do adapt their patterns of receptivity to infor-

mation to changing problem situations.

A series of experi-

ments should be directed at discovering what the situational

characteristics are that influence these changes in receptivity,
and

a

parallel scries of experiments might be directed at dis-

covering what patterns of receptivity to information are most

appropriate to effective problem solving given defined sets
of situational characteristics.

The results of a successful

set of such experiments would be two-fold.

would be

a

The first result

greater knowledge of the problem-solving process

one including the information-gathering component.

The study

reported here assumed that two categories of situational

characteristics, those contributing to arousal level and to

information input complexity, are important influences upon
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the range of categories regarded as pertinent
during infor-

mation gathering.

One characteristic from each category,

time/money availability (arousal level factor) and problem
scope (information input complexity factor), was chosen to
test this assumption initially, and the results were strong

enough to suggest that further investigation of the effects
of these characteristics and others in the same categories

would be fruitful.
The second result of a series of experiments such as

that suggested above would be the establishment of

constructing

a

a

base for

means of measuring individual differences with

respect to the effect of specific situational characteristics

upon information-gathering aspects of problem solving.
is

It

likely that situational characteristics contributing to

arousal level and information input complexity probably have

significant differential effects on people and that these

differences would have import for other areas of investigation
into problem-solving processes.

A significant practical con-

cern worth investigating would be the implications of the

differential influences of these situational characteristics
upon persons taking allegedly "standardized” aptitude and

achievement tests; for example, what effect does time-availability have on different test-takers' scopes of receptivity.
The other two hypotheses investigated in this study

concerned possible sources of these individual differences.
Neither Hypothesis

3,

that subject intolerance of ambiguity
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as

measured by the Budner test

is

related to intra- subj ect

variation nor Hypothesis

4,

measured by the Bieri

related to intra-subject variation

is

in scope of receptivity,

that cognitive complexity as

received significant support.

These

results may suggest that the search for underlying differences
in human traits

influencing differences in receptivity-

adaptability should be broadened to include others besides
cognitive complexity and tolerance of uncertainty.

However,

the more important implications of these inconclusive results

may be methodological rather than theoretical.

On the one

hand, actual problem-solving situations with experimentor

control over factors that affect arousal levels may have to
be substituted for paper and pencil situations requiring sub-

jects to imagine the presence of these factors.

On the other

hand, perhaps the development of better instruments for mea-

suring tolerance of uncertainty and cognitive complexity

should precede any further attempts to link either of these
factors with individual differences in receptivity- adaptabil ity

More generally speaking, the most significant implication of the results of the empirical study is that recepti-

vity-adaptability

is

a

concept worth further investigation.

Implications of the Conceptual Framework

Implications for Future Research

.

In addition to the

research endeavors suggested in the previous section and on
pages

178 to

183 above which focus upon the relationships

between characteristics of cognitive structure and recept ivit>
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adaptability, the conceptual framework presented in
Chapter
IV suggests the importance of identifying and
investigating

possible sources of individual differences in characteristics
of cognitive structure.

Careful case studies of children

identified as being various "cognitive types" similar to the
studies conducted by Adorno

et_ al.

into the early home and

school environments of children could yield important insights into

environmental factors which are possible contributors to
differences in cognitive development.

Further, more precise

study of these factors could then be undertaken.

In parti-

cular, the thinking underlying the theory developed in Chapter V implies that the roles played by parents and early

teachers in controlling the child's exposure to uncertainty
and the consequences of such exposures may be crucial.

For

example, do highly authoritarian parents on the one hand reduce
a

child's exposure to uncertainty through tight control over

the behavior patterns he or she is allowed to engage in and
througli limiting in a constant way the environmental stimuli

to which the child is exposed?

hand foster

a

And might they on the other

low tolerance for uncertainty in the child

by meting out punishment when he or she departs from the

prescribed patterns of behavior (i.e., delves into uncertain
areas).

Similarly, could highly authoritarian parents en-

courage an over - dependence upon source-orientation and/or
at tit udinal -valence types of category accessibility rules?

Such might be the case if these parental types consistently

insisted that the child use the source and/or attitude valence
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of information as the criteria for accepting or
rejecting

information from the environment.
Implications of the Conceptual Fr-amework:
A

-

Implications for future research

.

In Chapters II

through „ IV two major conceptual themes were developed:

(1)

that receptivity to information is most appropriately descri-

bed as

a

dynamic process undergoing transformations as the

characteristics of the situations in which an individual
finds himself change, and (2) that the characteristics of an

individual's receptivity to information are linked to characteristics of his cognitive structure through the influences
of the latter on the individual's emotional or affective states

when confronted with uncertainty.

The implications of the

thinking upon which these two themes are based fall into three

broad research areas.

The first of these is an investigation

of the process involved in an individual’s selectively re-

ceiving information from his external environment and/or

stored in or generated by his mind.

A preliminary attempt

was made in the discussion of Chapter III

(pp

.

7

7f f

j

to identify

key components of patterns of receptivity to information

-

namely category accessibility rules of several types and
scope of receptivity.

This attempt to identify the critical

components of receptivity patterns serves only to highlight
the value a systematic investigation of this issue would have

for facilitating further exploration into individual dif-

ferences in receptivity to information.

The departure made

215

in the conceptual framework from
characterizing receptivity

only in terms in scope and degree of
openness to counteratt i tudinal information by introducing the
notion of cate-

goiy accessibility rules adds

a new,

and perhaps useful,

perspective to explorations into individual differences

in

receptivity
The conceptual framework also implies that future in-

vestigations into receptivity should lay

a

heavier stress

upon exploring the interaction of situational variables such
as time availability and information novelty with personality/

cognitive characteristics of individuals.

More specifically,

the conceptual framework recommends particular attention to

situational factors contributing to arousal and/or information
input complexity and their interaction with characteristics
of cognitive structure such as comprehensiveness, differentiation,

and integration with personality characteristics related to

tolerance of uncertainty (e.g., tolerance of ambiguity, manifest anxiety, degree of felt security, etc.).
One of the more intriguing notions discussed in the

conceptual framework (pp 105f f) was that of the difference
.

between positive, negative, and ambivalent arousal
influencing patterns of receptivity to information.

as

factors

Because

this is an extension beyond the usual treatment of arousal
as a single factor,

it also merits consideration as a topic

for future research into receptivity patterns and their de-

terminants

.
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A second research area for which the conceptual frame-

work has implications is the area of problem solving.

The

most obvious implication is that the information seeking/

processing aspect of problem solving needs to be studied
a

constantly changing process

witli

as

an attempt made to iden-

tify the different patterns of receptivity appropriate to

particular problem-solving phases (e.g., problem definition,
identification of alternative solutions, evaluating potential
consequences of a given situation, etc.) and to different

problem characterist ics (e.g., problem scope, problem complexity, solution verifiability, etc.).
In addition,

the conceptual framework supplies

ra-

a

tionale for following the lead of Schroder, Driver, and

Streufert (see pp

.

156 ff

)

in investigating the differential

effects of situational factors upon individuals during the

information gathering phases of problem solving.

Their cat-

egorization into factors contributing to potential information
input complexity and factors contributing to potential arousal
level provide two possible foci for such investigations.
A third research area for which the conceptual frame-

work suggests possible lines of exploration
cognitive development.

is

the area of

A sizeable portion of Chaptei

111

is

devoted to identifying and discussing characteristics of
cognitive structure and three of them (comprehensiveness,
imdifferentiation, and integration) selected as the most
particular
portant in determining the cognitive complexity of a
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individual.

This assumption needs

a

much more complete ex-

ploration than it has yet received

-

an exploration that first

attempts to define the role each plays in determining cog-

nitive complexity and then attempts to determine the nature
of their interrelationships.

The extensive discussion given each of these character-

istics in Chapter III

(see pp

.

60 ff)

implies that

a

fruitful

approach to their exploration might be based upon the notion
of a cognitive structure made up of categories which in turn

consist of the overlapping of the dimensions which define
them.

This notion of evaluative dimensions as the basic

building block of cognitive structure is attractive because
it

is

consistent with the essential multi-dimensional nature

of environmental phenomena and allows for the explanation of

differences in perception of

a

given phenomenon among dif-

ferent individuals.
In Chapter IV,

the discussion of cognitive structure

was expanded to a consideration of the process by which changes
The relationship

in a cognitive structure would take place.

between uncertainty, arising out of an individual’s encountering a situation the outcome of which he could not predict

because of incongruities between the situation and his cognitive structure, and arousal was cited as

a

crucial factor

would attempt
in determining whether or not an individual

cognitive restructuring.
if true,

This is

a

basic hypothesis, which

educational
could have significant implications for
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piactices

(

see section below)

further investigation.

and for this reason merits

On a broader scale, reasoning pre-

sented in the conceptual framework implies that future
invest

igat ions into the sources of individual differences in cog-

nitive complexity should give careful attention to the inter-

relationship between aspects of the environment pertaining to
an individual's cognitive functioning

(e.g., variety of

phenomena present, level of abstraction at which information
pertaining to phenomena are presented, the distinctness of
dimensions characterizing the phenomena, the sequence of

presentation of stimuli, etc.) and aspects pertaining to his
affective state (e.g., threat presented by failure to overcome uncertainty, security level associated with the environ-

ment, the potential for receiving positive outcomes as

a

result

of encountering uncertainty, etc.).

Implications for educational practice

.

Given the ab-

sence of significant experimental validation of most of the

conceptual framework presented in Chapter IV, all practical

implications derived from it must be tentative.

It should

also be noted that none of the implications for educational

practice discussed below are very novel since most of them

conform to practices currently based on

a

smattering of

learning theory and a sizeable store of intuition and "con-

ventional wisdom."

The implications are nevertheless presen-

ted because they help to reinforce presumably desireable

practices

-

to raise their priority

-

lest they be neglected
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for other practices also supported by intuition and "con-

ventional wisdom" but not by any systematic theory, however

untested
The most general implication contained in the conceptual

framework concerns the role uncertainty plays in motivating
attempts to make changes in cognitive structure resulting in

cognitive growth.

Following Berlyne’s notion of conceptual

conflict one can reason that uncertainty arises when an in-

dividual encounters an incongruity between environmental

phenomena and his representation of the environment
bodied in his cognitive structure.

as em-

Because the individual

cannot rely on the relationships represented in his cognitive

structure to predict the consequences likely to follow from
the occurence of incongruent phenomena, he has no means of

choosing actions on his part that will lead to optimum outcomes for him.

Consequently, the individual experiences

arousal, which, if negative he will wish to relieve and if

positive or ambivalent will be eager, to forgo in favor of
discovering and experiencing anticipated rewarding outcomes.
A significant means of alleviating negative arousal through

restoring predictability and removing uncertainty

is

for the

individual to engage in information-gathering behavior (in-

volving either externally available information or infor-

mation generated internally by directed thinking) and to use
cogthis information to make appropriate changes in one’s

nitive structure

-

changes that render it congruent with the
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environment and restore the ability to predict the conscpuences of events.

Applying this principle of motivation to educational
settings implies that

a

major role to be played by the ed-

ucator is that of arranging for his students to encounter

significant incongruities between their cognitive structures
and their environment, the latter being partially susceptible
to manipulation by the educator.

simply providing information to

It is apparent than,
a

that

learner, even when it is

accompanied by some extrinsic form of motivation to recall
the information or use it in the process of solving a problem,

may not be sufficient to motivate the learner to undertake

cognitive restructuring.

For the latter to occur, a significant

incongruity must be encountered.
Related to this implication for educational practice
is

one derived from the notion that an individual can choose

to deal with uncertainty either by attempting to overcome it

through cognitive restructuring or through isolating himself
from the environmental or internal stimuli that are the source
of the incongruity.

The assumption made in the conceptual

framework is that the former course of action will only be
chosen if the incongruity is of an optimal size (or the stimulus situation moderately novel according to Piaget). Recall
that optimal incongruity occurs when the incongruity

is

neither

are not difso small that the relevant cognitive categories

percei\e the
ferentiated enough to allow the individual to
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incongruity nor so large that the comprehensiveness and/or
integration of the individual's cognitive structure

is

in-

sufficient to allow him to perceive appropriate structural
changes

.

The application of this principal of optimal incon-

gruity to educational practice calls for the educator to be
both sufficiently familiar with each of his students' cog-

nitive structures and sufficiently concerned with getting

continuous feedback from his students to allow him to make

reasonably accurate judgements about what learning situations
would expose each student to optimal levels of incongruity.
The teacher's responsibility, then, is to insure that the

cognitive restructuring necessary to remove the incongruity
does not require excessive increases in comprehensiveness (the

formation of new cognitive categories), in differentiation
(the addition of new dimensions to existing categories)
in integration

,

or

(the recognition of dimensions held in common

by new or existing categories)

.

Phrased in more general

that the
terms, the principle of optimal incongruity implies

student
major concern of the educator must be to help the

development
make transitions from one level of cognitive
the student with
to another and should not be to confront
level of
situations which cater strictly to his present
level of cognitive
cognitive development or which presume a
of acheiving
development which the student is incapable

involved
because the cognitive restructuring

tensive

is too ex-
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In the conceptual framework the emphasis placed on the

existence of three interrelated characteristics of cognitive
structure (comprehensiveness, differentiation, and integration)
suggests yet another educational practice pertaining to

cognitive development.

This is quite simply that both cur-

riculum development and instructional activities must have
as their object the development of all three characteristics

of the cognitive structure.

Educators concerned only with

increasing comprehensiveness are wont to neglect two other
important cognitive capacities.

They may neglect the im-

portance of increasing students' capacities to make subtle

discriminations (i.e., they fail to increase the differentiation of their students' cognitive structures) or they may

neglect the importance of increasing their students' capacities to perceive relationships between diverse phenomena
(i.e., they fail to increase integration of their students'

cognitive structures)

Another implication that the conceptual framework
to inhas for educational practices pertains specifically

creasing problem-solving effectiveness.

This implication

given to helping students
is that much greater effort should be

processes indevelop the information selection/rejection

volved in problem solving.

Just as students can be taught

scientific method of
to apply important components of the
apply principles
so could students be taught to

investigation,

particular patterns of
relating to the appropriateness of
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receptivity to different problem-solving situations.

The

effectiveness of problem-solving efforts would be greatly
improved if individuals consciously select appropriate patterns
of receptivity, that is appropriate scopes of receptivity

and category accessibility rules, for the situations with

which they are dealing.

Currently most public school

curricula concerned with learning in the cognitive domain
focus upon the acquisition of knowledge contained within dis-

creet disciplines rather than focusing on the acquisition
of general intellectual skills such as the one just dis-

cussed.
’’real

The generalizability of public school learning to

life" situations could be noticeably enhanced by

curricula designed specifically to foster the growth of
this and other general intellectual skills.
In addition to educational implications which concern

learning in the cognitive domain, the conceptual framework
suggests some guidelines for educational practices pei

taining to the affective domain.

The first of these relates

directly to the preceding discussion regarding the development
the charof skill in matching one's receptivity pattern to

acteristics of the problem-solving situation (developing
high degree of receptivity- adaptability)
to be developed,

.

a

If this skill is

students must not only be able to make correct

category accjudgements about the scope of receptivity and

would also have an
essabil ity which should be adopted, they

underlying the
appreciation of the psychological dynamics
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adoption of particular patterns of receptivity by themselves
and others.

Committment to maintaining

a

perspective that

acknowledges the influences of situational factors which

contribute to information input complexity and arousal level
upon an individual's behavior would be necessary before he
could accurately assess the character of, and exert control
over, his patterns of receptivity.

Also pertinent to an educator's concern with the

affective development of students is the hypothesized role
an individual's tolerance of uncertainty plays in determining

his recept ivity-adaptability
'

.

The implication of this

hypothesis is that teachers should be highly concerned
with developing in their students an appropriate attitude

towards uncertainty.

On the one hand teachers should ex-

pose students to situations in which encountering uncertainty
leads to positive arousal, i.e., situations of uncertainty

wherein the students' anticipated CL a i t
their current comparison levels (CL)

's

are higher than

(see pp. 105

ff_

)

.

On

the other hand it requires that teachers provide situations
in which the students experience negative arousal

(their

anticipated CL a ^t's are lower than their CL's) but are successful in avoiding the anticipated adverse consequences of
the encounter with uncertainty by carrying out the cog-

nitive restructuring necessary to restore congruence between

environment and cognitive structure.

Repeated exposures

the students
to both of these types of situations would help

225

to build and/or maintain a higher tolerance of uncertainty

than if, as is often the case, the predominant outcome of
their encounters with uncertainty are negative arousal followed
by the experiencing of anticipated adverse consequences.

Finally, the importance of tolerance of uncertainty in

determining an individual's R-A profile also necessitates that
the teacher not exacerbate the consequences of a student's

unsuccessful attempts to overcome uncertainty by cognitive
restructuring.

This would mean providing encouragement and

support to the student when he is unsuccessful

-

encourage-

ment that helps the student continue to tolerate uncertainty
and continue to attempt to make appropriate changes in cog-

nitive structure, and support that will help him identify
the needed changes.

The hypotheses contained in the conceptual framework

also imply that school environments should possess partic-

ular characteristics.

Despite the important part

a

teachei

in
must play in providing students with optimal levels of

encongruity between their cognitive structures and their

pat coins
vironments, the realities of present school staffing

preclude

a

teacher's having adequate time to provide and

systematically monitor

a

sufficient number and variety of

development
learning situations to cater to the cognitive
ff)
If, as Piaget argues (see pp.92
needs of all students.
its environment those stimuli
a child will select from

optimally incongruent)
that are moderately novel (i.e.,

,
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it

would be reasonable to rely on an adequately planned but

relatively unmonitored total school environment to contain
a

broad range of stimuli capable of providing each child

enough encounters with optimal incongruity to supplement the

more carefully planned and monitored learning situations
arranged by teachers.

But for this to be the case, the school

environment must be diverse and constantly changing rather
than uniform and bound by strictures which prevent

a

broad

range of interactions between students and the events and

objects in their environments.

It must also facilitate

frequent and varied interactions between the teacher and in-

dividual students rather than constrain the teacher to "sub-

ject-centered" and total-class interactions with students.
Only in the former kind of environment does the teacher have
ample opportunity to assess the character of each student's

cognitive structure and motivate the student's cognitive

development through his contributing to

a

process in which

the student encounters optimal incongruity, seeks or generates

new information about the incongruent aspects of the environment, and then changes his cognitive structure to

bi ing

i,

back into congruence with the environment.
for uncerTo foster in students a degree of tolerance

development,
tainty sufficient to encourage continuing cognitive

predictability and
the school environment should have less
point of view than
appear less structured from the student's
schools now.
is typically the case in public

Highly structured
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schedules, spaces divided into isolated subparts, and rigid
rules governing behavior patterns are likely to militate

against students' encountering uncertainty.

uncertainty students do encounter

in

What limited

such an environment is often

the result of their subordination to the wishes of a series of

arbitrary authority figures and is likely to be associated

with negative arousal and therefore lower the students' tolerance for uncertainty.

Instead, schools should strive for an

atmosphere often punctuated with uncertainty and likely to
induce x^ositive arousal (excitement associated with an-

ticipated favorable consequences resulting from successful
attempts to overcome uncertainty)

.

Normat ively based evaluation

procedures which promote comparisons between students and the
labelling of some of their efforts to overcome uncertainty as "failures" or inadequate performances, are likely
to cause students to associate negative arousal with the en-

countering of uncertainty.

Evaluation procedures stressing

diagnosis of individual progress rather than genei al catcgoiization of student behaviors should be used if tolerance

uncertainty

is

oi

i

to be built.

From the teachers' perspective the school environment

should appear more structured, albeit in
it does

to the student.

a

flexible way, than

This must necessarily be the case

monitor individual
if the teacher is to be in a position to
factors in the
students' needs and systematically manipulate

development.
students' environments to foster cognitive

The
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structure should consist of clear objectives at an institutional
level toward which all teachers are working and of

a

well-

conceived set of curricula which provides

a

work within which teachers can function.

Thus, the character-

istics of a school environment derived from

flexible frame-

a

concern with

the major hypotheses developed in the conceptual framework

differentiate it from those found in "free schools" by
emphasizing the importance of

a

flexible structure, clear goal

orientation, careful monitoring of student progress toward
goals, and consistent and systematic manipulation of the en-

vironment to provide students with carefully chosen learning
situations.

And, other equally important characteristics

derived from the conceptual framework differentiate such an

environment from those found in "traditional schools" by
emphasizing ever-present variety, both planned and unplanned
change, individually oriented teacher- student interactions,

intellectual skills -oriented rather than "subject-oriented"
curricula, careful encouragement of efforts to cope with

uncertainty rather than adverse reactions to unsuccessful
attempts, de-emphasis of constraining spatial arrangements,

de-emphasis of constraining author ity- subordinate relationships,
and de-emphasis of rules governing behavior.
educational
The presumptuous nature of this last set of
the theoretical
implications underscores the motivation behind

and empirical tasks undertaken in this dissertation.

Nearly

equally tentative theoretical
all educational practice is based on
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notions or, more often, upon conventional wisdom that is
seven parts intuition, three parts experience, and

a

dash

Though grandiose, and consequently initially

of theory.

superficial, such efforts are needed to guide subsequent

research efforts which systematically address the task of
building

a

comprehensive theory of human psychological

development.

The results could have a profound impact

on education and possibly upon the human condition.

APPENDIX
Instruments Used in the Empirical Study

please read these directions carefully before beginning
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On the following pages are

eight

problem situations which are intended to

Investigate human problem-solving behavior.

Your task in each problem situation

ts to indicate the importance of different categories or elements of information

to your solving the problem.

For example, in solving the problem of where to buy

your clothes the following categories of information might be available to you:
1.

The relative expense of the clothes carried by the store.

2.

The styles and types of clothing carried by the store.

3.

The political party affiliation of the store's owner.

4.

The availability of credit at the store.

5.

How long the store has been doing business at its present address.

Your task would then be to indicate for each of the above categories of information
if you think it is:
(a)
(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

CRITICAL INFORMATION (i.e. you could not solve the problem adequately
without it)
IMPORTANT INFORMATION (i.e. you could solve the problem without this
information, but the solution would be much
easier and/or better if you have this in forma t ion)
RELEVANT INFORMATION (i.e. you could definitely solve the problem a
little more easily and/or better with this information)
POSSIBLY RELEVANT INFORMATION (i.e. you could possibly solve the problem
a little more easily and/or a little
better with this information)
IRRELEVANT INFORMATION (i.e. this information would be of no use to
you in solving the problem)

by
Your indication of the importance of the item of information should be made

separate
filling in the appropriate space opposite the category's number on the
sheet.

cr

sheet as
Your answers to the example given above might appear on the answer

follows

4

3

5

1

2

1.

II

©

I

II

2.

H

ill'

"

3.

II

I

II

"
$

II

ll

I)

|l

4.
5.

I

I

I

I

I

I|U *
I

Ml

I

I

11

situations, keep the following
When proceeding through the set of sixteen problem

points in mind

DIRECTIONS (continued)
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1.

Rend each problem carefully
Some of the problem situations appear
to be exactly like one another but in actuality differ slightly
(pay particular attention to underlined words and phrases).

2.

Treat each numbered problem separately and without regard to any of
For example
the other problems you have done no matLer how similar.
when doing problem I.V treat it as though you had not done problem II.

3.

Do the problems in the order in which they are presented. Do not
under any circumstances skip ahead to read or work on other problems
or go back to reconsider any problems you have already done.

4.

For

.

purposes of this experiment assume all the information given
in the problems is correct eventhough you may think or know it is
not accurate or true in reality.
tihe

Now please begin doing the problems.

I.
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SENATOR'S AIDE PROBLEM

You are an aide to a very prominent United States Senator who

lias

Been

legalizing
receiving heavy pressure from women's groups to write and sponsor a bill
task of compiling
abortions in the United States. The senator has assigned you the

arguments made by both
and summarizing all background material relevant to the
abortion nation-wide. The
those against and those favoring the legalization of
you write an unbiased
senator has asked that, whatever your feelings on the matter,
write and sponsor a bill to
summary that he can use to decide whether or not to
measures the bill should
legalize abortion, and, if so, to decide what specific
summary is not needed
This session of congress has just begun, so your
contain.
In
carry_mit^thej^^^
for several weeks giving you plenty of time to
information are potenyourself to the task the following elements of

addressing

tially available to you.

(Use information set A)

II.
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SENATOR'S AIDE PROBLEM

You are an aide to a very prominent United States Senator who has been

receiving heavy pressure from women's groups to write and sponsor
legalizing abortions in the United States.

a bill

The senator has assigned you the

task of compiling and summarizing all background material relevant to the

arguments made by both those against and those favoring the legalization of

abortion nation-wide.

The senator has asked that, whatever yotr feelings on

the matter, you write an unbiased summary that he can use to decide whether or

not to write and sponsor a bill to legalise abortion, and if so, to decide what

specific measures the bill should contain.

This session of congress has just

two weeks remaining, so the senator needs your report on his desk within the

next two days leav ing you very little time in which to complete the task

.

In carrying out the assignment the following elements of information are poten-

tially available to you.
(Use information set A)

III.

LAW CLERK PROBLEM
2

You are a law clerk for a Supreme Court Justice of the United Slates and
you have been assigned the task of compiling and summarizing all baiiground

material relevant to a Court Opinion the Justice must write.

The opinion

must justify the as--yet-unannounced decision of the Court to strike down

Montana state law prohibiting abortions.

a

Whether you agree or not with the

Court's decision, your task is to supply the Justice with mater ia l which can
be

i nclu d ed

in the legal rat i onale for the Cou rt's ruling the Montan a abortion

law unconstitutional

Because the Court is presently hearing another case

.

and will not be announcing its ruling for several months, you have ample time
to complete

t he

In addressing yourself to the task the following

ta sk.

categories of information are potentially available to you:

.

(Use information set A)

IV.

LAW CLERK PROBLEM

You are a law clerk for a Supreme Court Justice of the United Stutes
and you have been assigned the task of compiling and summarizing all back-

ground material relevant to a Court Opinion the Justice must write.

The

opinion must justify the as-yet-unannounced decision of the Court to strike
down a Montana state

lav;

prohibiting abortions.

Whether you agree or not

with the Court’s decision, your task is to sup ply the Justice with ma t erial

which can be included in the legal rationale for the Court’s
Montana abortion law unconstitutional

.

ruling,

t he

Because the Court wishes to announce

the decision shortly, you have only two days in which to complete the task

and get the summary on the Justice’s desk.

In carrying out the task the

following categories of information are potentially available to you:

(Use information set A)

,

IX.

URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM

Tin-,

>

now mayor o

c ompruhcn s

1'

237

Vancouver, British Columbia has just hiied

ive study of possible s ol u Lions

transportation problems

.

He has chosen you,

}

o Vancouver's
a

y*‘i

n ipldjy

!<»

.1

i

rc««:l

£r« \w nji
i

general Lst without specialized

because he wants a
knowledge of transportation systems, to direct the study
unbiased manner many possible
final report from the study that reviews in an
streets. You have been
approaches to solving the problem of overcrowded city
the study and you are expected
given three years and a large budget for conducting
used as the basis for both selecting a
to produce a final report that can be
problems and guiding the implelongterm solution to Vancouver’s transportation

mentation of the chosen solution.
of the transportation study
All you know about Vancouver at the outset
the
suffering from almost total dependence on
is that it is a typical big city
serving the city and the surrounding
automobile as a form of transportation

suburban and rural region.

of information
You must now identify what categories

compile in
systems you think the study should
about different transportation
following
report desired by the mayor. The
order to produce the kind of final

potentially available to you:
categories of information are
(Use information set C)

X.

URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
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direct
The new mayor of Vancouver, British Columbia has just hired you to
rowing
Vancouver's rap yd
a comprehensive study of possible solutions to
He has chosen you, a generalist without specialized
transportation problems
.

knowledge of transportation systems, to direct

the.

study because he wants a

manner many possible
final report from the study that reviews in an unbiased
You have been
approaches to solving the problem of overcrowded city streets.
the study and you
given only six weeks and a very small budget for conducting
be used as the basis for both
are expected to produce a final report that can
transportation problems and guiding
selecting a longterm solution to Vancouver’s
the implementation of the chosen solution.

that

of the transportation study is
All you know about Vancouver at the outset
almost total dependence on the
it is a typical big city suffering from

the city and the surrounding
automobile as a form of transportation serving
identify what categories of information
suburban and rural region. You must now

you think the study should compile in
about different transportation systems
following
report desired by the mayor. The
order to produce the kind of final
available to you:
categories of information are potentially
(Use information set C)

URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
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The new mayor of Vancouver, British Columbia is intent upon solving the

problem of overcrowding and congestion on Vancouver's freeways and cit\
The Canadian Federal Government

lias

offered to pay the bill for

a

streets.

full-scale

study of Vancouver's transportation problems and to provide money to cover
50% of the cost of implementing a longterm solution if one condition is met.

That one condition is that the new mayor prove by means of

a

small-scale pilot

project that the automobile commuters and taxi users living in and around

Vancouver will abandon their cars for some alternative means of transportation.
The mayor has hired you to direct

a

study of possible transportation systems

to i de ntify a system that would be the most likely to attract drivers away
f rom

a

t h eir

cars

.

The study's final report will be used by the mayor for choosi

transportation system to be used in the pilot project and also for guiding

the implementation of the pilot project.

All you know about Vancouver at the outset of the transportation study
is that it is a typical big city suffering from almost total dependence on the

automobile as the form of transportation serving the city and the surrounding
suburban and rural area.

You must now identify what categories of information

about different transportation systems you think the study should compile in

order to produce the kind of final report desired by the mayor,
you tw o yea rs a nd a generous budget to accomplish the task

.

categories of information are potentially available to you:

(Use information set C)

lie

has given

The following

XII.

URBAN TRANSPORTATION PROBLEM
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The new mayor of Vancouver, British Columbia is intent upon solving the

problem of overcrowding and congestion on Vancouver's freeways and city streets.
The Canadian Federal Government has offered to pay the bill for

a

full-scale

study of Vancouver's transportation problems and to provide money to cover 50%
of the cost of implementing a longterm solution if one condition is met.

That

one condition is that the new mayor prove by means of a small-scale pilot pro-

ject that the automobile commuters and taxi users living in and around Vancouver
will abandon their cars for some alternative means of transportation. The

mayor has hired you to direct a study of possible transportation systems to
iden tify a syste m that would be the most likely to attract drivers away from
their cars. The study's final report will be used by the mayor for choosing
a

transportation system to be used in the pilot project

and also for guiding

the implementation of the pilot project.

All you know about Vancouver

at.

the outset of the transportation study is

total dependence on the
that it is a typical big city suffering from almost
and the surrounding
automobile as the form of transportation serving the city

suburban and rural area.

You must now identify what categories of information

the study should compile in
about different transportation systems you think
desired by the mayor. He has given
order to produce the kind of final report

you only

task.
weeks and a very small budget to accomplish the
to you:
of information are potentially available

s ix

categories

(Use information set C)

The following

INFORMATION SET A

1
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Statistics compiled by the University of Indiana comparing the
number of upperand middle-class women who had secured legal abortions in
the United States avid
abroad to the number of lower-class and poverty-level women
who were able to
secure legal abortions in the United States and abroad.

.

A ruling by the South Dakota State Supreme Court that the state’s
law prohibiting
abortion violated the state constitution's guarantees of individual freedom
and
instructing the State Legislature that any law restricting a woman's action with
respect to her own physical person (excepting actions which contribute directly
to the immorality of others or to the physical detriment of her person)
is prohibited by the state's constitution.

2

.

3

.

4

.

A treatise written by the president of Zero Population
Growth arguing that abortion
and other means of birth control must be allowed if the earth
is to be saved from
world-wide famine caused by over-population.

A depaitment of Health, Education, and Welfare study purporting to substantiate
the relationship between the incidence of unwanted children and the socio-economic
level of the parents.

5

6

8

9

.

10

.

.

12 .

13

.

14 .

A recent issue of the Harvar d Law Revl ew reviewing decisions made by state and
federal courts regarding state abortion laws.

A column by a nationally syndicated journalist arguing that abortion as an issue
should be dealt with at the state rather that at the national level to prevent
its becoming a national political issue that could cause an unhealthy schism
along religious lines in the upcoming national elections.

.

7

11

.

.

.

The testimony of the president of the National Association of Adoption Agencies
and Child Placement Services that there is an immense demand among childless
couples for adoptable children and that liberalized abortion laws are the major
contributor to this condition because they have drastically reduced the number
of illegitimate children put up for adoption.
A psychotherapist's testimony before a state legislature committee that serious
neuroses can be caused by the guilt often experienced by women who have had
abortions.
moral justification
A prominent Protestant theologian's contention that there is no
regarding abortion
for a society's taking from a woman the right to make decisions
according to the dictates of her own conscience.

A national poll on the question:
abortion laws in this country?"

"Do you favor the liberalization or repeal of

rate in the United States lias
Census Bureau st atistics that show that the birth
growth in the last five years.
decreased nearly to the point of zero population

Association that four of every five
Statistics compiled by the American Medical
result in death or permanent injur,
illegal abortions not performed by a doctor
was performed.
to the woman upon whom the abortion
immoral
arguments concerning why abortion rs
A respected English philosopher's
existence.
and an affront to the dignity of human
several
detailing legal arguments for why
An American Civil Liberties Union tract
obtain
to
the civil rights of women
of the Constitution's ammendments protect

^

15

.

4

A

A research article by a noted social scientist which describes the results of
over-population in communities of rats as leading to a complete breakdown of
social order in the rat communities, abnormally high intra-species aggression,
and severe distortions of normal patterns of rat sexual behavior. The article
concludes that excessive human population densities would probably lead to

similar social disruptions.
16.

A statement by the President of the United States that he did not believe any
branch of the Federal Government should take a position on the issue of abortion,
but that it should be left to the individual states to decide upon,

17

A Yale Law Review article authored by a noted "strict constructionist" which
argues that the Supreme Court must exercise caution and restraint in interpreting the civil rights and individual freedoms sections of the Constitution or the
Court will destroy the distinction between the legislative functions of Congress
and the judicial responsibilities of the Federal Courts.

.

18.

A set of volumes containing arguments and opinions made by the Supreme Court
since its founding in 1789.

19.

An impassioned letter written from a physician serving a prison term for performing
an illegal abortion who is urging the passage of a liberalized abortion law in
California that would remove that state’s physicians from the untenable position
break the law or having to refuse to perform operations which
of either having to
they believe are critical to the physical and psychological well-being of their
patients

20.

A report by a presidential commission recommending the distribution of information about birth control and the availability of legal abortions as part of
comprehensive government effort to plan and control population growth in the
United States.

a
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and
To what extent the system will disrupt present pedestrian, automobile,
bus routes.

^

2

downtown area
How the system will affect the street-level aesthetics of the
of the city.

.

3.

in various
What effect the system will have on the incidence of crime
routes.
transportation
major
locations within the city including along its

4.

will be.
How aesthetically attractive the system's vehicles

5.

construction of the system.
How many jobs are likely to be created by the

6.

of different socio-econonuc
How the system will affect the housing patterns
groups

7.

growth or decay of retail businesses
How the system is likely to influence the
along its routes.

8

expected to have on future patterns of
What influences the system can be
population density in and around the city.

9.

will prove disturbing to private
How likely the noise level of the system
residents, schools, hospitals, etc.
will be for passengers during rush
How quiet and comfortable the system
hour periods.
the degr,ee to which new building
HOW the system is likely to influence
older burldings.
construction in the city will replace

10.

11

H/»v

12

i»

win

tabs

t rj

actually put the system into operation.

-n

of the system will require reTo what extent construction and operation
surrounding areas.
location of inhabitants of the city and

14 .

affect the presently available
how the operation of the system will
dependent.
sources of energy upon which the city is

,r
15
’

16.

17.
X8 .

19
*

20.

while they
will allow passengers to engage in
what activities the system
y
television, playing
Sfbe^g transported (e.g. reading, eating, watching
cards, betting on horses, etc.)
public
itself to use as a means of raising
To what extent the system lends
space.
revenue through the sale of advertising
physical beauty.
city's prominent features of
How the system will affect the

transport packages,
the users of the system to
How convenient it will be for
luggage, and other objects.
in neighborhood
Influence community participation
How the system Is likely to
entertainment events.
vs. City-wide cultural and

habitats of local wildlife.
How the system will affect the
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Ihe persons described below represent specific
individuals that vou know
personally.
In each of the numbered spaces at the
top of the grid on the following
page, write the first name or initial of the
person who is correspondingly numbered
below on this page. For example, in space 1 at the top
of the grid write your name
or initials, etc.
Do not repeat any names. If a person is already
listed, select n
second choice.
(1)

Yourself.

(?)

A person you dislike (or have disliked)

(3)

Your mother (or person most like a mother)

(4)

A person you know whom you would like to help.

(5)

Your father (or person most like a father)

(6)

Closest friend of the same sex.

(7)

Closest friend of the opposite sex (or spouse)

(8)

A person with whom you feel most comfortable.

(9)

A boss you had on a previous job.

(10)

A person you know who is difficult to understand.

You will notice on the page containing the grid that there are are ten pairs
of traits along the right side of the grid.

Starting with the first pair (shy-outgoing'

you are to decide for each person you have listed which half of the pair, "shv" or

"outgoing", best describes him.

If a person is better described by the trait "shy"

write in the box under his name an "L".

However, if

a

person is better described by

the trait "outgoing", write in the box under his name an "R".

"L" means that vou

think the person is better described by the trait on the left, and "R" means that

he is best described by the trait on the right.

After you have rated all ten indi-

viduals on the first pair of traits, repeat the process for the next pair (adjustedmaladjusted) and so on until you have rated every person on all the pairs of traits.
Be sure to rate all persons listed on each pair of traits before proceeding to the next

pair of trai ts.

When you are finished, there should be a rating in each box.

leave any boxes blank.

Do not
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We would like to have your opinion on a variety of tonics.

The following

are statements with which some people agree and others disagree.

each one on the answer sheet (numbers

1

Please mark

through 16), according to the amount

below:
of your agreement or disagreement, by following the scale

Strongly agree

4.

Slightly disagree

2.

Moderately agree

5.

Moderately disagree

3.

Slightly agree

6.

Strongly disagree

1

.

your way of looking at things.
A good teacher is one who makes you wonder about

1.

a chance for one

2.

give
Teachers or supervisors who hand out vague assignments
to show initiative and originality.

3.

People who insist upon
things really are.

4.

definite answer probably doesn’t know
An expert who doesn’t come up with a
too much.

a

yes or no answer just don’t know how complicated

are based upon insufficient information.
Many of our most important decisions

5.

more than ones where all or
parties where I know most of the people
strangers.
most of the people are complete
I like

6.

solve a simple one.
a complicated problem than to
It is more fun to tackle

7.
8

unexpected
regular life in which few surprises or
A person who leads an even,
to be grateful for.
happenings arise, really has a lot

9

small, simple
possible to get more done by tackling
In the long run it is
complicated ones.
problems rather than large and

10.
16.

most of the iov of
a schedule probably miss
People who fit their lives to
of living.

u.

I

12'.

better.
similar values and ideals the
The sooner we all acquire

13.
14.

15

.

country for awhile.
would like to live in a foreign

can't be solved.
thing as a problem that
There is really no such
how lL
what is to he done and
A good job is one where
always clear

who don’t mind
stimulating people are those
and
interesting
often the most
original.
being different and
what is unfamiliar.
always preferable
What we are used to is
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